Human capital in a global and knowledge-based economy. Part 2. Asssessment at the EU country level by Fuente, Ángel de la et al.
1H
u
m
an
 cap
ital in
 a glob
al an
d
 k
n
ow
led
ge-b
ased
 econ
om
y,
p
art II: assessm
en
t at th
e E
U
 cou
n
try level
FIN
A
L
 R
E
P
O
R
T
A
n
gel d
e la Fu
en
te*
In
stitu
to d
e A
n
álisis E
con
óm
ico (C
S
IC
)
A
p
ril 2003
A
b
stract
T
his rep
ort is an extension and
 p
artial u
p
d
ate of d
e la Fu
ente and
 C
iccone (2002). It
constru
cts estim
ates of the p
rivate and
 social rates of retu
rn on schooling for fou
rteen E
U
cou
ntries u
sing m
icroeconom
etric estim
ates of M
incerian w
age equ
ations, the resu
lts of cross-
cou
ntry grow
th regressions and
 O
E
C
D
 d
ata on ed
u
cational exp
end
itu
res, tax rates and
 social
benefits. T
he resu
lts are u
sed
 to d
raw
 som
e tentative conclu
sions regard
ing the op
tim
ality of
observed
 investm
ent patterns and
 ed
u
cational su
bsid
y levels.
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T
his d
ocu
m
ent is an extension and
 p
artial u
p
d
ate of a p
reviou
s rep
ort on the role of
investm
ent in hu
m
an capital as part of a grow
th-prom
oting strategy (d
e la Fu
ente and
 C
iccone
(D
&
C
), 2002). Its focu
s is narrow
er than that of the earlier stu
d
y. It concentrates on the
m
easu
rem
ent of the econom
ic retu
rns to schooling in the m
em
ber cou
ntries of the E
u
rop
ean
U
nion, both from
 a p
rivate and
 from
 a social p
ersp
ective. It also attem
p
ts to d
raw
 som
e
conclu
sions regard
ing the ad
equ
acy of observed
 aggregate investm
ent p
atterns and
 of p
rivate
incentives for investing in ed
u
cation from
 a com
p
arison of the estim
ated
 p
rivate and
 social
rates of retu
rn to schooling w
ith each other and
 w
ith those available on alternative assets.
T
he results obtained
 in this stud
y tend
 to confirm
 and
 strengthen the m
ain conclusion of our
p
reviou
s rep
ort (D
&
C
, 2002). I find
, in p
articu
lar, that i) ed
u
cational attainm
ent is a key
d
eterm
inant of ind
ivid
u
al earnings and
 aggregate p
rod
u
ctivity and
 has a significant effect on
labou
r m
arket ou
tcom
es and
 ii) that hu
m
an cap
ital ap
p
ears as an attractive investm
ent
relative to alternative assets, both from
 the ind
ivid
u
al and
 from
 the aggregate p
ersp
ectives.
M
ethodology
I calcu
late the p
rivate and
 social rates of retu
rn to ed
u
cation as the d
iscou
nt rates that
equ
ate the p
resent valu
e of the increm
ental cost and
 incom
e stream
s generated
 by a m
arginal
increase in the schooling of a rep
resentative ind
ivid
u
al for each cou
ntry to w
hom
 I attribu
te
the observed
 average levels of attainm
ent and
 either w
ages or p
rod
u
ctivity. T
o qu
antify the
contribu
tion of schooling to ind
ivid
u
al w
ages and
 to aggregate prod
u
ctivity levels and
 grow
th
rates, I u
se m
icroeconom
etric estim
ates of M
incerian w
age equ
ations for E
U
 cou
ntries and
 the
results of cross-country grow
th regressions d
raw
n from
 the literature.
W
h
ile th
ese calcu
lation
s w
ere carried
 ou
t in
 D
&
C
 (2002) on
ly for th
e case of a
hyp
othetical average E
U
 cou
ntry, the p
resent rep
ort extend
s the analysis to ind
ivid
u
al
m
em
ber states and
 introd
u
ces several refinem
ents relative to the p
reviou
s stu
d
y. E
stim
ates of
the relevant rates of return are constructed
 for all current m
em
bers of the E
uropean U
nion w
ith
the excep
tion of L
u
xem
bou
rg (for w
hich m
u
ch of the requ
ired
 d
ata are u
navailable). T
he
m
od
el has also been extend
ed
 to take into accou
nt the p
ositive effects of ed
u
cation on
em
p
loym
ent and
 the im
p
act of taxes and
 social p
olicies on the p
rivate retu
rn to schooling.
T
hese extensions have m
ad
e it p
ossible to d
raw
 on tax and
 benefit ind
icators p
rovid
ed
 by the
O
EC
D
 and on recent Labour Force Survey data from
 Eurostat to construct a m
ore com
prehensive
m
easu
re of the econom
ic benefits of ed
u
cation than the one p
rovid
ed
 in D
&
C
 (2002), and
 to
u
nd
ertake a d
etailed
 analysis of the im
p
act of p
ersonal taxes, u
nem
p
loym
ent benefits and
ed
u
cational su
bsid
ies on the private incentive to invest in ed
u
cation.
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Social returns to schooling and physical capital and the optim
al investm
ent pattern
D
raw
ing on recent resu
lts in the literatu
re, I estim
ate that an ad
d
itional year of average
school attainm
ent raises p
rod
u
ctivity in the average E
U
 cou
ntry by 6.2%
 on im
p
act and
 by a
fu
rther 3.1%
 in the long ru
n throu
gh its contribu
tion to faster technological p
rogress. T
he first
of these effects is consid
erably higher in the cohesion cou
ntries and
 in Italy, reaching 9.2%
 in
the case of P
ortu
gal, and
 d
rop
s to arou
nd
 5%
 in the Scand
inavian and
 G
erm
an-sp
eaking
countries.
T
he social rate of retu
rn to schooling reflects, in ad
d
ition to these p
rod
u
ctivity effects, the
increase in p
articip
ation and
 em
p
loym
ent rates ind
u
ced
 by a m
arginal increase in attainm
ent
and
 the d
irect and
 opportu
nity costs of school attend
ace born d
irectly by ind
ivid
u
als or by the
p
u
blic sector. M
y estim
ates of this rate of retu
rn for the E
U
 cou
ntries range from
 8.3%
 in
Finland
 to 11.5%
 in P
ortu
gal, w
ith an average valu
e of 9.7%
. For all the cou
ntries in the
sam
p
le, the social retu
rn on hu
m
an cap
ital ap
p
ears to be higher than the retu
rn on p
hysical
cap
ital, su
ggesting that a m
arginal reallocation of investm
ent resou
rces in favou
r of ed
u
cation
w
ou
ld
 be socially d
esirable. T
he social p
rem
iu
m
 on hu
m
an cap
ital, d
efined
 as the d
ifference
betw
een the estim
ated
 rates of retu
rn on hu
m
an and
 p
hysical cap
ital, varies across m
em
ber
states reflecting the relative end
ow
m
ents of p
rod
u
ction factors and
 ap
p
ears to be largest in
Finland
, Italy, D
enm
ark, G
reece, the N
etherland
s, Sp
ain and
 Ireland
, and
 sm
allest in the
U
K
, A
u
stria, France, B
elgiu
m
 and
 P
ortu
gal.
P
rivate returns to schooling and the incentive to invest in education
T
he p
rivate rate of retu
rn to schooling m
easu
res the financial retu
rns to a m
arginal
in
crease in
 attain
m
en
t th
at are available to in
d
ivid
u
als, takin
g in
to accou
n
t on
ly th
e
p
rivately born costs of ed
u
cation and
 the exp
ected
 increase in net incom
e after p
ersonal taxes
and
 social benefits. E
stim
ated
 p
rivate retu
rns clu
ster betw
een 8%
 and
 10%
 for m
ost E
u
rop
ean
cou
ntries. T
he highest retu
rns corresp
ond
 to the U
K
 and
 P
ortu
gal, follow
ed
 by A
u
stria,
G
erm
any and
 Ireland
, and
 the low
est ones to Sw
ed
en, w
hich is a clear ou
tlier at the bottom
 of
the d
istribu
tion.
V
ariou
s p
u
blic p
olicies have a significant im
p
act on the p
rivate retu
rn to schooling. O
n
average, d
irect su
bsid
ies to ed
u
cation raise p
rivate retu
rns by arou
nd
 a third
 w
hile p
ersonal
taxes and
 social benefits red
u
ce them
 by 10%
 and
 8%
 resp
ectively. In m
ost cou
ntries, the
com
bined
 effect of all these policies is a net su
bsid
y to ed
u
cation. T
his su
bsid
y exceed
s 30%
 in
Sw
ed
en, P
ortu
gal and
 D
enm
ark and
 has an average valu
e of 10%
 in the entire sam
p
le. T
he
only cou
ntries w
here the net tax on schooling is p
ositive (for an ind
ivid
u
al earning the w
age
of the average p
rod
u
ction w
orker) are Ireland
 and
 G
erm
any, w
ith effective tax rates of 15%
and
 4%
 resp
ectively.
A
t the ind
ivid
u
al level, schooling seem
s to be a m
ore attractive investm
ent than the
fin
an
cial assets available to h
ou
seh
old
s. T
akin
g as a referen
ce a balan
ced
 p
ortfolio of
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orate shares and
 governm
ent bond
s, the p
rivate p
rem
iu
m
 on hu
m
an cap
ital ranges from
2.11%
 in Sw
ed
en to 9.87%
 in the U
K
 w
ith a m
ean valu
e of 5.72%
. For m
ost cou
ntries, the
p
rivate p
rem
iu
m
 on schooling has the sam
e sign as the social one and
 is significantly larger,
su
ggesting that the com
bination of m
arket forces and
 existing su
bsid
ies alread
y provid
es m
ore
than su
fficient financial incentives for ind
ivid
u
als to m
od
ify their investm
ent p
atterns in
w
ays that are consistent w
ith social need
s. T
he only excep
tion ap
p
ear to be the Scand
inavian
cou
ntries, w
here slightly larger su
bsid
ies m
ay be requ
ired
 to fu
lly offset the d
isincentives
created
 by rath
er flat p
ayscales th
ay m
ay n
ot ad
equ
ately cap
tu
re ed
u
cation
-in
d
u
ced
p
rod
u
ctivity gains.
P
olicy 
im
plication
s
A
lthou
gh consid
erable cau
tion is need
ed
 for a nu
m
ber of technical reasons that are
d
iscu
ssed
 in d
etail in the rep
ort, I believe the resu
lts I have ju
st su
m
m
arized
 p
rovid
e a
reasonable assessm
ent, given ou
r cu
rrent state of know
led
ge, of the p
rivate and
 social retu
rns
to investm
ent in hu
m
an cap
ital. T
hese resu
lts also reinforce the tw
o m
ain p
olicy conclu
sions
d
raw
n in D
&
C
 (2002): First, that a m
od
est increase in ed
u
cational investm
ent w
ou
ld
 alm
ost
certainly be beneficial from
 a social p
oint of view
 in all E
U
 cou
ntries. A
nd
 second
, that an
increase in general su
bsid
ies for post-com
pu
lsory schooling w
ou
ld
 probably not be requ
ired
 to
achieve this goal in m
ost E
u
ropean cou
ntries.
T
he first of these conclu
sions follow
s essentially from
 a com
p
arison betw
een the estim
ated
social rates of retu
rn on p
hysical and
 hu
m
an cap
ital. M
y resu
lts su
ggest that the econom
ic
retu
rns to schooling investm
ent are at least com
p
arable to, and
 very likely significantly
h
igh
er th
an
, th
ose available from
 in
vestm
en
t in
 p
h
ysical cap
ital. W
h
en
 a reason
able
allow
ance is m
ad
e for the non-m
arket retu
rns to ed
u
cation and
 for its benefits for social
cohesion and
 for ind
ivid
u
al d
evelop
m
ent, hu
m
an cap
ital ap
p
ears as a rather attractive
investm
ent alternative from
 a social p
oint of view
 for all the cou
ntries in the sam
p
le.
It m
u
st be kep
t in m
ind
, how
ever, that the d
ata u
nd
erlying m
y social retu
rn calcu
lations
refer to 1990, and
 that m
u
ch of the requ
ired
 investm
ent in ed
u
cation is p
robably u
nd
er w
ay
alread
y, as schooling levels for you
ng cohorts are consid
erably higher than p
op
u
lation
averages in all E
U
 cou
ntries. H
ence, average attainm
ent w
ill rise sharp
ly in the near fu
tu
re
even w
ithou
t any changes in cu
rrent p
olicies. W
hile it is im
p
ossible to know
 at this stage
w
h
eth
er th
e social p
rem
iu
m
 on
 h
u
m
an
 cap
ital w
ill rem
ain
 p
ositive in
 th
e fu
tu
re, th
e
acceleration of the p
ace of technological change in recent d
ecad
es and
 the secu
lar trend
tow
ard
s an increasingly know
led
ge-intensive econom
y d
o m
ake it likely that hu
m
an cap
ital
w
ill con
tin
u
e to be a strategic p
rod
u
ction
 factor, an
d
 h
en
ce an
 attractive in
vestm
en
t
alternative, in the foreseeable fu
tu
re.
Strictly sp
eaking, all the resu
lts obtained
 in this rep
ort refer to the retu
rns to a m
arginal
increase in the quantity of ed
u
cation as m
easu
red
 by average years of school attainm
ent.
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T
here is still consid
erable room
 for im
p
rovem
ent in this area, p
articu
larly in som
e of the
poorer countries and
 regions of the U
nion, w
here enrollm
ent in upper second
ary training is still
far from
 u
niversal and
 tertiary accession rates rem
ain relatively low
. B
u
t there can be little
d
ou
bt that in the long ru
n the m
ore relevant p
olicy m
argin has to d
o w
ith the qu
ality of
ed
u
cation, rather than w
ith its qu
antity, as w
e m
u
st eventu
ally ru
n into sharp
ly d
im
inishing
retu
rns to fu
ther increases in attainm
ent.
M
y conclu
sion regard
ing su
bsid
y levels is based
 both on the large p
rivate p
rem
iu
m
 on
schooling and
 on the fact that this p
rem
iu
m
 generally exceed
s its social cou
nterp
art. T
hese
find
ings su
ggest that the financial retu
rns to investm
ent in ed
u
cation reflect social need
s m
ore
th
an
 ad
equ
ately an
d
 th
at th
ey are h
igh
 en
ou
gh
 th
at it is u
n
likely th
at in
su
fficien
t
p
ecu
niary incentives can be seen as a real obstacle to higher enrollm
ent rates in m
ost E
U
cou
ntries. I su
sp
ect that other factors (and
 in p
articu
lar liqu
id
ity constraints and
 low
 levels of
basic skills for ind
ivid
u
als from
 d
isad
vantaged
 backgrou
nd
s) are far m
ore im
p
ortant as
barriers to access to ad
vanced
 p
rogram
m
es. H
ence, p
olicies sp
ecifically targeted
 at these
problem
s shou
ld
 be m
ore effective in raising u
pper-level enrollm
ents than fu
rther d
ecreases in
alread
y low
 tu
ition charges that im
p
ly a large su
bsid
y for relatively p
rivileged
 grou
p
s.
Ind
eed
, higher tu
ition fees, cou
p
led
 w
ith a w
ell d
esigned
 loan p
rogram
m
e and
 w
ith an
increase in m
eans-tested
 grants, m
ay be an efficient w
ay to p
rovid
e ad
d
itional resou
rces to
in
crease th
e qu
ality of p
ost-secon
d
ary ed
u
cation
 w
h
ile at th
e sam
e tim
e red
u
cin
g th
e
regressivity of its financing, ensu
ring equ
al access op
p
ortu
nities regard
less of socieconom
ic
backgrou
n
d
, an
d
 im
p
rovin
g stu
d
en
t m
otivation
 to take fu
ll ad
van
tage of ed
u
cation
al
op
p
ortu
nities.
71. Introduction
T
his d
ocu
m
ent is an extension and
 p
artial u
p
d
ate of a p
reviou
s rep
ort on the role of
investm
ent in hu
m
an capital as part of a grow
th-prom
oting strategy (d
e la Fu
ente and
 C
iccone
(D
&
C
), 2002). Its focu
s is narrow
er than that of the earlier stu
d
y. It concentrates on the
m
easu
rem
ent of the econom
ic retu
rns to schooling in the m
em
ber cou
ntries of the E
u
rop
ean
U
nion, both from
 a p
rivate and
 from
 a social p
ersp
ective. It also attem
p
ts to d
raw
 som
e
conclu
sions regard
ing the ad
equ
acy of observed
 aggregate investm
ent p
atterns and
 of p
rivate
incentives for investing in ed
u
cation from
 a com
p
arison of the estim
ated
 p
rivate and
 social
rates of retu
rn to schooling w
ith each other and
 w
ith those available on alternative assets.
T
hese issu
es w
ere stu
d
ied
 in D
&
C
 (2002) from
 the p
oint of view
 of a hyp
othetical average
E
U
 cou
n
try. T
h
e p
resen
t rep
ort exten
d
s th
e an
alysis to in
d
ivid
u
al m
em
ber states an
d
introd
u
ces several refinem
ents relative to the p
reviou
s stu
d
y. E
stim
ates of the relevant rates
of retu
rn are constru
cted
 for all cu
rrent m
em
bers of the E
u
ropean U
nion w
ith the exception of
L
u
xem
bou
rg (for w
hich m
u
ch of the requ
ired
 d
ata are u
navailable). T
he m
od
el u
sed
 for the
calcu
lation of the rates of retu
rn has been extend
ed
 to take into accou
nt the p
ositive effects of
ed
u
cation on em
p
loym
ent and
 the im
p
act of tax and
 social p
olicies on the p
rivate retu
rn to
schooling. T
hese extensions have m
ad
e it possible to constru
ct a m
ore com
prehensive m
easu
re
of the econom
ic benefits of ed
ucation than the one provid
ed
 in D
&
C
 (2002), and
 to und
ertake a
d
etailed
 analysis of the im
p
act of p
ersonal taxes, u
nem
p
loym
ent benefits and
 ed
u
cational
su
bsid
ies on the private incentive to invest in ed
u
cation.
In ad
d
ition, I have u
p
d
ated
 or refined
 ou
r p
reviou
s estim
ates of som
e of the relevant cost
and
 retu
rn variables. In p
articu
lar, the calcu
lations in this rep
ort m
ake u
se of im
p
roved
estim
ates of the rates of retu
rn on assets other than hu
m
an cap
ital and
 of the d
irect and
opportu
nity costs of schooling. M
y cu
rrent estim
ates of the d
irect costs of an ad
d
itional year of
schooling have been p
u
rged
 of research exp
end
itu
re at the u
niversity level and
 take into
accou
nt p
u
blic su
bsid
ies for living exp
enses and
 other non-tu
ition costs, w
hile those of the
op
p
ortu
nity costs of ed
u
cation now
 allow
 for p
art-tim
e w
ork and
 for d
ifferential stu
d
ent
u
nem
p
loym
ent and
 p
articip
ation rates. Finally, I have also refined
 ou
r form
er estim
ates of
the p
aram
eters linking average attainm
ent to aggregate p
rod
u
ctivity u
sing the final resu
lts
of a stu
d
y by R
. D
om
énech and
 m
yself (D
&
D
, 2002) that w
as still in p
rogress w
hen the
previous report w
as com
pleted
.
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It shou
ld
 be noted
 that the attem
p
t to enlarge the scop
e of the stu
d
y so as to p
rovid
e
cou
ntry-sp
ecific resu
lts and
 cover em
p
loym
ent asp
ects introd
u
ces new
 m
argins for error and
ad
d
s several item
s to the long list of reasons that requ
ire cau
tion in the interp
retation of m
y
find
ings. A
s w
e em
p
hasized
 in D
&
C
 (2002), there is consid
erable u
ncertainty concerning the
valu
es of the key p
aram
eters that m
easu
re the contribu
tion of investm
ent in hu
m
an cap
ital to
ind
ivid
u
al w
ages and
 to aggregate p
rod
u
ctivity grow
th. T
his u
ncertainty is even greater in
the case of som
e of the em
ploym
ent param
eters that enter the calcu
lations reported
 below
, for
w
hich I have constru
cted
 a very tentative set of estim
ates that attem
p
t only to cap
tu
re the
likely ord
er of m
agnitu
d
e of the relevant effects.
A
n ad
d
itional p
roblem
, to w
hich I w
ill retu
rn below
, is that cross-cou
ntry com
p
arisons of
social returns to schooling are m
uch m
ore sensitive to assum
ptions concerning functional form
s
and
 to other estim
ation issu
es than conclu
sions based
 on sam
p
le averages. Finally, concerns
abou
t d
ata qu
ality are also com
pou
nd
ed
 by the cross-cou
ntry d
im
ension. T
he d
ata u
nd
erlying
the calcu
lations rep
orted
 below
 are often incom
p
lete and
 m
ay not alw
ays p
rovid
e an accu
rate
p
ictu
re of the situ
ation in each m
em
ber state. Since errors w
ill tend
 to cancel ou
t, I am
 fairly
certain that sam
p
le averages are not far off the m
ark, bu
t I am
 m
u
ch less confid
ent in the
accu
racy of the d
ata for any ind
ivid
u
al cou
ntry, p
articu
larly w
hen, as is often the case, m
y
estim
ates rely on rather ad
-hoc assu
m
p
tions to get arou
nd
 m
issing inform
ation. I have
attem
p
ted
 throu
ghou
t the text to alert the read
er to p
articu
larly u
nreliable estim
ates. I
w
ou
ld
 also w
elcom
e any inform
ation from
 national au
thorities or ind
ivid
u
al read
ers that
m
ay help
 im
p
rove these estim
ates.
T
hese caveats notw
ithstand
ing, I believe the resu
lts p
resented
 below
 p
rovid
e a reasonable
assessm
ent, given ou
r cu
rrent state of know
led
ge, of the p
rivate and
 social retu
rns to
investm
ent in hum
an capital. T
hese results reinforce the conclusions of our previous report and
su
ggest that they are valid
 for m
ost, if not all, m
em
ber states of the E
U
. A
ccord
ing to m
y
estim
ates, the social retu
rn to schooling is at least com
p
arable to, and
 p
robably higher than,
th
at on
 p
h
ysical cap
ital in
 all E
U
 cou
n
tries, su
ggestin
g th
at in
creased
 in
vestm
en
t in
ed
u
cation w
ou
ld
 be socially beneficial even if it com
es at the exp
ense of other cap
ital
exp
end
itu
res. T
he social p
rem
iu
m
 on hu
m
an cap
ital, how
ever, varies significantly across
m
em
ber states reflecting the relative end
ow
m
ents of p
rod
u
ction factors and
 ap
p
ears to be
largest in Finland
, Italy, D
enm
ark, G
reece, the N
etherland
s, Sp
ain and
 Ireland
, and
 sm
allest
in the U
K
, A
u
stria, France, B
elgiu
m
 and
 P
ortu
gal.
 A
t the ind
ivid
u
al level, schooling seem
s to be a m
ore attractive investm
ent than the
financial assets available to hou
sehold
s. P
rivate retu
rns to schooling, m
oreover, incorp
orate
an im
p
ortant p
u
blic su
bsid
y, even after taking into accou
nt the d
isincentives generated
 by
p
rogressive p
ersonal taxes and
 relatively generou
s social benefits. T
he overall effective tax
rate on hu
m
an cap
ital (w
hich su
m
m
arizes the com
bined
 effect on net p
rivate retu
rns of
ed
u
cational finance, taxation and
 u
nem
p
loym
ent p
rotection) is negative in eleven ou
t of the
9fou
rteen cou
ntries in the sam
p
le and
 has an average valu
e of -10%
. Finally, the p
rem
iu
m
 on
hu
m
an cap
ital relative to alternative assets ap
p
ears to be higher at the p
rivate than at the
social level in m
ost cou
ntries, ind
icating that p
rivate incentives to invest in schooling reflect
social need
s m
ore than ad
equ
ately. T
he one excep
tion to this are the Scand
inavian cou
ntries.
A
s in D
&
C
 (2002), I d
raw
 tw
o m
ain p
olicy conclu
sion from
 these resu
lts: First, that a
m
od
est increase in ed
u
cational investm
ent w
ou
ld
 alm
ost certainly be beneficial from
 a social
p
oint of view
 in all E
U
 cou
ntries. A
nd
 second
, that an increase in general su
bsid
ies for p
ost-
com
p
u
lsory schooling w
ou
ld
 p
robably not be requ
ired
 to achieve this goal in m
ost E
u
rop
ean
cou
ntries becau
se the m
ain obstacle to higher enrollm
ents d
oes not lie in an insu
fficient
financial rew
ard
.
T
h
e rem
ain
d
er of th
e rep
ort is d
ivid
ed
 in
to five section
s. Section
 2 d
escribes th
e
theoretical fram
ew
ork u
sed
 for the calcu
lation of the p
rivate and
 social rates of retu
rn to
schooling, w
hich inclu
d
es a sim
p
le grow
th m
od
el sp
ecifying the links betw
een average
ed
u
cational attainm
ent and
 aggregate p
rod
u
ctivity. B
y necessity, this section is som
ew
hat
technical and
, w
ith the excep
tion of its first tw
o p
ages, can p
robably be skip
p
ed
 by the read
er
w
ithou
t seriou
ly im
p
airing his or her ability to follow
 the rest of the d
iscu
ssion. Sections 3
and
 4 d
eal w
ith the qu
antification of the p
rivate and
 social costs and
 benefits of p
ost-
com
p
u
lsory schooling. E
ach of these sections contains a d
escrip
tion of the d
ata and
 of the
p
aram
eter valu
es u
sed
 in the calcu
lations (w
ith fu
rther d
etails given in the A
p
p
end
ix), a
d
iscu
ssion of the resu
lts and
 a com
p
arison of the estim
ated
 retu
rns on hu
m
an cap
ital w
ith
those on other assets. A
n im
p
ortant p
art of section 3 d
eals w
ith the im
p
act of p
u
blic p
olicies
on p
rivate financial incentives for investing in ed
u
cation. In section 4 of the text and
 section 6
of the A
p
p
end
ix, a fair am
ou
nt of sp
ace is d
evoted
 to ju
stifying m
y choice of valu
es for the
p
aram
eters that m
easu
re the contribu
tion of investm
ent in hu
m
an cap
ital to aggregate
p
rod
u
ctivity grow
th. Since this section d
raw
s heavily on recent w
ork by R
. D
om
énech and
m
yself w
hich m
ay be som
ew
hat controversial, I have attem
p
ted
 to give the read
er enou
gh
in
form
ation
 to ju
d
ge by h
im
self or h
erself th
e sen
sitivity of th
e resu
lts to ch
an
ges in
assu
m
p
tion
s con
cern
in
g th
ese aggregate p
aram
eters. Section
 5 attem
p
ts to d
raw
 som
e
tentative conclu
sions regard
ing the ad
equ
acy of observed
 levels of ed
u
cational su
bsid
ies on
the basis of com
p
arisons betw
een the rates of retu
rn to schooling and
 the schooling p
rem
ia at
the p
rivate and
 social levels. Section 6 conclu
d
es w
ith a su
m
m
ary of the m
ain resu
lts and
 a
d
iscu
ssion of their p
olicy im
p
lications.
2. T
h
eoretical fram
ew
ork
: th
e rate of retu
rn
 to sch
oolin
g
A
ny ind
ivid
u
al enrolled
 in an ed
u
cational institu
tion beyond
 the com
p
u
lsory age faces at
each point in his career a choice betw
een continu
ing his training and
 w
ithd
raw
ing from
 school
to enter the labou
r m
arket on a fu
ll-tim
e basis. W
hile other factors are certainly at w
ork, the
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op
tion to rem
ain in school is at least in p
art an investm
ent d
ecision for it involves a trad
e-off
betw
een cu
rrent costs (foregone w
ages, tu
ition charges and
 other school-related
 expenses) and
fu
tu
re benefits (the exp
ected
 increase in earnings associated
 w
ith higher qu
alifications). A
sim
ilar bu
t not id
entical trad
e-off arises from
 a social p
oint of view
, as the d
ecision to d
evote
ad
d
itional resou
rces to training can be exp
ected
 to increase national ou
tp
u
t in the fu
tu
re by
raising the skill level of the w
orkforce.
A
s in the case of m
ore stand
ard
 investm
ent p
rojects, the financial p
ayoff to an ad
d
itional
year of schooling can be qu
antified
 by com
p
u
ting its internal rate of retu
rn, w
hich is form
ally
d
efin
ed
 as th
e d
iscou
n
t rate th
at equ
ates th
e p
resen
t valu
e of th
e relevan
t stream
s of
increm
ental pecu
niary costs and
 benefits. In this section I w
ill d
iscu
ss a set of form
u
las for the
calcu
lation of the p
rivate and
 social rates of retu
rn to schooling. T
hese form
u
las w
ill be u
sed
later on to obtain qu
antitative m
easu
res of the p
rivate and
 social retu
rns to investm
ent in
ed
u
cation and
 to analyse the im
p
act of variou
s p
u
blic p
olicies on ind
ivid
u
al incentives.
Su
bsection a d
eals w
ith the p
rivate retu
rn to ed
u
cation. For each cou
ntry, I w
ill consid
er a
rep
resentative ind
ivid
u
al end
ow
ed
 w
ith the average attainm
ent level and
 earning average
p
rod
u
ction w
orker (A
P
W
) w
ages and
 com
p
u
te the exp
ected
 p
rivate p
ayoff to an ad
d
itional
year of schooling. T
he calcu
lation w
ill take into accou
nt the exp
licit costs of schooling
actu
ally born by the agent, his opportu
nity cost in the form
 of foregone labou
r incom
e, and
 the
expected
 increase in fu
tu
re net-of-tax labou
r earnings and
 u
nem
ploym
ent benefits arising both
from
 higher w
ages and
 from
 higher em
p
loym
ent p
robabilities.
T
he logic w
ill be very sim
ilar in su
bsection b, w
here I w
ill analyse the social retu
rn to
ed
u
cation. T
he m
ain d
ifference is that I w
ill now
 be concerned
 w
ith the total costs of training
(rather than w
ith their p
rivately-born com
p
onent) and
 w
ith the total increase in ou
tp
u
t
(rather than in after-tax w
ages) generated
 by an increase in average attainm
ent. H
ence,
resou
rce flow
s betw
een the private and
 pu
blic sectors, su
ch as taxes and
 su
bsid
ies, need
 not be
consid
ered
 in the calcu
lations. O
n the other hand
, to p
rop
erly m
easu
re the social retu
rns to
ed
u
cational investm
ent, I w
ill need
 to take into accou
nt its external effects. Since the m
ain
externality associated
 w
ith rising attainm
ent ap
p
ears, on m
y read
ing of the literatu
re, to
take the form
 of an increase in the rate of technical p
rogress, it w
ill be necessary to sp
ecify a
sim
p
le grow
th m
od
el linking these tw
o variables in ord
er to d
erive the d
esired
 form
u
la.
T
o p
rop
erly interp
ret the resu
lts that w
ill be p
resented
 below
, it is im
p
ortant to keep
 in
m
ind
 that the rates of retu
rn I w
ill calcu
late m
easu
re the retu
rn to ed
u
cational investm
ent in
a rather sp
ecific and
 restrictive sense. T
hey cap
tu
re, in p
articu
lar, the average p
ayoff to an
ad
d
itional year of schooling hold
ing its cost and
 qu
ality constant at the existing level. T
hey
d
o not, how
ever, tell u
s anything abou
t the retu
rns to ad
d
itional sp
end
ing on qu
ality-
im
p
rovin
g p
olicies. T
h
e p
roblem
 h
ere is em
p
irical rath
er th
an
 con
cep
tu
al. W
h
ile it is
straigh
tforw
ard
 to d
erive th
e ap
p
rop
riate rate of retu
rn
 form
u
las for in
vestm
en
t in
ed
u
cational qu
ality, w
e d
o not yet have reliable estim
ates of the im
p
act of resou
rce inp
u
ts on
11
ed
u
cational qu
ality or of the effects of qu
ality on w
ages and
 p
rod
u
ctivity that can be entered
into these form
u
las. T
his is m
ost u
nfortu
nate becau
se this is w
ithou
t d
ou
bt the m
ore relevant
p
olicy m
argin in the long ru
n, and
 becau
se w
e have reasons to su
sp
ect that the qu
ality of
ed
u
cation m
ay be at least as im
p
ortant as its qu
antity. (See A
p
p
end
ix 3e in D
&
C
, 2002).
W
hen it com
es to interpreting m
y estim
ates of the social rate of retu
rn to schooling there is
an ad
d
itional althou
gh related
 p
roblem
 of w
hich the read
er shou
ld
 be aw
are. O
ne of the key
inp
u
ts for this calcu
lation is an econom
etric estim
ate of the contribu
tion of school attainm
ent
to p
rod
u
ctivity w
hich essentially m
easu
res the strength of this connection in the case of a
hyp
othetical average cou
ntry. 1 H
ence, m
y social rate of retu
rn estim
ates im
p
licitly assu
m
e
that the qu
ality of a year of schooling is the sam
e everyw
here, irresp
ective of its cost or
ind
eed
 of any other factor. T
his im
p
lies that m
y calcu
ations w
ill u
nd
erstate the aggregate
retu
rn to schooling in cou
ntries w
ith ed
u
cational system
s of above-average qu
ality. If qu
ality
is p
ositively correlated
 w
ith resou
rce inp
u
t (an issu
e that rem
ains controversial, as d
iscu
ssed
in our previous report), m
y results w
ill also und
erestim
ate the returns to ed
ucation in countries
w
ith high exp
end
itu
re p
er stu
d
ent.
It shou
ld
 also be noted
 that m
y estim
ates of both p
rivate and
 social retu
rns to schooling
m
ay be biased
 u
p
w
ard
 by the failu
re to take into accou
nt on-the-job training. A
s observed
 by
B
assan
in
i (2003), sin
ce m
ore ed
u
cated
 w
orkers ten
d
 to receive m
ore train
in
g, existin
g
estim
ates of the M
incerian retu
rns p
aram
eter at the ind
ivid
u
al level (and
 p
ossibly at the
cou
ntry level as w
ell) w
ill tend
 to p
ick u
p
 not only the d
irect effects of schooling p
er se, bu
t
also the ad
d
itional benefits that resu
lt from
 increased
 training. W
hile this is not a p
roblem
p
er se, failu
re to take into accou
nt the cost of training w
ill lead
 to the overestim
ation of the
relevant rates of retu
rn. A
lthou
gh the d
ata requ
ired
 for a correction are not available, I
w
ou
ld
 expect that the resu
lting bias shou
ld
 not be very large becau
se investm
ent in training is
likely to be m
u
ch sm
aller than in form
al schooling and
, since it takes p
lace later in life, it
shou
ld
 be d
iscou
nted
 m
ore heavily.
A
 fin
al sou
rce of bias th
at w
ill w
ork in
 th
e op
p
osite d
irection
 an
d
 is likely to be
consid
erably m
ore im
portant is that the rates of retu
rn com
pu
ted
 below
 d
o not incorporate the
non-m
arket retu
rns to schooling in hom
e p
rod
u
ction and
 leisu
re (see section 3a.xi in D
&
C
,
2002) and
 fail to take into accou
nt the d
irect consu
m
p
tion valu
e of ed
u
cation and
 any "civic"
externalities generated
 by it. A
s a resu
lt, I exp
ect that m
y calcu
lations w
ill u
nd
erestim
ate
the tru
e retu
rns to schooling by an am
ou
nt that m
ay be large bu
t is extrem
ely d
ifficu
lt to
m
easu
re w
ith p
recision.
1
 T
his p
roblem
 d
oes not arise in the calcu
lation of the p
rivate retu
rns to schooling becau
se the relevant
param
eter is estim
ated
 separately for each cou
ntry u
sing ind
ivid
u
al d
ata and
 can therefore pick u
p cross-
cou
ntry d
ifferences in the qu
ality of ed
u
cation. W
e cannot follow
 a sim
ilar strategy to estim
ate the
aggregate param
eter because there are not enough data, and not enough variation in the available aggregate
d
ata, to obtain precise country-specific estim
ates.
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a. T
h
e p
rivate rate of retu
rn
 to sch
oolin
g
C
onsid
er an ind
ivid
u
al w
ho goes to school the first S years of his ad
u
lt life and
 retires at
tim
e U
. I w
ill assu
m
e that the d
irect cost to the agent of each year of schooling is a constant
fraction µ
s
 of the earnings of a typ
ical w
orker w
ith the average level of schooling in the
cou
ntry as a w
hole, w
hich w
ill be d
enoted
 by S
o . T
he gross w
age of the rep
resentative
ind
ivid
u
al w
ill be given by the p
rod
u
ct of a technical efficiency ind
ex A
t  =
 A
o e gt that grow
s
over tim
e at a constant exp
onential rate g, and
 a fu
nction f(S) that increases w
ith ed
u
cational
attainm
ent. T
he p
robability of em
p
loym
ent w
ill also be assu
m
ed
 to be an increasing fu
nction
of schooling. I w
ill d
enote by p(S) the fu
nction d
escribing this relation for the case of an ad
u
lt
w
orker seeking fu
ll-tim
e em
p
loym
ent, and
 by p
s (S) =
 η
p(S) the analogou
s fu
nction for a
stu
d
ent seeking p
art-tim
e em
p
loym
ent. H
ence, η is an ad
ju
stm
ent coefficient that corrects for
the d
ifferential em
p
loym
ent p
robability of stu
d
ents. 2
I w
ill allow
 for taxes and
 for u
nem
p
loym
ent and
 hou
sing benefits. It w
ill be assu
m
ed
 that
tax rates are a fu
nction of relative rather than absolu
te incom
es 3 (i.e. of f(S) rather than of
A
f(S
)), so the net-of-tax earnings at tim
e t of a w
orker w
ith S
 years of schooling w
ho is
em
p
loyed
 fu
ll-tim
e w
ill be given by
(1)   f
S
T
f
S
A
t
(
)
(
)
−
(
)
[
]
w
h
ere 
T
() is th
e total tax d
u
e p
er "efficien
cy u
n
it" of labou
r. If th
e sam
e w
orker is
u
nem
p
loyed
, he is entitled
 to a benefit w
hich I w
ill w
rite in net-of-tax term
s. Since this
benefit m
ay or m
ay not be linked
 to p
reviou
s earnings, I w
ill allow
 for both p
ossibilities and
w
rite the w
orker's net incom
e out of em
ploym
ent in the form
(2)   a
f
S
T
f
S
A
b
f
S
T
f
S
A
t
t
o
o
(
)
(
)
(
)
(
)
−
(
)
[
]
+
−
(
)
[
]
w
h
ere a is the com
p
onent of the net rep
lacem
ent ratio (a+
b) that is linked
 to p
reviou
s
earnings and
 b cap
tu
res benefits that are ind
ep
end
ent of the agent's p
reviou
s incom
e (bu
t are
assu
m
ed
 to be ind
exed
 to average earnings, w
hich are given by A
f(S
o )).
I w
ill assu
m
e that stu
d
ents are not entitled
 to u
nem
p
loym
ent benefits (w
hich is tru
e in
m
ost cou
ntries, as a m
inim
u
m
 p
eriod
 of p
reviou
s em
p
loym
ent is generally requ
ired
 for
contribu
tory benefits), and
 that fu
ll-tim
e school attend
ance takes u
p
 a fraction φ
 of their tim
e
so that their p
otential labou
r su
p
p
ly is a fraction 1-φ of the stand
ard
 w
ork-year. U
nd
er these
assu
m
p
tions, the exp
ected
 earnings at tim
e t of a stu
d
ent w
ho has com
p
leted
 s years of
training are given by
2
 N
otice that the m
od
el incorporates som
e rather strong sim
plifying assu
m
ptions abou
t the behaviou
r of
w
ages and
 em
ploym
ent rates over the lifecycle. It w
ou
ld
 be preferrable to w
ork w
ith observed
 w
age and
em
ploym
ent profiles follow
ing w
hat Psacharopoulos (1995) has called
 the "full d
iscounting m
ethod
" for the
calcu
lation of the retu
rns to schooling. T
his w
ou
ld
, how
ever, requ
ire m
u
ch m
ore d
etailed
 d
ata than I had
access to for all of the countries in the sam
ple.
3
 O
therw
ise, the tax rates faced
 by all agents w
ould
 increase over tim
e w
ith prod
uctivity grow
th in a w
ay
that is probably not realistic and
 w
ould
 consid
erably com
plicate the calculations. Since w
e are consid
ering
a horizon of over forty years, this effect w
ould
 be im
portant and
 is likely to d
istort the results.
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(3)   η
φ
φ
p
s
f
s
T
f
s
A
t
(
)
(
)
(
)
(
)
(
)
1
1
−
−
−
(
)
[
]
w
here ps (s) =
 η
p(s) is the relevant p
robability of em
p
loym
ent as d
iscu
ssed
 above.
G
iven these assu
m
p
tions, the p
resent valu
e of the agent's exp
ected
 lifetim
e net earnings
can be w
ritten
(4) V
(S) =
 J(S) +
 I(S) - C
(S)
w
here(5) J(S) =
   
η
φ
φ
p
t
f
t
T
f
t
A
e
dt
t
S
rt
(
)
(
)
(
)
(
)
(
)
1
1
0
−
−
−
(
)
[
]
∫
−
(6) I(S) =
  
p
S
f
S
T
f
S
p
S
a
f
S
T
f
S
b
f
S
T
f
S
A
e
dt
o
o
S U
rt
t
(
)
(
)
(
)
(
)
(
)
(
)
(
)
(
)
−
(
)
[
] +
−
(
)
−
(
)
[
] +
−
(
)
[
]
[
]
{
}
∫
−
1
(7) C
(S) =
  
µ
s
t
o
A
f
S
e
dt
S
rt
0
∫
−
(
)
and
 r is the d
iscou
nt rate. T
he term
 J(S) d
enotes the p
resent valu
e of exp
ected
 labou
r earnings
w
hile attend
ing school and
 (p
otentially) w
orking p
art-tim
e a fraction 1-φ of the stand
ard
w
ork-year betw
een tim
es 0 and
 S, I(S) the p
resent valu
e of labou
r incom
e and
 u
nem
p
loym
ent
benefits over the ind
ivid
u
al's p
ost-school w
orking life (betw
een tim
es S and
 U
), and
 C
(S) the
p
resent valu
e of the d
irect costs of schooling born by the agent (i.e. net of p
u
blic su
bsid
ies).
N
otice that I am
 not taking into accou
nt retirem
ent benefits. Since p
ensions are generally tied
to p
reviou
s earnings, their inclu
sion in the m
od
el w
ill raise the estim
ated
 retu
rn to schooling,
althou
gh the effect is not likely to be very large becau
se benefits accru
e far into the fu
tu
re and
m
ust be d
iscounted
 accord
ingly. 4
T
o obtain the requ
ired
 rate of retu
rn, I w
ill com
pu
te the net m
arginal prod
u
ct of schooling,
w
hich w
ill be given by the d
erivative of the net lifetim
e earnings fu
nction, V
'(S), and
 solve
for the valu
e of the d
iscou
nt rate, r, that m
akes this d
erivative equ
al to zero w
hen S =
 S
o  (i.e.
for an ind
ivid
u
al of average attainm
ent). 5 T
his p
roced
u
re yield
s the follow
ing exp
ression for
the (net) private rate of retu
rn on ed
u
cation:
(8) rp =
 R
p  +
 g
w
here g is the exogenou
s grow
th rate of p
rod
u
ctivity and
 R
p  is the valu
e of R
 that solves the
follow
ing equ
ation
(9)   
Re
p
p
a
p
p
a
b
T
a
b
p
p
p
a
b
p
p
p
a
b
R
H
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
so
1
1
1
11
11
1
11
11
−
=
+
−
+
−
+
 
 
−
−
 
 
+
−
−
+
−
+
 
 
−
−−
−
+
−
+
 

−
(
)
(
)(
)
©
(
)
(
)(
)
(
)
(
)(
) τ
θ
ε
ττ
φη

+
−
+
−
+
[
]
µ
τ
s
o
o
o
p
p
a
b
(
)
(
)(
)
1
1
   ≡
++
θ
ε
net
net
O
P
P
C
D
IR
C
 .
In this exp
ression, p
o  stand
s for the p
robability of em
p
loym
ent of an ad
u
lt of average
attainm
ent, το  and
 T
' are the average and
 m
arginal tax rates ap
p
licable to the sam
e w
orker,
4
 N
otice also that I am
 not allow
ing for the possibility of d
eath prior to retirem
ent. A
s d
e la C
roix (2003)
observes, it w
ou
ld
 also be d
esirable to correct for this factor, bu
t I d
ou
bt the error ind
u
ced
 by this
assu
m
ption is im
portant. A
s he him
self notes, the rou
gh correction constru
cted
 by this au
thor is likely to
su
bstantially overstate the im
p
ortance of this factor becau
se it is based
 on an assu
m
p
tion (that the
p
robability of d
eath is constant at each p
oint in tim
e) that w
ill generate extrem
ely u
nrealistic su
rvival
p
rofiles.
5
 See d
e la Fuente (2003) for further d
etails.
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τs  the average tax rate on incom
e from
 p
art-tim
e w
ork for a stu
d
ent w
ith schooling S
o , θ
 th
e
M
incerian retu
rns to schooling p
aram
eter, ε the cu
rvatu
re of the fu
nction that gives the
p
robability of em
p
loym
ent as a fu
nction of ed
u
cational attainm
ent, and
 H
 =
 U
-S the d
u
ration
in years of the w
orking life of the rep
resentative ind
ivid
u
al; that is,
(10)
po  =
 p(S
o )
θ =   f
S
f
S
oo
©(
)
(
)
ε =   p
S
p
S
oo
©(
)
(
)
το  =   T
f
S
f
S
oo
(
)
(
)
(
)
T' =   T
f
S
o
©
(
)
(
)
τs  =   T
f
S
f
S
oo
(
)
(
)
(
)
(
)
11
−
(
)
−
φφ
T
o interp
ret equ
ation (9), notice that its left-hand
 sid
e is an increasing fu
nction of R
 w
here
the term
 1-e -R
H
 that ap
p
ears in the d
enom
inator serves to ad
ju
st for the fact that the "u
sefu
l
life" of the asset (the w
orking life of the ind
ivid
u
al) is finite. T
he right-hand
 sid
e is sim
p
ly
the ratio of the m
arginal benefits d
erived
 from
 an ad
d
itional year of schooling (w
hich w
e
can
 in
terp
ret as th
e "d
ivid
en
d
" p
aid
 by h
u
m
an
 cap
ital) to its cost, w
ith
 all th
e term
s
exp
ressed
 as fractions of the exp
ected
 net-of-tax earnings of an ad
u
lt w
orker w
ith average
ed
u
cation. T
he first term
 in the nu
m
erator (θ
net ) cap
tu
res the exp
ected
 increase in after-tax
earnings and
 benefits hold
ing the p
robability of em
p
loym
ent constant, and
 the second
 one
(εnet ) the increase in exp
ected
 net earnings that com
es from
 an increase in the p
robability of
em
p
loym
ent. T
he d
enom
inator m
easu
res the total cost of an ad
d
itional year of schooling as
the su
m
 of tw
o term
s. T
he first one (O
P
P
C
) is the op
p
ortu
nity cost of school attend
ance
(foregone w
ages), and
 the second
 one (D
IR
C
) the d
irect costs of schooling born by the stu
d
ent
h
im
self.
N
otice th
at p
u
blic p
olicies in
flu
en
ce th
e p
rivate retu
rn
 to sch
oolin
g in
 m
an
y w
ays.
E
d
u
cational su
bsid
ies or the d
irect p
u
blic p
rovision of ed
u
cational services w
ill raise the
retu
rn to schooling by low
ering its d
irect cost to the ind
ivid
u
al (D
IR
C
). T
he effect of taxation
is m
ore com
p
licated
. N
otice that a flat-rate incom
e tax (i.e. a tax system
 in w
hich το   =
 T
' =
τs ) w
ou
ld
 have absolu
tely no effect on the retu
rn to schooling w
henever there are no d
irect
costs (i.e. w
hen D
IR
C
 =
 0) becau
se taxes w
ou
ld
 then red
u
ce both the costs and
 the benefits of
ed
ucation in the sam
e proportion.
H
ence, the effects of the tax system
 w
ill com
e from
 d
ifferences am
ong the three tax rates
that enter the form
u
la and
 from
 their interaction w
ith the d
irect cost term
, D
IR
C
. N
otice
that θ
net  d
ep
end
s only on the p
rogressivity of the tax sched
u
le at the average incom
e level:
as the tax system
 becom
es m
ore p
rogressive (i.e. as the ratio (1-T
')/(1-τo ) d
eclines), the
incentive to invest in ed
u
cation falls. If w
e fix the d
egree of p
rogressivity, an increase in τo
actu
ally raises the retu
rn to schooling by low
ering its op
p
ortu
nity cost, w
hile an increase in
the stu
d
ent tax rate, τs , has the op
p
osite effect. Finally, tax rates interact w
ith the d
irect
cost of schooling term
, D
IR
C
. If µ
s >
 0, an increase in the average tax rate, το  , increases D
IR
C
(by low
ering its d
enom
inator) thu
s low
ering the retu
rn to schooling. If stu
d
ents receive a net
su
bsid
y, so that µ
s <
 0, the effect of το
  on rp  is the op
p
osite one: higher taxes now
 raise the
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retu
rn to schooling by increasing the size of the su
bsid
y w
hen m
easu
red
 as a fraction of net
ad
u
lt earnings.
U
nem
p
loym
ent benefits red
u
ce the retu
rn to schooling by raising the exp
ected
 incom
e of
ad
u
lt w
orkers, thereby increasing the op
p
ortu
nity cost of not being in the (fu
ll-tim
e) labou
r
m
arket, and
 by red
u
cing the loss of earnings associated
 w
ith u
nem
p
loym
ent (i.e. by low
ering
εnet ). N
otice that the size of this second
 effect w
ill be p
rop
ortional to the valu
e of ε, for if
schooling has no effect on em
p
loym
ent p
robabilities the d
ifference in earnings betw
een
em
p
loyed
 and
 u
nem
p
loyed
 w
orkers is irrelevant for the calcu
lation.
 W
hen u
nem
p
loym
ent
ben
efits are lin
ked
 to p
reviou
s earn
in
gs (an
d
 th
erefore to ed
u
cation
), th
ese effects are
p
artially offset by an increase in θ
net  as ad
d
itional schooling now
 translates into an increase
in  benefit levels.
b
. T
h
e social rate of retu
rn
 to sch
oolin
g
In this section I w
ill ap
p
ly the p
roced
u
re d
evelop
ed
 above to a rep
resentative ind
ivid
u
al
w
hose level of schooling d
eterm
ines, together w
ith other factors to be sp
ecified
 below
, the
behaviou
r of aggregate prod
u
ctivity. T
he resu
lting rate of retu
rn form
u
la m
u
st be regard
ed
 as
an ap
p
roxim
ation becau
se the com
p
u
tation im
p
licitly assu
m
es that a one-year increase in
average attainm
ent w
ill be obtained
 by im
m
ed
iately send
ing the entire labou
r force to school
for a year (rather than by grad
u
ally raising the attainm
ent of you
nger cohorts).
T
o calcu
late the social retu
rn to ed
u
cation, I need
 to sp
ecify the connections betw
een the
ed
u
cational attainm
ent of the labou
r force and
 the level and
 grow
th rate of aggregate
p
rod
u
ctivity. T
his is d
one in B
ox 1, w
here I ou
tline a sim
p
le m
od
el of grow
th w
ith hu
m
an
cap
ital. A
s in ou
r p
reviou
s rep
ort, the m
od
el allow
s for tw
o typ
es of links betw
een average
schooling and
 aggregate ou
tp
u
t to w
hich I w
ill refer as "level" and
 "rate" effects. First, the
level of ou
tp
u
t is assu
m
ed
 to be an increasing fu
nction of average attainm
ent throu
gh a
stand
ard
 aggregate p
rod
u
ction fu
nction w
ith hu
m
an cap
ital as an inp
u
t. 6 A
nd
 second
, the
m
od
el assu
m
es that the rate of technical p
rogress is also an increasing fu
nction of average
schooling throu
gh an external effect that cannot be p
rivately ap
p
rop
riated
 by ind
ivid
u
als in
the form
 of higher w
ages. T
he choice of valu
es for the key p
aram
eters of the m
od
el, w
hich is
cru
cial for m
y calcu
lations, w
ill be d
iscu
ssed
 in d
etail below
.
6 T
he functional form
 of the prod
uction function is very im
portant in cross-country com
parisons. A
s show
n
in B
ox 1, the C
obb-D
ou
glas fu
nction in years of schooling that u
nd
erlies m
y calcu
lations (equ
ation (1) in
B
ox 1) forces the aggregate M
incerian retu
rns param
eter (ρ) for each cou
ntry to be inversely proportional
to its average attainm
ent. A
n alternative ("M
incerian") specification that has often been u
sed
 in the recent
literature, by contrast, im
poses a com
m
on value of ρ for the w
hole sam
ple (see B
ox 2 in section 3b.ii of D
&
C
(2002)). T
his m
akes little d
ifference w
hen w
e are interested
 in d
raw
ing conclu
sions for a hyp
othetical
average cou
ntry bu
t becom
es cru
cial w
hen w
e w
ant to com
p
are rates of retu
rn across territories. W
hile I
find
 the C
obb-D
ou
glas sp
ecification intu
itively m
ore ap
p
ealing than the M
incerian fu
nctional form
 and
have fou
nd
 that it fits the O
E
C
D
 d
ata better, it m
ay still be too restrictive. If this is the case, cross-cou
ntry
results m
ay be distorted in a w
ay that w
ill depend on the true sensitivity of ρ to average attainm
ent.
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B
ox 1: A
 sim
p
le m
od
el of h
u
m
an
 cap
ital an
d
 grow
th
____________________________________________________________
M
y estim
ates of the social retu
rn to schooling w
ill be based
 on a sim
p
le m
od
el of hu
m
an
cap
ital and
 grow
th w
ith tw
o com
p
onents: an aggregate p
rod
u
ction fu
nction and
 a technical
progress function. T
he prod
uction function w
ill be assum
ed
 to be of the C
obb-D
ouglas type:
(1) Y
it  =
 A
it K
it α
kS
it α
SL
it α
l
w
here Y
it  d
enotes the aggregate ou
tp
u
t of cou
ntry i at tim
e t, L
it  is the level of em
p
loym
ent,
K
it  th
e stock of p
h
ysical cap
ital, S
it  th
e average stock of h
u
m
an
 cap
ital p
er w
orker,
m
easu
red
 by the average years of schooling of the ad
u
lt p
op
u
lation, and
 A
it  an ind
ex of
technical efficiency or total factor p
rod
u
ctivity (T
FP
) w
hich su
m
m
arizes the cu
rrent state of
th
e tech
n
ology an
d
, p
ossibly, om
itted
 factors su
ch
 as geograp
h
ical location
, clim
ate,
institu
tions and
 end
ow
m
ents of natu
ral resou
rces. T
he coefficients α
i (w
ith i =
 k, s, l) m
easu
re
the elasticity of ou
tp
u
t w
ith resp
ect to the stocks of the d
ifferent factors. A
n increase of 1%
 in
the stock of hu
m
an cap
ital p
er w
orker, for instance, w
ou
ld
 increase ou
tp
u
t by α
S %
, hold
ing
constant the stocks of the other factors and
 the level of technical efficiency.
U
nd
er the stand
ard
 assu
m
p
tion that (1) d
isp
lays constant retu
rns to scale in cap
ital,
labou
r an
d
 total h
u
m
an
 cap
ital, L
S
, (i.e. that α
k +
 α
l =
 1) w
e can d
efine a p
er cap
ita
p
rod
u
ction fu
nction that w
ill relate average p
rod
u
ctivity to average schooling and
 the stock
of cap
ital p
er w
orker. L
etting Q
 =
 Y
/L d
enote ou
tp
u
t p
er w
orker, Z
 =
 K
/L the stock of cap
ital
per w
orker, and
 d
ivid
ing both sid
es of (1) by total em
ploym
ent, L, w
e have:
(2) Q
  =
 f(S) =
 A
Z
α
kS
α
S
T
he aggregate M
incerian retu
rns p
aram
eter that ap
p
ears in the rate of retu
rn calcu
lation is
given by(3) ρ =
 f'(S)
f(S
)  =
 A
Z
α
kα
S S
α
S
−1
A
Z
α
kS
α
S
 = α
S
S
T
he technical p
rogress fu
nction d
escribes the d
eterm
inants of the grow
th rate of total
factor p
rod
u
ctivity. I w
ill assu
m
e that cou
ntry i's T
FP
 level can be w
ritten in the form
:
(4)A
it  =
 B
t X
it
w
here B
t  d
enotes the w
orld
 "technological frontier" (i.e. the m
axim
u
m
 attainable level of
efficiency in p
rod
u
ction given the cu
rrent state of scientific and
 technological know
led
ge) and
X
it  =
 A
it /B
t  the "technological gap
" betw
een cou
ntry i and
 the w
orld
 frontier. It w
ill be
assu
m
ed
 that B
t  grow
s at a constant and
 exogenou
s rate, g, and
 that the grow
th rate of X
it  is
given by(5) ∆
xit =
 γio  - λxit +
 γS
it
w
here xit  is the log of X
it  and
 γio  a cou
ntry fixed
 effect that help
s control for om
itted
 variables
su
ch as R
&
D
 investm
ent. N
otice that this sp
ecification incorp
orates a technological d
iffu
sion
or catch-u
p
 effect. If λ
 >
 0, cou
n
tries th
at are closer to th
e tech
n
ological fron
tier w
ill
exp
erience low
er rates of T
FP
 grow
th. A
s a resu
lt, relative T
FP
 levels w
ill tend
 to stabilize
and
 their stead
y-state valu
es w
ill be p
artly d
eterm
ined
 by the level of schooling.
____________________________________________________________
T
he d
erivation of the rate of retu
rn form
u
la is very sim
ilar to the one in the p
reviou
s
section. T
he m
ain d
ifferences are that w
e m
u
st now
 consid
er the fu
ll d
irect costs of training
(rather than the com
p
onent that is born by p
rivate ind
ivid
u
als) and
 the total increase in
ou
tp
u
t generated
 by ad
d
itional schooling (rather than the increase in after-tax ind
ivid
u
al
earnings). T
his second
 d
ifference has several im
p
lications. First, taxes and
 social benefits are
now
 irrelevant, as they are transfers betw
een the p
rivate and
 p
u
blic sectors that d
o not
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d
irectly change total ou
tp
u
t. Second
, the fu
nction f(S) introd
u
ced
 in the p
reviou
s section to
d
escribe the resp
onse of gross w
ages to ed
u
cational attainm
ent w
ill now
 be interp
reted
 as a
per capita prod
u
ction fu
nction. A
ccord
ingly, the m
icroeconom
ic M
incerian param
eter d
erived
from
 the w
age fu
nction, θ, w
ill now
 be rep
laced
 by its aggregate cou
nterp
art, ρ
, w
hich
m
easu
res the p
ercentage increase in ou
tp
u
t resu
lting from
 a one-year increase in average
attainm
ent. A
nd
 third
, w
e need
 to extend
 the p
reviou
s form
u
la to take into accou
nt the
externality effect that w
orks throu
gh the rate of technological p
rogress.
U
nd
er the assu
m
ptions listed
 above, the social rate of retu
rn to schooling, rs , is given by
(11) rs  =
 R
s  +
 g
w
here g is the rate of exogenou
s p
rod
u
ctivity grow
th at the w
orld
 frontier (see B
ox 1) and
 R
s
the valu
e of R
 that solves the follow
ing equ
ation:
(12)    
Re
R
p
R
H
o
1
1
1
−
=
+
+
+
−
−
(
)
+
−
ε
ρ
γ
λ
φη
µ
(
)
  ≡
+
++
ρ
ε
E
X
T
O
P
P
C
D
IR
C
w
here µ is the total d
irect cost of a year of schooling m
easu
red
 as a fraction of average ou
tp
u
t
p
er w
orker, ρ  is the aggregate M
incerian retu
rns coefficient, γ
 the rate effects p
aram
eter that
cap
tu
res the contribu
tion of schooling to technical p
rogress and
 λ the rate of technological
d
iffu
sion (see B
ox 1). T
he rem
aining p
aram
eters have the sam
e interp
retation as in the
previou
s section. N
otice that equ
ation (12) has the sam
e form
 as equ
ation (9) above, except for
the absence of tax and
 benefit p
aram
eters and
 for the inclu
sion of a new
 term
 (E
X
T
) that
cap
tu
res the externality or rate effects of hu
m
an cap
ital. A
sid
e from
 this, the interp
retation
of the form
u
la rem
ains u
nchanged
: the rate of retu
rn to schooling is the ratio of its m
arginal
benefits to its m
arginal costs, ad
ju
sted
 for the finite life of the asset.
3. T
h
e p
rivate retu
rn
 to sch
oolin
g an
d
 th
e in
cen
tive to in
vest in
 ed
u
cation
In this section I w
ill present estim
ates of the private retu
rn to post-com
pu
lsory schooling in
the m
em
ber cou
ntries of the E
u
rop
ean U
nion. T
hese rates of retu
rn w
ill be calcu
lated
 by
ap
p
lying equ
ation (9) to a rep
resentative ind
ivid
u
al for each cou
ntry end
ow
ed
 w
ith average
school attainm
ent. I w
ill assu
m
e that this rep
resentative agent's incom
e, w
hen em
p
loyed
, is
equ
al to the gross earnings of the average p
rod
u
ction w
orker (A
P
W
). 7 It w
ill also be assu
m
ed
that the agent is active throu
ghou
t his w
orking life (i.e. that he is active w
hile attend
ing
school at p
ost-com
p
u
lsory levels and
 rem
ains a m
em
ber of the labou
r force u
ntil the stand
ard
retirem
ent age) and
 that he w
ants to w
ork (but m
ay not succeed
 in d
oing so) 20%
 of a stand
ard
7
 T
his assum
ption is m
ad
e for convenience, as it allow
s m
e to m
ake use of the estim
ates of A
P
W
 earnings
and
 of the relevant tax rates that are p
rovid
ed
 by the O
E
C
D
 for all cou
ntries in the sam
p
le. It shou
ld
 be
noted
, how
ever, that this is not necessarily a good
 ap
p
roxim
ation, for average w
ages and
 skill levels in
m
anufacturing m
ay differ from
 those in the overall econom
y.
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w
ork-year w
h
ile en
rolled
 in
 sch
ool. 8 H
en
ce, th
e em
p
loym
en
t p
robabilities an
d
 related
p
aram
eters u
sed
 in the calcu
lation are cond
itional on labou
r force p
articip
ation. A
s su
ggested
by d
e la C
roix (2003), I w
ill allow
 retirem
ent ages to vary across cou
ntries. I w
ill also take
into accou
nt cross-cou
ntry d
ifferences in school-leaving ages, and
 set the expected
 d
u
ration of
th
e (p
ost-sch
ool) w
orkin
g life of th
e rep
resen
tative in
d
ivid
u
al for each
 cou
n
try as th
e
d
ifference betw
een these tw
o variables.
T
h
e 
calcu
lation
s 
w
ill 
also 
allow
 
for 
th
e 
taxes 
on
 
labou
r 
in
com
e 
to 
w
h
ich
 
th
e
rep
resentative ind
ivid
u
al w
ou
ld
 be su
bject in each cou
ntry (inclu
d
ing national and
 regional
incom
e taxes and
 em
p
loyee social secu
rity contribu
tions) and
 for the u
nem
p
loym
ent and
hou
sing benefits for w
hich he w
ou
ld
 be eligible, w
orking u
nd
er the assu
m
p
tions that i) he is
single and
 has no child
ren (so as to abstract from
 cross-cou
ntry d
ifferences in fam
ily su
p
p
ort
p
olicies), and
 ii) that any u
nem
p
loym
ent sp
ells he su
ffers are relatively short-lived
 and
 d
o
not exahu
st contribu
tive benefits.
a. D
ata an
d
 sou
rces
T
able 1 d
escribes the d
ifferent variables and
 p
aram
eters u
sed
 in the com
p
u
tation of the
p
rivate rate of retu
rn to schooling and
 gives the sou
rces of these d
ata. T
he d
etails of the
constru
ction of the d
ifferent variables are d
iscu
ssed
 in the A
ppend
ix.
T
he exp
ected
 length of the w
orking life of the rep
resentative ind
ivid
u
al for each cou
ntry
is calcu
lated
 as the d
ifference betw
een the estim
ated
 average age of retirem
ent and
 the age
at w
h
ich
 average attain
m
en
t h
as been
 com
p
leted
 (p
rovid
ed
 th
is last figu
re is at least
fou
rteen years). R
etirem
ent ages refer to 1995 and
 are calcu
lated
 by averaging the estim
ates
for m
ales and
 fem
ales rep
orted
 by B
lönd
al and
 Scarp
etta (1999), w
eighting them
 by the
share of each sex in total em
p
loym
ent (u
sing E
u
rostat d
ata for 2000 referring to the age grou
p
25-64). A
verage attainm
ent is taken from
 d
e la Fu
ente and
 D
om
énech (2001).
A
 key inp
u
t to m
y calcu
lations is a set of estim
ates of the ind
ivid
u
al-level M
incerian
retu
rn
s 
to 
sch
oolin
g 
p
aram
eter 
(θ
) 
th
at 
h
as 
been
 
con
stru
cted
 
u
sin
g 
th
e 
resu
lts 
of
m
icroeconom
etric w
age regressions rep
orted
 in H
arm
on, W
alker and
 W
estergaard
-N
ielsen
(2001). 9 T
hese au
thors p
rovid
e sep
arate estim
ates of this coefficient for m
en and
 w
om
en in
m
ost E
U
 countries using relatively hom
ogeneous d
ata for 1995 or a nearby year and
 a com
m
on
econom
etric sp
ecification. I have averaged
 these estim
ates across sexes u
sing their shares in
total em
ploym
ent, and
 introd
uced
 som
e corrections (using inform
ation reported
 in the relevant
cou
ntry chap
ters of the sam
e stu
d
y) in those cases in w
hich the original estim
ates seem
ed
 to
8 T
his figure of 20%
 m
ay be too low
 w
hen interpreted
 strictly as a m
easure of potential labour supply, but
it is p
robably realistic as an estim
ate of p
otential stu
d
ent earnings relative to those of fu
ll-tim
e ad
u
lt
w
orkers w
ith sim
ilar attainm
ent levels.
9
 H
arm
on et al's estim
ates of θ
 are obtained
 by O
L
S and
 are therefore potentially su
bject to biases arising
from
 m
easurem
ent error and
 the om
ission of ability. O
ur read
ing of the relevant literature suggests that the
net bias is unlikely to be large (see D
&
C
 (2002), sections 3ai and
 ii and
 A
ppend
ix 1).
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be based
 on d
ata referring to net rather than gross w
ages. (See Section 2 of the A
p
p
end
ix for
d
etails).
T
ab
le 1: V
ariab
les an
d
 p
aram
eters u
sed
 in
 th
e calcu
lation
 of th
e p
rivate
rate of retu
rn
 on
 sch
oolin
g an
d
 sou
rces of th
e d
ata
______________________________________________________________________
param
eters
g = 1.5%
, rate of exogenous prod
uctivity grow
th. Source: Jones (2002).
φ =
 0.8, fraction of tim
e taken u
p
 by (fu
ll-tim
e) school attend
ance; 1-φ is the p
otential labou
r
su
p
p
ly w
hile in school.
v
ariables
U
  =
 A
verage retirem
ent age in 1995, constru
cted
 by averaging separate estim
ates for m
en and
w
om
en, w
eighted
 in p
rop
ortion to their shares in total em
p
loym
ent. Sou
rce: B
lönd
al and
Scarp
etta (1999).
So  =
 average years of school attainm
ent of the ad
u
lt (over 25) p
op
u
lation in 1990. Sou
rce: d
e
la Fuente and
 D
om
énech (2001).
H
=
 U
 - M
ax(6+
S
o , 14) =
 estim
ated
 len
gth
 of th
e (p
ost-sch
ool) w
orkin
g life of th
e
rep
resentative ind
ivid
u
al.
θ =
 m
icroeconom
ic M
incerian retu
rns to schooling p
aram
eter. It m
easu
res the average (log)
in
crease in
 gross w
ages (w
ages before in
com
e taxes an
d
 em
p
loyee social secu
rity
con
tribu
tion
s are w
ith
eld
) resu
ltin
g from
 an
 ad
d
ition
al year of sch
oolin
g. Sou
rce:
constru
cted
 u
sing estim
ates for 1995 taken from
 H
arm
on, W
alker and
 W
estergaard
-
N
ielsen (2001). See section 2 of the A
p
p
end
ix for d
etails.
µ
s  =
 d
irect cost of schooling born by the ind
ivid
u
al, m
easu
red
 as a fraction of A
P
W
 gross
earnings (w
eighted
 average of second
ary and
 tertiary levels w
ith w
eights 2/
3 and
 1/
3
resp
ectively). A
verage costs are show
n net of d
irect p
u
blic su
bsid
ies to stu
d
ents for living
costs and
 other non-tu
ition exp
enses and
 w
ill be negative w
hen these su
bsid
ies exceed
tu
ition charges. Sou
rce: constru
cted
 u
sing d
ata in variou
s issu
es of E
ducation at a G
lance.
See section 1 of the A
ppend
ix.
µ
 =
 total cost (p
rivate +
 p
u
blic) of schooling p
er stu
d
ent m
easu
red
 as a fraction A
P
W
 gross
earnings (w
eighted
 average of second
ary and
 tertiary levels w
ith w
eights 2/
3 and
 1/
3
resp
ectively). It exclu
d
es an estim
ate of research exp
end
itu
re by u
niversities. D
irect
su
bsid
ies to stu
d
ents for living and
 non-tu
ition expenses are not consid
ered
 a net cost from
the p
oint of view
 of society as a w
hole (I consid
er them
 a transfer to the p
rivate sector).
Sou
rce: constru
cted
 u
sing d
ata in variou
s issu
es of E
ducation at a G
lance. See section 1 of the
A
p
p
end
ix.
p
o  =
 p
robability of em
p
loym
ent after leaving school, cond
itional on p
articip
ation in the
labou
r force. Sou
rce: E
u
rostat, Sp
ring 2000 L
abor Force Su
rvey. I u
se one m
inu
s the
u
nem
ploym
ent rate for the 35-44 popu
lation.
ps  =
  p
robability of em
p
loym
ent w
hile attend
ing school, cond
itional on p
articip
ation in the
labou
r force. I estim
ate it as ps  =
 η
po , w
here η
 is d
efined
 below
.
______________________________________________________________________
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T
ab
le 1: V
ariab
les an
d
 p
aram
eters u
sed
 in
 th
e calcu
lation
 of th
e p
rivate
rate of retu
rn
 on
 sch
oolin
g an
d
 sou
rces of th
e d
ata -- con
tin
u
ed
______________________________________________________________________
η
  =
 correction factor cap
tu
ring the greater d
ifficu
lty of find
ing p
art-tim
e em
p
loym
ent w
hile
attend
ing school. Sou
rce: calcu
lated
 as the ratio betw
een the p
robability of em
p
loym
ent of
those enrolled
 in ed
u
cation and
 those not enrolled
 in ed
u
cation am
ong active w
orkers aged
20 to 24, u
sing d
ata for 1998 from
 E
ducation at a G
lance 2000. See section 3 of the A
ppend
ix.
ε =
 p'(S)/p(S) m
easu
res the resp
onsiveness of the p
robability of em
p
loym
ent of active w
orkers
to their level of schooling. Sou
rce: estim
ated
 u
sing d
ata from
 E
u
rostat's Sp
ring 2000 L
abor
Force Survey. See section 3 of the A
ppend
ix.
το  =
 average tax rate on labou
r incom
e (inclu
d
ing national and
 regional incom
e taxes and
em
p
loyee social secu
rity contribu
tions) ap
p
licable to the average p
rod
u
ction w
orker in
2000. Sou
rce: O
E
C
D
 tax d
atabase w
ith d
ata from
 T
axing W
ages.
T
' =
 m
arginal tax rate on labou
r incom
e (inclu
d
ing national and
 regional incom
e taxes and
em
p
loyee social secu
rity contribu
tions) ap
p
licable to the average p
rod
u
ction w
orker in
2000. Sou
rce: O
E
C
D
 tax d
atabase w
ith d
ata from
 T
axing W
ages.
τs  =
 average tax rate on labou
r incom
e (inclu
d
ing national and
 regional incom
e taxes and
em
p
loyee social secu
rity contribu
tions) ap
p
licable to a w
orker earning 20%
 of the A
P
W
salary in 2000. Sou
rce: calcu
lated
 u
sing the d
escrip
tion of national tax system
s given in
T
axing W
ages 2000-2001.
a =
 first com
p
onent of the net rep
lacem
ent ratio (ratio of net after-tax earnings ou
t of w
ork to
net after-tax earnings w
hile em
p
loyed
) for a single ind
ivid
u
al w
ith no child
ren w
hose
p
reviou
s earnings w
ere equ
al to the average p
rod
u
ction w
orker's salary. T
his p
aram
eter
captu
res the effects of u
nem
ploym
ent benefits that are linked
 to previou
s earnings. Sou
rce:
estim
ated
 u
sing  the d
escrip
tion of national social p
rotection system
s given in the cou
ntry
chap
ters of B
enefit system
s and w
ork incentives 1999.
b =
 second
 com
ponent of the net replacem
ent ratio, calculated
 und
er the sam
e assum
ptions as a.
It captures the effects of unem
ploym
ent and
 housing benefits w
hose am
ount is not linked
 to
previous earnings. Source: sam
e as for a.
______________________________________________________________________
M
y estim
ates of the d
irect costs of schooling (µ
 and
 µ
s ) are based
 on d
ata on p
rivate and
governm
ent exp
end
itu
re on second
ary and
 higher ed
u
cation taken from
 recent issu
es of the
O
E
C
D
's E
ducation at a G
lance. T
hese variables try to ap
p
roxim
ate the (total and
 p
rivate)
cost per stu
d
ent of a m
arginal increase in enrollm
ents, w
hich w
ou
ld
 have to com
e at the u
pper
second
ary and
 u
niversity levels since attend
ance at low
er levels is alread
y com
p
u
lsory in the
E
U
. T
he cost of higher ed
u
cation is p
u
rged
 of research exp
end
itu
re by u
niversities, and
p
rivate costs are show
n net of d
irect governm
ent transfers to hou
sehold
s for living and
 other
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non-tu
ition exp
enses (w
hich m
akes them
 negative in qu
ite a few
 E
u
rop
ean cou
ntries). 10 B
oth
d
irect cost variables are w
eighted
 averages of exp
end
itu
re p
er stu
d
ent at the second
ary and
tertiary levels and
 are m
easu
red
 as a fraction of the gross earnings of the average p
rod
u
ction
w
orker. I use w
eights of 2/
3 and
 1/
3 for second
ary and
 tertiary schooling respectively to try to
captu
re the im
pact of a m
arginal change in u
pper second
ary attainm
ent u
nd
er the assu
m
ption
that half of the new
 grad
u
ates w
ill go on to u
niversity. (See section 1 of the A
p
p
end
ix).
T
he probability of em
ploym
ent of ad
u
lt w
orkers (po ) has been taken from
 E
u
rostat's Spring
2000 L
abour Force Survey. It is calculated
 as 1-u w
here u is the unem
ploym
ent rate of the 35-44
age grou
p
. 11 T
he sam
e d
ata, w
hich are d
isaggregated
 into three ed
u
cational levels, have
been
 u
sed
 to calcu
late th
e sen
sitivity of th
e p
robability of em
p
loym
en
t to ed
u
cation
al
attainm
ent (cap
tu
red
 by ε =
 p'(S
o )/p(S
o )). For each cou
ntry, I ap
p
roxim
ate p'(S
o ) by the
average in
crease in
 th
e p
robability of em
p
loym
en
t in
d
u
ced
 by an
 ad
d
ition
al year of
schooling. D
ivid
ing this figu
re by po , I obtain a p
relim
inary estim
ate of ε. Since this estim
ate
is likely to be biased
 u
p
w
ard
 d
u
e to the im
p
ossibility of controlling for relevant ind
ivid
u
al
characteristics w
ith aggregate d
ata, I red
u
ce it by 1/
3 before u
sing it in the calcu
lations
d
iscu
ssed
 in this section. T
he correction factor for d
ifferential stu
d
ent u
nem
p
loym
ent is
obtained
 u
sing d
ata from
 E
ducation at a G
lance 2000 on the u
nem
p
loym
ent rates of the in-
school and
 out-of-school population betw
een ages 20 and
 24.
T
he tax and
 benefit p
aram
eters are taken from
 variou
s O
E
C
D
 sou
rces and
 refer to single
ind
ivid
u
als w
ith no child
ren. 12 T
he average and
 m
arginal tax rates on ad
u
lt w
orkers (τo  and
T
') are taken d
irectly from
 the O
E
C
D
 T
ax D
atabase (and
 originally from
 T
axing W
ages).
T
hey refer to the year 2000 and
 are those ap
p
licable to an ind
ivid
u
al earning the sam
e salary
as the average p
rod
u
ction w
orker (A
P
W
), i.e. w
ith average earnings for fu
ll-tim
e w
orkers in
the m
anu
factu
ring sector. T
he average tax rate on stu
d
ent incom
e (τs ) has been constru
cted
u
sing the d
escrip
tion of the 2000 tax system
s of E
u
rop
ean cou
ntries given in T
axing W
ages
2000-2001. T
h
is rate h
as been
 calcu
lated
 u
n
d
er th
e assu
m
p
tion
 th
at th
e in
com
e of an
em
p
loyed
 stu
d
ent is 20%
 of A
P
W
 earnings. A
ll tax rates incorp
orate p
ersonal incom
e taxes
and
 em
p
loyee (bu
t not em
p
loyer) social secu
rity contribu
tions, so as to be consistent w
ith the
10
 In the case of G
erm
any, the bu
lk of p
rivate exp
end
itu
re on second
ary ed
u
cation corresp
ond
s to
enterprise contributions to apprenticeship program
m
es. (T
hanks to L
. W
össm
an for pointing this out). Since
I am
 concerned w
ith the return to individuals, I treat this item
 as public expenditure.
11 T
he choice of the unem
ploym
ent rate for prim
e-age ind
ivid
uals is probably an optim
istic assum
ption, as
unem
ploym
ent rates are generally higher in early post-school years and
 for old
er ind
ivid
uals. T
he resulting
bias is at leat p
artially offset by tw
o factors: the fact that I am
 u
sing u
nem
p
loym
ent rates for the entire
p
op
u
lation (and
 not for relatively skilled
 ind
ivid
u
als, w
hich are the grou
p
 of intersest) and
 the u
se of
estim
ated
 retirem
ent ages w
hich incorporate inform
ation abou
t early exit from
 the labou
r m
arket. In any
event, the rate of return is not very sensitive to the choice of unem
ploym
ent rate. N
otice that, if w
e assum
e
there are no unem
ploym
ent benefits (i.e. a = b = 0), po  drops out of equation (9) except for the denom
inator of
the D
IR
C
 term
. A
s w
ill be show
n later, this term
 has only a m
inor im
pact on the estim
ated rate of return.
12
 A
s several d
iscu
ssants have noted
, it w
ou
ld
 be interesting to relax this assu
m
p
tion and
 analyze the
im
p
act of fam
ily-related
 benefits and
 tax d
ed
u
ctions. T
he requ
ired
 calcu
lations are, how
ever, fairly
com
plex and could not be com
pleted w
ithin the tim
e available for the preparation of this report.
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d
efinition of gross w
ages that seem
s to have been u
sed
 in the w
age equ
ation estim
ates I am
using.
T
ab
le 2: D
ata u
sed
 in
 th
e calcu
lation
 of th
e p
rivate rate of retu
rn
 on
 sch
oolin
g
______________________________________________________________________
U
H
θ
µ
s
µ
p
o
p
s
A
u
stria
57.7
40.4
8.60%
-1.40%
35.33%
96.35%
96.35%
B
elgiu
m
56.1
40.0
7.24%
0.32%
21.46%
94.63%
83.27%
D
en
m
ark
61.2
43.4
5.71%
-4.44%
21.38%
96.29%
90.03%
F
in
lan
d
59.0
42.0
8.69%
-1.84%
22.91%
92.67%
62.64%
F
ran
ce
58.8
42.3
7.77%
1.94%
32.76%
91.27%
61.79%
G
erm
an
y
59.6
40.6
8.73%
0.00%
21.29%
93.11%
93.11%
G
reece
61.5
47.5
8.21%
0.98%
21.56%
92.37%
67.52%
Irelan
d
62.1
46.7
10.90%
0.73%
27.20%
93.16%
93.16%
Italy
59.4
45.3
7.90%
0.74%
25.28%
97.76%
31.97%
N
etherlan
ds
57.3
40.4
6.70%
-1.34%
21.40%
97.06%
93.47%
P
ortu
gal
62.3
48.3
9.70%
-0.33%
39.51%
95.23%
87.80%
S
pain
60.5
46.5
8.23%
4.05%
25.64%
88.62%
60.00%
S
w
eden
62.7
46.1
3.96%
-5.80%
29.84%
95.74%
75.35%
U
K
61.4
44.8
10.34%
0.94%
20.34%
94.17%
94.26%
average E
U
14
59.97
43.89
8.05%
-0.39%
26.14%
94.17%
77.31%
η
 *
ε
το
T'
τs
a
b
A
u
stria
1
0.51%
0.279
0.429
18.20%
59.56%
0.00%
B
elgiu
m
0.880
0.86%
0.419
0.555
13.07%
0.00%
64.47%
D
en
m
ark
0.935
0.40%
0.441
0.507
20.04%
0.00%
62.71%
F
in
lan
d
0.676
0.77%
0.336
0.480
23.20%
33.74%
31.16%
F
ran
ce
0.677
1.23%
0.268
0.335
18.01%
70.52%
0.00%
G
erm
an
y
1
1.14%
0.420
0.579
20.50%
59.69%
0.51%
G
reece
0.731
0.36%
0.181
0.285
15.90%
46.59%
0.00%
Irelan
d
1
0.91%
0.203
0.525
2.00%
0.00%
31.18%
Italy
0.327
0.51%
0.285
0.404
9.19%
39.28%
2.29%
N
etherlan
ds
0.963
0.35%
0.362
0.531
10.52%
77.27%
4.72%
P
ortu
gal
0.922
0.03%
0.177
0.260
11.00%
78.89%
0.00%
S
pain
0.677
0.66%
0.185
0.288
6.35%
74.45%
0.00%
S
w
eden
0.787
0.49%
0.329
0.352
24.21%
0.00%
70.62%
U
K
1
0.91%
0.236
0.320
0.00%
0.00%
46.32%
average E
U
14
0.821
0.65%
0.294
0.418
13.73%
38.57%
22.43%
______________________________________________________________________
N
otes:
   E
ntries in bold
 type ind
icate very unreliable estim
ates. For the sake of com
pleteness, I generally estim
ate
m
issing data by assum
ing that a country is sim
ilar to its neighbours.
θ  : N
o estim
ates are available for B
elgium
. I assign to this country the average of the values for France and
H
olland
.
ε: I assum
e Ireland is the sam
e as the U
K
.
η
 : I assum
e A
ustria is the sam
e as G
erm
any, France the sam
e as Spain, and Ireland the sam
e as the U
K
.
   (*) W
hen the value of η
  given in Table A
.10 of the A
ppendix exceeds 1, I use a value of 1.
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Finally, m
y estim
ates of the benefit p
aram
eters (i.e. of the tw
o com
p
onents of the net
replacem
ent ratio for u
nem
ployed
 w
orkers) have been constru
cted
 u
sing the d
escription of the
existing benefit schem
es given in the cou
ntry chap
ters of the O
E
C
D
's B
enefit System
s and
W
ork Incentives 1999, assu
m
ing again that w
e are d
ealing w
ith a single ind
ivid
u
al w
ith no
child
ren w
hose w
age p
rior to the loss of em
p
loym
ent w
as equ
al to A
P
W
 earnings. For this
calcu
lation, I have assu
m
ed
 that any u
nem
p
loym
ent sp
ells exp
erienced
 by this rep
resentative
w
orker are su
fficiently brief that he d
oes not exhau
st the contribu
tive benefits to w
hich he is
en
titled
.
T
able 2 show
s the actu
al d
ata u
sed
 in the rate of retu
rn calcu
lations (excep
t for S
o , w
hich
is show
n in T
able 7 below
). A
s noted
 in the introd
u
ction, m
issing d
ata have been a problem
 in
som
e cou
ntries. T
hrou
ghou
t the text, I w
ill u
se bold
 typ
e to id
entify p
articu
larly u
nreliable
observations. M
ore sp
ecifically, bold
 entries in a table ind
icate that the requ
ired
 d
ata or
som
e key p
aram
eter for its calcu
lation are u
navailable and
 have been filled
 in by im
p
u
ting to
problem
 cou
ntries the valu
es of the sam
e variable observed
 in close neighbou
rs or in cou
ntries
w
ith sim
ilar incom
e levels, w
henever this p
roblem
 can have an im
p
ortant effect on the
calcu
lations. B
old
 italics w
ill be u
sed
 in cases w
hen there is p
artially incom
p
lete d
ata or
w
hen the m
issing d
ata is not exp
ected
 to have an im
p
ortant effect on the final estim
ates. For
p
u
rp
oses of this section, the first of these p
roblem
s affects fou
r cou
ntries (B
elgiu
m
, Ireland
,
A
u
stria and
 France) and
 is p
articu
larly w
orrisom
e in the case of B
elgiu
m
 as the m
issing p
iece
of inform
ation for this cou
ntry is the M
incerian retu
rns p
aram
eter. H
ence, all the estim
ates
for this cou
ntry given in this section shou
ld
 be interp
reted
 w
ith extrem
e cau
tion and
 are
rep
orted
 only becau
se com
p
arisons am
ong estim
ated
 retu
rns u
nd
er d
ifferent assu
m
p
tions d
o
contain u
sefu
l inform
ation abou
t the im
p
act of B
elgian p
olicies on p
rivate incentives. M
issing
inform
ation about ed
ucational expend
iture or its financing has been a problem
 in four countries
(A
u
stria, G
reece, Italy and
 P
ortu
gal) bu
t this shou
ld
 not have a m
aterial im
p
act on the
estim
ated
 rates of retu
rn, excep
t p
ossibly in the case of P
ortu
gal w
here exp
end
itu
re m
ay
ap
p
ear to be artificially high w
hen m
easu
red
 as a fraction of A
P
W
 earnings d
u
e to the
su
sp
ect and
 atyp
ically low
 valu
e of this variable relative to G
D
P
 p
er cap
ita (see section 1c of
the A
p
p
end
ix).
b
. B
asic resu
lts
Figu
re 1 d
isp
lays m
y estim
ates of the p
rivate rate of retu
rn (rp ) to schooling in fou
rteen
E
u
rop
ean cou
ntries. 13 For m
ost cou
ntries, the valu
e of rp  lies betw
een 8 and
 10%
, w
ith an
average valu
e of 9.75%
. Sw
ed
en is a clear ou
tlier. T
he rate of retu
rn estim
ated
 for this cou
ntry
(6.06%
) is alm
ost tw
o p
oints low
er than that of the N
etherland
s, w
hich is the second
 cou
ntry
13
 In this figu
re, and
 elsew
here in the rep
ort, the rates of retu
rn for the average cou
ntry are obtained
 by
entering average p
aram
eter valu
es in the relevant form
u
la, not by averaging the rates of retu
rn across
countries.
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at the bottom
 of the d
istribu
tion. B
y contrast, the estim
ated
 valu
e of rp  exceed
s 12%
 in the
U
K
 and
 P
ortugal and
 is over 10%
 in A
ustria, G
erm
any and
 Ireland
.
Figu
re 1: P
rivate rate of retu
rn
 to sch
oolin
g in
 th
e E
U
4% 6% 8%
10%
12%
14%
UK
Po
O
st
G
e
Ir
G
r
avge.
Fi
Fr
Sp
Dk
It
B
e
N
l
S
w
- N
ote: the estim
ate for B
elgiu
m
 is based
 on seriou
sly incom
p
lete d
ata and
 is inclu
d
ed
 for illu
strative
purposes only.
T
he u
p
p
er p
anel of T
able 3 show
s the nu
m
erical valu
es behind
 Figu
re 1 and
 the fou
r cost
and
 benefit "com
p
onents" of the rate of retu
rn. A
s above, bold
 entries id
entify estim
ates that
are based
 on incom
p
lete inform
ation. T
he estim
ate of rp  for B
elgiu
m
 is show
n in bold
 typ
e
becau
se, as noted
 above, I am
 m
issing a cru
cial p
iece of inform
ation for its calcu
lation. T
he
entries for Ireland
, A
u
stria and
 France ap
p
ear in bold
 italics becau
se the error ind
u
ced
 by the
m
issing d
ata for these cou
ntries is likely to be relatively m
inor. T
he sam
e convention is u
sed
in the rem
aining colum
ns of T
able 3.
T
o interp
ret this table, recall the rate of retu
rn form
u
la d
erived
 in Section 2a,
(9') R
'   ≡
−
−
Re
R
H
1
  =
++
θ
ε
net
net
O
P
P
C
D
IR
C
  ≡
N
U
M
D
E
N
O
M
In this exp
ression, θ
net  and
 εnet  cap
tu
re the net after-tax benefits of a m
arginal increase in
sch
oolin
g th
at are lin
ked
, resp
ectively, to h
igh
er earn
in
gs an
d
 to h
igh
er em
p
loym
en
t
p
robabilities, w
hile O
P
P
C
 and
 D
IR
C
 m
easu
re the op
p
ortu
nity and
 d
irect costs of schooling,
w
ith all variables m
easu
red
 as fractions of the exp
ected
 after-tax earnings of an ad
u
lt
w
orker. T
h
u
s, N
U
M
 m
easu
res the total p
ayoff to an ad
d
itional year of schooling and
D
E
N
O
M
 its total cost. (N
otice that θ
net  and
 εnet  are norm
alized
 by the average valu
e of their
su
m
, N
U
M
, and
 O
P
P
C
 and
 D
IR
C
  are norm
alized
 by the average valu
e of D
E
N
O
M
).
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T
ab
le 3: P
rivate rate of retu
rn
 to sch
oolin
g an
d
 its com
p
on
en
ts
a. O
b
served
 valu
es
______________________________________________________________________
rp
N
U
M
θnet
εnet
D
E
N
O
M
O
P
P
C
D
IR
C
U
K
13.87%
9.42%
8.94%
0.47%
75.82%
74.55%
1.27%
P
ortu
gal
12.29%
8.73%
8.72%
0.01%
80.41%
80.81%
-0.41%
A
u
stria
10.50%
7.01%
6.81%
0.20%
75.84%
77.81%
-1.97%
G
erm
an
y
10.43%
6.77%
6.33%
0.43%
73.76%
73.75%
0.01%
Irelan
d
10.41%
6.96%
6.35%
0.61%
76.91%
75.96%
0.96%
G
reece
9.81%
7.35%
7.16%
0.18%
86.78%
85.54%
1.24%
F
in
lan
d
9.62%
6.91%
6.65%
0.26%
82.29%
85.13%
-2.84%
F
ran
ce
9.59%
7.40%
7.06%
0.34%
88.50%
85.79%
2.71%
S
pain
9.36%
7.34%
7.19%
0.15%
90.92%
85.80%
5.12%
D
en
m
ark
8.87%
5.06%
4.91%
0.14%
65.83%
73.88%
-8.05%
Italy
8.61%
6.88%
6.58%
0.29%
92.81%
91.76%
1.05%
B
elgiu
m
8.56%
5.64%
5.35%
0.29%
75.14%
74.59%
0.56%
N
etherlan
ds
7.95%
4.98%
4.92%
0.06%
71.54%
73.65%
-2.11%
S
w
eden
6.06%
3.84%
3.70%
0.14%
74.01%
82.76%
-8.75%
avge. E
U
14
9.75%
6.78%
6.53%
0.24%
79.95%
80.52%
-0.56%
______________________________________________________________________
b
. N
orm
alized
 valu
es
______________________________________________________________________
rp
N
U
M
θnet
εnet
D
E
N
O
M
O
P
P
C
D
IR
C
U
K
142.3
138.9
131.9
7.0
94.8
93.2
1.6
P
ortu
gal
126.1
128.7
128.7
0.1
100.6
101.1
-0.5
A
u
stria
107.7
103.5
100.5
3.0
94.9
97.3
-2.5
G
erm
an
y
106.9
99.8
93.4
6.4
92.3
92.2
0.0
Irelan
d
106.7
102.7
93.7
9.0
96.2
95.0
1.2
G
reece
100.6
108.4
105.7
2.7
108.5
107.0
1.6
F
in
lan
d
98.6
101.9
98.1
3.8
102.9
106.5
-3.5
F
ran
ce
98.3
109.2
104.1
5.0
110.7
107.3
3.4
S
pain
96.0
108.3
106.0
2.3
113.7
107.3
6.4
D
en
m
ark
91.0
74.6
72.5
2.1
82.3
92.4
-10.1
Italy
88.3
101.4
97.1
4.3
116.1
114.8
1.3
B
elgiu
m
87.8
83.2
78.9
4.3
94.0
93.3
0.7
N
etherlan
ds
81.5
73.5
72.6
0.9
89.5
92.1
-2.6
S
w
eden
62.1
56.7
54.6
2.1
92.6
103.5
-10.9
avge. E
U
14
100.0
100.0
96.4
3.6
100.0
100.7
-0.7
______________________________________________________________________
- N
ote: entries in bold
 or bold
 italics are based
 on incom
plete inform
ation. See the text and
 the notes to T
able
2 for further d
etails.
 
Insp
ection of T
able 3 show
s that the retu
rn to schooling is p
rim
arily d
eterm
ined
 by its
w
age-related
 benefits and
 its op
p
ortu
nity cost, w
ith em
p
loym
ent-related
 effects and
 d
irect
costs p
laying a second
ary role. For the average cou
ntry in the sam
p
le, 96.4%
 of the p
ayoff to
schooling com
es from
 its im
pact on earnings and
 over 100%
 of its costs take the form
 of foregone
w
ages. T
his im
p
lies that the d
irect costs of schooling are in fact negative in the average
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cou
ntry as a resu
lt of governm
ent su
bsid
ies in excess of p
rivate costs. 14 T
here is consid
erable
variation across cou
ntries in this resp
ect, how
ever. Su
bsid
ies are p
articu
larly generou
s in the
Scand
inavian cou
ntries, althou
gh not enou
gh to com
p
ensate low
 earnings effects in D
enm
ark
and
 Sw
ed
en, w
hile net p
rivate costs are highest in Sp
ain, m
ainly as a resu
lt of the existence
of a large p
rivate sector at the second
ary level w
hich is only p
artially su
bsid
ized
 by the
state.
c. T
he im
pact of public policies and student unem
ploym
ent
T
his section analyzes the effects on the p
rivate retu
rn to schooling of variou
s form
s of
governm
ent intervention and
 of you
th u
nem
ploym
ent. T
o qu
antify the contribu
tion of each of
these factors to the net p
rivate retu
rn to schooling, I w
ill recalcu
late the rate of retu
rn u
nd
er a
set of d
ifferent cou
nterfactu
al assu
m
p
tions or scenarios. In the baseline scenario [1] I assu
m
e
there is no governm
ent intervention, i.e. that p
rivate agents p
ay the fu
ll costs of ed
u
cation
and
 there are no taxes or social benefits. In scenario [2] I introd
u
ce subsidies to ed
u
cation
respecting the rem
aining assum
ptions. In [3] I introd
uce taxes and
 in [4] social benefits to obtain
an estim
ate that inclu
d
es the effects of all relevant p
u
blic p
olicies (G
O
V
T
). In these fou
r
scenarios I assu
m
e η
 =
 1, i.e. that the p
robability of find
ing p
art-tim
e w
ork w
hile in school is
the sam
e as the p
robability of find
ing fu
ll-tim
e w
ork after grad
u
ation. Scenario [5], finally,
correspond
s to the observed
 retu
rns to ed
u
cation (O
B
S) as m
easu
red
 by the estim
ates given in
the p
reviou
s su
bsection. It d
iffers from
 scenario [4] only in that it m
akes u
se of the estim
ated
valu
e of η
  to correct for the ad
d
ed
 d
ifficu
lty of find
ing p
art-tim
e w
ork in m
any cou
ntries
(difstU
 correction). 15 T
able 4 su
m
m
arizes these assu
m
p
tions.
T
able 4: A
ssum
ptions underlying the scenarios
_________________________________________________________
baselin
e
su
bsidies
taxes
G
O
V
T
O
B
S
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
direct costs
to
tal
p
riv
ate
p
riv
ate
p
riv
ate
p
riv
ate
taxes
none
none
observed
observed
observed
ben
efits
none
none
none
observed
observed
diffstU
 
correct.
no
no
no
no
yes
_________________________________________________________
T
he d
etailed
 resu
lts of the calcu
lations are show
n in T
able A
.12 in section 5 of the
A
p
p
end
ix. Figu
re 2 su
m
m
arizes grap
hically the m
ain resu
lts by com
p
aring each cou
ntry's
relative rate of retu
rn (w
ith the sam
p
le average norm
alized
 to 100 in each case) u
nd
er the
baseline, G
O
V
T
 and
 O
B
S scenarios. N
otice that changes in relative p
ositions as w
e go from
14
 T
his m
ay be som
ew
hat m
islead
ing as our cost estim
ates d
o not take into account the purchase of books
and
 other classroom
 m
aterials or other school-related
 expenses such as transport.
15 I carry out this correction last partly in ord
er to isolate the effects of d
ifferential stud
ent unem
ploym
ent,
and
 p
artly becau
se the d
ata on stu
d
ent u
nem
p
loym
ent is incom
p
lete and
 I have som
e d
ou
bts abou
t its
quality, as I suspect that, at least in som
e countries, labour force surveys d
o not target this group carefully.
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the first to the second
 scenario are d
u
e to cross-cou
ntry d
ifferences in tax and
 benefit system
s
and
 in ed
u
cational finance, and
 those that arise as w
e go from
 the second
 to the third
 scenario
reflect d
ifferences in stu
d
ent u
nem
p
loym
ent d
ifferentials relative to ad
u
lt w
orkers.
T
he figu
re su
ggests that stu
d
ent u
nem
p
loym
ent has a relatively low
 im
p
act on the
relative rate of retu
rn to schooling excep
t in the case of Italy, and
 that governm
ent p
olicies
m
ake a big d
ifference in m
any cou
ntries. T
he com
bination of the d
ifferent p
olicies w
e are
consid
ering, in p
articu
lar, greatly raises the relative retu
rn to schooling in D
enm
ark, Sw
ed
en
and
 Portugal, and
 red
uces it in Ireland
 and
 G
erm
any.
Figu
re 2: N
orm
alized
 rate of retu
rn
 to sch
oolin
g u
n
d
er d
ifferen
t scen
arios
25 50 75
100
125
150
UK
Ir
G
e
Fi
G
r
Sp
Po
It
B
e
F
r
O
st
N
l
Dk
S
w
baseline
GOVT
OBS
- N
ote: A
ll estim
ates for B
elgiu
m
 are based
 on seriou
sly incom
p
lete d
ata. D
ifferences across scenarios,
how
ever, should contain useful inform
ation.
T
o obtain m
ore p
recise m
easu
res of the im
p
act of d
ifferent p
olicies on the p
rivate retu
rn to
schooling, I w
ill constru
ct an effective tax rate on hu
m
an cap
ital (  etrgov
t© ) and
 d
ecom
p
ose it
into a series of factors by com
p
aring the retu
rns obtained
 u
nd
er d
ifferent scenarios. L
etting ri
d
enote the estim
ated
 p
rivate rate of retu
rn to schooling u
nd
er scenario i, I w
ill d
efine   etrgov
t©
by
(13)  1
−
=
etr
rr
gov
t
gov
t
baseline
©
©
.
H
ence,   etrgov
t©  cap
tu
res the joint effect of all the relevant p
u
blic p
olicies. N
otice that this tax
rate can be d
ecom
p
osed
 into three factors that isolate the im
p
act of ed
u
cational su
bsid
ies,
p
ersonal taxes and
 social benefits u
sing the follow
ing id
entity:
(14)  1
1
1
1
−
=
=
=
+
−
−
etr
rr
rr
rr
rr
subs
etr
etr
gov
t
gov
t
baseline
subsidies
baseline
taxes
subsidies
gov
t
taxes
tax
ben
©
©
©
(
)(
)(
).
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Fin
ally, I w
ill con
stru
ct in
 a sim
ilar w
ay th
e effective tax rate im
p
licit in
 th
e stu
d
en
t
u
nem
p
loym
ent d
ifferential, w
hich is given by
(15)  1
−
=
etr
rr
stU
obs
gov
t©
Figu
re 3: T
ax rate im
p
licit in
 d
ifferen
tial stu
d
en
t u
n
em
p
loym
en
t (  etrstU
)
0% 5%
10%
15%
20%
It
Fi
Fr
Sp
S
w
G
r
avge.
B
e
Dk
Po
N
l
O
st
G
e
Ir
UK
- N
ote: E
stim
ates for Ireland
, A
ustria and
 France are based
 on seriously incom
plete d
ata.
Figu
re 4: E
ffective tax rate on
 h
u
m
an
 cap
ital (  etrgov
t© )
-50%
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-10% 0%
10%
20%
Ir
G
e
B
e
Fi
N
l
Sp
G
r
avge.
UK
It
Fr
O
st
Dk
Po
Sw
T
he resu
lts of these calcu
lations are show
n in T
able A
.14 in section 5 of the A
p
p
end
ix and
in Figu
res 3-5. A
s noted
 above, the d
ifficu
lty of find
ing p
art-tim
e w
ork w
hile attend
ing
schoool red
u
ces the expected
 retu
rn of schooling by over 15%
 in Italy and
 is also a problem
 in
Finland
, France, Sp
ain, Sw
ed
en, G
reece and
 B
elgiu
m
 (Figu
re 3). T
aken together, p
u
blic
p
olicies im
p
ly a net su
bsidy to hu
m
an cap
ital at a rate of 10%
 in the average E
u
rop
ean
cou
ntry. (N
otice in Figu
re 4 that the average valu
e of   etrgov
t©  is negative). H
ence, ed
u
cational
su
bsid
ies m
ore than offset the d
isincentive effects generated
 by p
ersonal taxes and
 social
benefits. T
he average su
bsid
y rate (subs) is over 30%
 w
hen w
e consid
er only the effects of
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Figu
re 5: C
om
p
on
en
ts of th
e effective tax rate on
 h
u
m
an
 cap
ital
a. E
d
u
cation
al su
b
sid
ies (  subs)
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b
. T
axes (  etrtax )
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c. S
ocial b
en
efits (  etrben )
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p
u
blic ed
u
cational finance (Figu
re 5a) bu
t both p
ersonal taxes and
 social benefits red
u
ce the
net retu
rn to schooling and
 p
artially offset d
irect su
bsid
ies to ed
u
cation. T
he effective tax
rates ind
u
ced
 by these factors in the average E
U
 cou
ntry are 10.1%
 and
 7.4%
 resp
ectively
(Figures 5b and
 5c).
T
here are very im
p
ortant d
ifferences across cou
ntries in term
s of both the total tax bu
rd
en
on hu
m
an cap
ital and
 the sou
rces of this bu
rd
en. Ireland
 and
 G
erm
any are the only tw
o
cou
ntries w
here the effective tax rate on schooling is significantly p
ositive. In the case of
Ireland
, the m
ain d
isincentive has to d
o w
ith the very high p
rogressivity of p
ersonal taxes
at A
P
W
 incom
e levels. In G
erm
any, the high effective tax rate arises from
 the com
bination of
high tax p
rogressivity and
 a fairly low
 rate of d
irect su
bsid
ies. A
t the other end
 of the scale,
the overall su
bsid
y rate exceed
s 30%
 in Sw
ed
en, P
ortu
gal and
 D
enm
ark. In these three cases,
the d
irect su
bsid
y rate is high (althou
gh this resu
lt is som
ew
hat su
sp
ect in the case of
P
ortu
gal for reasons alread
y d
iscu
ssed
) and
 the d
isincentive effects of p
ersonal taxes are low
.
In P
ortu
gal, m
oreover, the tax rate im
p
lied
 by social benefits is very low
, m
ostly as a resu
lt of
the low
 sensitivity of the p
robability of em
p
loym
ent to attainm
ent (i.e. becau
se of the low
estim
ated
 valu
e of ε). 16 In both D
enm
ark and
 Sw
ed
en, the tax system
 actu
ally raises the
retu
rn to schooling. T
his su
rp
rising resu
lt arises from
 a com
bination of factors that inclu
d
es
relatively low
 p
rogressivity ratios and
 the interaction betw
een a negative p
rivate cost (µ
s  <
0) and
 a high average tax rate on ad
u
lt w
orkers.
d
. H
ow
 d
oes th
e p
rivate retu
rn
 on
 sch
oolin
g com
p
are w
ith
 th
at on
 altern
ative assets?
T
able 5 com
p
ares the p
rivate after-tax retu
rn to ed
u
cation (u
nd
er the all-in scenario, O
B
S)
to the before-tax real retu
rn on d
ebt and
 equ
ity. T
he real retu
rns on bond
s and
 stocks are
averages for the p
eriod
 1950-1989 and
 are taken from
 D
im
son, M
arsh and
 Stau
nton (2002). 17
Since these au
thors p
rovid
e no d
ata for A
u
stria, G
reece, Finland
 and
 P
ortu
gal, I have
im
p
u
ted
 to these cou
ntries the average retu
rns in the rem
aind
er of the sam
p
le. A
s u
su
al, the
corresp
ond
ing entries are show
n in bold
 typ
e in T
able 5. C
olu
m
n [5] of T
able 5 show
s w
hat I
w
ill call the private prem
ium
 on hum
an capital. T
his variable is d
efined
 as the d
ifference
betw
een the private rate of retu
rn on schooling (colu
m
n [1] of the sam
e table) and
 the average
return on a portfolio w
here bond
s and
 shares have the sam
e w
eight (colum
n [4]).
16
 See the d
iscu
ssion of the im
pact of u
nem
ploym
ent benefits at the end
 of section 2a. B
ecau
se the rate of
return form
ula is highly non-linear, interaction effects are im
portant. A
s a result, effective tax rates are not
necessarily p
rop
ortional to tax or benefit levels -- i.e. it is not necessarily tru
e, for instance, that the
d
isincentive effects of u
nem
p
loym
ent benefits are highest in cou
ntries w
here those benefits are m
ost
generous.
17 T
he sam
e sou
rce p
rovid
es average retu
rns for the p
eriod
 1950-2000. T
his last year, how
ever, is
p
robably not a good
 reference p
oint, for it m
arks the p
eak of a long bu
ll m
arket associated
 w
ith a
"technological bu
bble." A
t the tim
e of w
riting this rep
ort, m
any W
estern stock m
arket ind
ices have lost
around
 50%
 of their value relative to their 2000 peaks. T
he average return on the equal w
eights portfolio I
u
se as a reference, w
ere 1 p
ercentage p
oint higher over 1950-2000 than over 1950-89 (5.02%
 rather than
4.03%
). T
his is a significant d
ifference, but it d
oes not qualitatively affect our conclusions.
31
T
ab
le 5: N
et after-tax rate of retu
rn
 on
 sch
oolin
g vs. before-tax real retu
rn
on
 fin
an
cial assets, an
d
 p
rivate p
rem
iu
m
 on
 h
u
m
an
 cap
ital
__________________________________________________________
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
schoolin
g
rp
equ
ity
bonds
av
g
e.
portfolio
prem
ium
 on
h. 
capital
A
u
stria
10.50%
6.93%
1.12%
4.03%
6.48%
B
elgiu
m
8.56%
6.50%
1.90%
4.20%
4.36%
D
en
m
ark
8.87%
6.20%
2.60%
4.40%
4.47%
F
in
lan
d
9.62%
6.93%
1.12%
4.03%
5.59%
F
ran
ce
9.59%
7.70%
3.70%
5.70%
3.89%
G
erm
an
y
10.43%
9.50%
3.40%
6.45%
3.98%
G
reece
9.81%
6.93%
1.12%
4.03%
5.78%
Irelan
d
10.41%
6.90%
0.30%
3.60%
6.81%
Italy
8.61%
4.90%
0.20%
2.55%
6.06%
N
etherlan
ds
7.95%
7.50%
-0.30%
3.60%
4.35%
P
ortu
gal
12.29%
6.93%
1.12%
4.03%
8.27%
S
pain
9.36%
4.50%
-0.90%
1.80%
7.56%
S
w
eden
6.06%
8.70%
-0.80%
3.95%
2.11%
U
K
13.87%
8.30%
-0.30%
4.00%
9.87%
avge. E
U
14
9.75%
6.93%
1.12%
4.03%
5.72%
__________________________________________________________
- N
ote: N
o d
ata are available on the returns to bond
s and
 shares in A
ustria, Finland
, G
reece and
 Portugal. I
im
pute to these countries the average return in the rest of the sam
ple.
T
hese d
ata reinforce ou
r conclu
sion in D
&
C
 (2002) that schooling is a rather attractive
investm
ent from
 an ind
ivid
u
al p
oint of view
. 18 For the average cou
ntry, the real retu
rn to
schooling exceed
s the retu
rn on bond
s by 8.6 p
oints and
 that on equ
ity by 2.8 p
oints. W
hen
allow
ance is m
ad
e for taxes on cap
ital incom
e (a com
p
licated
 m
atter that I w
ill not ad
d
ress
here), the p
rem
iu
m
 on schooling w
ill increase significantly. T
he retu
rn d
ifferential w
ith
bon
d
s is p
ositive in
 all cou
n
tries an
d
 is alw
ays above 5.9 p
oin
ts (w
h
ich
 is th
e valu
e
corresp
ond
ing to France). T
he before-tax retu
rn to equ
ity, how
ever, is above the rate of retu
rn
on schooling in Sw
ed
en d
ue to a com
bination of outstand
ing stock m
arket perform
ance and
 the
low
est returns to ed
ucation in the sam
ple. T
he prem
ium
 on hum
an capital, as d
efined
 above, is
p
ositive in all cou
ntries, and
 ranges from
 2.11%
 in Sw
ed
en to 9.87%
 in the U
K
 w
ith a m
ean
valu
e of 5.72%
. 19
18
 A
s noted
 in D
&
C
 (2002), in ord
er to d
raw
 u
nequ
ivocal conclu
sions abou
t the relative attractiveness of
ed
ucation as an investm
ent, w
e w
ould
 need
 to control for the riskiness of its returns. W
hile the variation of
earnings across w
orkers w
ith sim
ilar attainm
ent levels is very high, m
uch of this variation is not the result
of rand
om
 lu
ck bu
t of d
ifferences in ind
ivid
u
al abilities and
 career choices. I am
 not aw
are of any refined
m
easures of earnings risk that can be used
 to d
raw
 valid
 com
parisons w
ith other assets.
   O
n a d
ifferent note, P
ad
u
la and
 P
istaferri (2001) p
rovid
e som
e evid
ence that introd
u
cing risk
consid
erations m
ay actually increase the attractiveness of investm
ent in schooling. T
hey find
, in particular,
that increases in attainm
ent tend
 to low
er w
age risk and
, as a resu
lt, increase the (risk-ad
ju
sted
) rate of
return on schooling. (T
hanks to G
. B
runello for provid
ing this reference).
19 T
he absence of d
ata on financial returns m
akes m
y estim
ates of the private prem
ium
 on schooling rather
u
ncertain for fou
r cou
ntries (A
u
stria, G
reece, Finland
 and
 P
ortu
gal). N
otice, how
ever, that the hu
m
an
capital prem
iu
m
 in these cou
ntries w
ou
ld
 rem
ain over three percentage points if w
e assigned
 to them
 the
highest rate of retu
rn on financial assets observed
 in the sam
p
le. T
he p
rem
iu
m
 on schooling w
ou
ld
 also
rem
ain positive in all cases if w
e used
 financial returns over the period
 1950-2000 to calculate it.
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4. T
h
e social retu
rn
 to sch
oolin
g an
d
 th
e op
tim
al in
vestm
en
t p
attern
In this section I w
ill focus on the social return to investm
ent in ed
ucation. A
s in the previous
section, the relevant rate of retu
rn w
ill be calcu
lated
 by ap
p
lying the form
u
la d
erived
 in
section 2 (equ
ation (12)) to a hyp
othetical rep
resentative ind
ivid
u
al for each cou
ntry. T
he
only d
ifference is that w
e w
ill now
 be concerned
 w
ith the social, rather than p
rivate, costs
and
 benefits of an ad
d
itional year of schooling. A
s a resu
lt, w
e need
 to consid
er the effects of
ed
u
cation on aggregate ou
tpu
t rather than on ind
ivid
u
al incom
e, and
 its contribu
tion to faster
technological p
rogress. O
n the other hand
, taxes and
 social benefits are no longer relevant, as
w
e are not interested
 in flow
s of resources betw
een the public and
 private sectors.
a. D
ata an
d
 sou
rces
T
able 6 d
efines the variables that enter the social rate of retu
rn form
u
la and
 T
able 7 show
s
the relevant d
ata. A
s u
su
al, bold
 entries ind
icate m
issing or incom
p
lete d
ata. T
he cost and
em
p
loym
ent p
aram
eters have been taken from
 the sam
e sou
rces as those u
sed
 in the p
rivate
return calculations, and
 their construction is d
iscussed
 in the A
ppend
ix.
T
ab
le 6: V
ariab
les u
sed
 in
 th
e calcu
lation
 of th
e social
rate of retu
rn
 on
 sch
oolin
g an
d
 sou
rces of th
e d
ata
______________________________________________________________________
ρ
, ρ
m
in =
 m
acroeconom
ic M
incerian retu
rns to schooling p
aram
eter. It m
easu
res the average
(log) in
crease in
 ou
tp
u
t p
er em
p
loyed
 w
orker resu
ltin
g from
 an
 ad
d
ition
al year of
schooling of the ad
u
lt p
op
u
lation. It is obtained
 by d
ivid
ing the estim
ated
 elasticity of
ou
tp
u
t w
ith resp
ect to the stock of hu
m
an cap
ital (α
S ) by average attainm
ent in each
cou
ntry, u
sing the resu
lts in D
&
D
 (2002). M
y baseline estim
ates of ρ are based
 on an
estim
ate of α
S  that is corrected
 for m
easu
rem
ent error bias, bu
t I also u
se an u
ncorrected
estim
ate to obtain a low
er bound
 on the value of ρ, w
hich is d
enoted
 by ρ
m
in .
U
  =
 A
verage retirem
ent age in 1995. See T
ables 1 and
 2.
So  =
 average years of school attainm
ent of the ad
u
lt (over 25) p
op
u
lation in 1990. Sou
rce: d
e
la Fuente and
 D
om
énech (2001).
H
=
 U
 - M
ax(6+
S
o , 14) =
 estim
ated
 len
gth
 of th
e (p
ost-sch
ool) w
orkin
g life of th
e
rep
resentative ind
ivid
u
al. See T
ables 1 and
 2.
µ
 =
 total costs of schooling p
er stu
d
ent m
easu
red
 as a fraction of G
D
P
 p
er em
p
loyed
 w
orker.
C
alcu
lated
 as d
escribed
 in T
able 1. See section 1 of the A
p
p
end
ix for d
etails.
p
o  =
 total p
robability of em
p
loym
ent after leaving school (i.e. ratio of em
p
loym
ent to the
total p
op
u
lation of w
orking age). Sou
rce: E
u
rostat, Sp
ring 2000 L
abor Force Su
rvey. I u
se
valu
es for the 35-44 p
op
u
lation.
______________________________________________________________________
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T
ab
le 6-- con
tin
u
ed
______________________________________________________________________
η  =
 correction factor capturing low
er stud
ent labour force participation and
 em
ploym
ent rates.
Sou
rce: calcu
lated
 as the ratio betw
een the total p
robability of em
p
loym
ent of those
enrolled
 in ed
u
cation and
 those not enrolled
 in ed
u
cation am
ong w
orkers aged
 20 to 24,
u
sing d
ata for 1998 from
 E
ducation at a G
lance 2000. See section 3 of the A
ppend
ix.
ε =
 p'(S)/p(S) =
 sensitivity of the total p
robability of em
p
loym
ent to the level of schooling.
Sou
rce: estim
ated
 u
sing d
ata from
 E
u
rostat's Spring 2000 L
abor Force Su
rvey. See section 3
of the A
p
p
end
ix.
______________________________________________________________________
T
ab
le 7: D
ata u
sed
 in
 th
e calcu
lation
 of th
e social rate of retu
rn
 to sch
oolin
g
____________________________________________________________________
S
o
ρ
ρ
m
in
µ
p
o
ε
η
A
u
stria
11.31
5.19%
3.48%
14.59%
84.73%
1.17%
61.95%
B
elgiu
m
10.08
5.82%
3.91%
9.69%
80.95%
1.53%
13.10%
D
en
m
ark
11.73
5.00%
3.36%
13.04%
87.66%
0.87%
88.66%
F
in
lan
d
10.97
5.35%
3.59%
9.90%
83.65%
0.71%
41.05%
F
ran
ce
10.45
5.62%
3.77%
11.77%
80.41%
1.49%
16.46%
G
erm
an
y
12.95
4.53%
3.04%
12.02%
81.62%
1.64%
61.95%
G
reece
7.91
7.42%
4.98%
7.29%
74.05%
1.29%
8.58%
Irelan
d
9.41
6.24%
4.19%
7.98%
73.54%
2.46%
57.86%
Italy
8.04
7.30%
4.90%
9.29%
82.90%
1.24%
1.67%
N
etherlan
ds
10.95
5.36%
3.60%
10.70%
83.97%
2.07%
65.19%
P
ortu
gal
6.41
9.16%
6.15%
11.98%
84.57%
0.65%
25.06%
S
pain
7.10
8.27%
5.55%
8.16%
70.61%
1.36%
15.37%
S
w
eden
10.62
5.53%
3.71%
13.16%
81.74%
1.25%
27.77%
U
K
10.52
5.58%
3.75%
10.41%
80.80%
2.46%
57.86%
average E
U
14
9.89
6.17%
4.14%
10.71%
80.80%
1.44%
38.75%
____________________________________________________________________
  - N
ote. Incom
plete data on ε
 and η: Ireland is assum
ed to be equal to the U
K
 and A
ustria equal to G
erm
any.
A
n im
p
ortant d
ifference w
ith the calcu
lations p
resented
 in the p
reviou
s section is that I
w
ill now
 consid
er the total effect of ed
u
cation on em
p
loym
ent, rather than ju
st the increase in
the p
robability of em
p
loym
ent of active w
orkers. T
hat is, I w
ill consid
er as p
art of the social
benefits of ed
u
cation the ind
u
ced
 increase in the rate of labou
r force p
articip
ation. H
ence, the
valu
es of p
o , ε
 and
 η
 u
sed
 in this section are based
 on d
ata on the absolu
te p
robability of
em
p
loym
ent (i.e. the fraction of the ad
u
lt p
op
u
lation that is em
p
loyed
) rather than on the
p
robability of em
p
loym
ent cond
itional on labou
r force p
articip
ation, as w
as the case in the
p
reviou
s 
section
. 20 A
 second
 d
ifference is that the variable that m
easu
res the cost of
20
 A
s in the previous section, the raw
 estim
ate of ε
 d
escribed
 in section 3 of the A
ppend
ix is red
uced
 (now
by tw
o third
s) to try to correct for its likely bias.
34
ed
u
cation
, µ
, now
 refers to total rather than p
rivate exp
end
itu
re, and
 is norm
alized
 by
average labou
r p
rod
u
ctivity rather than by A
P
W
 earnings.
For the calcu
lation of the social rate of retu
rn, the m
icroeconom
ic M
incerian retu
rns
param
eter (θ) used
 in the previous section m
ust be replaced
 by its m
acroeconom
ic or aggregate
cou
n
terp
art (ρ
), w
hich m
easu
res the contribu
tion of an ad
d
itional year of schooling to
aggregate p
rod
u
ctivity rath
er th
an
 to labou
r earn
in
gs. T
h
is variable is con
stru
cted
 by
d
ivid
ing the estim
ated
 coefficient of hu
m
an cap
ital in the aggregate p
rod
u
ction fu
nction (α
S )
by average attainm
ent in each cou
ntry, as ind
icated
 in B
ox 1. T
he estim
ate of α
S com
es from
 a
single cross-cou
ntry grow
th regression w
ith p
anel d
ata rather than from
 w
age equ
ations
estim
ated
 sep
arately for each
 cou
n
try w
ith
 in
d
ivid
u
al-level w
age d
ata. T
h
e ch
oice of
baseline valu
es for α
S  w
ill be d
iscu
ssed
 in greater d
etail in the follow
ing section.
b
. P
aram
eter valu
es an
d
 th
e effects of h
u
m
an
 cap
ital on
 aggregate p
rod
u
ctivity
T
able 8 lists the valu
es or ranges of valu
es of the p
aram
eters that w
ill be u
sed
 below
 to
com
p
u
te the social retu
rn on investm
ent in hu
m
an and
 p
hysical cap
ital, w
ith m
y baseline
estim
ates show
n in italics. A
s in the p
reviou
s section, I assu
m
e an exogenou
s (stead
y-state)
rate of prod
uctivity grow
th of 1.5%
 per annum
 and
 a value of φ
 equal to 0.8.
T
ab
le 8:  P
aram
eter valu
es u
sed
 in
 th
e calcu
lation
s
__________________________________
    hum
an capital:
level effects: α
S
0.394-0.587
rate effects: γ
0-0.20%
    others:
p
hysical cap
ital: α
k
0.345
technological d
iffu
sion: λ
0.074
s.s. rate of tech. progress: g
0.015
tim
e used
 in school: φ
0.80
__________________________________
- N
ote: T
he rep
orted
 valu
es of α
k ,  λ and
 the first valu
e given for α
S  are taken from
 d
e la Fu
ente and
D
om
énech (D
&
D
 2002), T
able 9e, equ
ation [e8]. T
he second
 valu
e for α
S   is taken from
 D
&
D
 (2002), T
able
11a, equ
ation [4].
T
he rem
aining coefficients show
n in the table are the key p
aram
eters of the grow
th m
od
el
ou
tlined
 in section 2b (see B
ox 1). T
he first tw
o are the elasticities of aggregate ou
tp
u
t w
ith
resp
ect to average ed
u
cational attainm
ent (α
S ) and
 to the stock of p
hysical cap
ital (α
k ).
T
hese p
aram
eters m
easu
re the p
ercentage increase in ou
tp
u
t that w
ou
ld
 resu
lt from
 a 1%
increase in the stocks of hu
m
an or p
hysical cap
ital. T
he third
 coefficient (γ) cap
tu
res the
intensity of rate effects, i.e. the contribu
tion of one ad
d
itional year of schooling to the grow
th
rate of total factor p
rod
u
ctivity (T
FP
). T
he last p
aram
eter of interest (λ) can be interp
reted
 as
the rate of technological d
iffu
sion across cou
ntries. N
otice that the technological d
iffu
sion
p
rocess assu
m
ed
 in the m
od
el im
p
lies that increases in schooling have only transitory effects
35
on the grow
th rate of T
FP
 and
, in the long ru
n, affect only the level of this variable. T
he
p
ercentage increase in stead
y-state T
FP
 ind
u
ced
 by a one-year increase in average attainm
ent
is given by γ/λ.
T
he values of α
k  and
 λ  show
n in T
able 8 and
 the low
er bound
 on the level effects param
eter
(α
S  =
 0.394) com
e from
 d
e la Fu
ente and
 D
om
énech's (D
&
D
 2000) estim
ation (w
ithou
t
correcting for m
easu
rem
ent error) of a m
od
el sim
ilar to the one d
escribed
 in B
ox 1 excep
t in
that it d
oes not inclu
d
e rate effects. 21
T
he baseline estim
ates of α
S   and
 γ  are constru
cted
 d
raw
ing on the resu
lts of D
&
D
 (2002)
and
 other p
ap
ers in the m
anner d
iscu
ssed
 in d
etail in section 6 of the A
p
p
end
ix. I take from
the literatu
re a nu
m
ber of estim
ates of the effect of an ad
d
itional year of schooling on the
level of ou
tp
u
t and
 u
se resu
lts from
 D
&
D
 (2002) to correct them
 for m
easu
rem
ent error bias.
T
he corrected
 estim
ates obtained
 in this m
anner im
p
ly M
incerian retu
rns to schooling at the
ind
ivid
u
al level that are w
ell above existing m
icroeconom
etric estim
ates. 22 If w
e take these
resu
lts at face valu
e, they ind
icate that the externalities associated
 w
ith the accu
m
u
lation
of hu
m
an cap
ital are p
otentially very large. W
e need
 to be carefu
l, how
ever, becau
se as noted
in D
&
C
 (2002), these estim
ates m
ay also contain a p
ositive bias arising from
 end
ogeneity
(reverse cau
sation) problem
s.
T
he corrected
 estim
ates of the hu
m
an cap
ital coefficient constru
cted
 in the A
p
p
end
ix m
ay
be seen as the su
m
 of three com
p
onents: the first one m
easu
res the d
irect contribu
tion of
schooling to p
rod
u
ctivity that is d
irectly ap
p
rop
iable by ind
ivid
u
als throu
gh higher w
ages,
the second
 one cap
tu
res externalities linked
 to investm
ent in hu
m
an cap
ital, and
 the third
 is
the p
otential end
ogeneity bias. T
o try to sep
arate these three factors, I w
ill set the first
com
p
on
en
t ap
p
roxim
ately equ
al to th
e valu
e of α
S  that w
ou
ld
 be im
p
lied
 by existing
m
icroeconom
etric estim
ates of the M
incerian retu
rns param
eter for ou
r E
U
 sam
ple. I w
ill then
interp
ret the d
ifference betw
een each of the corrected
 estim
ates and
 this baseline valu
e of α
S
as a p
otentially biased
 m
easu
re of the size of externalities. Finally, I attem
p
t to narrow
 d
ow
n
the range of p
ossible valu
es of the externality p
aram
eter by exam
ining the im
p
lications of
d
ifferent assu
m
p
tions abou
t its valu
e
 for the im
p
ortance of externalities from
 hu
m
an cap
ital
as a sou
rce of cross-cou
ntry d
ifferentials in relative levels of total factor p
rod
u
ctivity (T
FP
) in
an O
E
C
D
 sam
p
le. M
y baseline valu
e of the externalities coefficient w
ill be based
 on the
21
 A
s is often the case in the literatu
re, attem
p
ts to estim
ate level and
 rate effects jointly p
rod
u
ced
u
nsatisfactory resu
lts. T
here is som
e d
iscu
ssion in D
&
C
 (2002) of w
hy it m
ay be d
ifficu
lt to d
isentangle
these tw
o effects.
22 A
s d
iscussed
 in D
&
C
 (2002), estim
ates of the m
icro and
 m
acroeconom
ic M
incerian returns param
eter (θ
and
 ρ) cannot be com
p
ared
 d
irectly becau
se the latter hold
 the stock of p
hysical cap
ital constant and
 the
form
er d
o not. U
nd
er som
e assum
ptions (see section 8 of the A
ppend
ix), the relationship betw
een these tw
o
param
eters is given by ρ =
 (1-α
k ) θ, w
here α
k  is the elasticity of aggregate output w
ith respect to the stock of
physical capital. I w
ill u
se this form
ula below
, w
ith the value of α
k  given in T
able 8, to calculate the value
of θ im
plied by different estim
ates of ρ.
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assu
m
p
tion that the external effects of hu
m
an cap
ital accou
nt for one third
 of observed
 T
FP
d
ifferentials across O
E
C
D
 cou
ntries in 1990.
T
o 
im
p
lem
en
t 
th
is 
ap
p
roach
, 
I 
w
ill 
assu
m
e 
th
at 
th
e 
extern
alities 
lin
ked
 
to 
th
e
accu
m
u
lation of hu
m
an cap
ital take the form
 of w
hat I have called
 rate effects, i.e. that
they affect the rate of technical p
rogress in the m
anner d
escribed
 in B
ox 1. I m
ake this
assu
m
p
tion for tw
o reasons. T
he first one is that I believe this is the m
ost p
lau
sible sou
rce of
hu
m
an cap
ital externalities id
entified
 in the literatu
re. T
he second
 reason is that this is
actu
ally a rather conservative assu
m
p
tion, for it im
p
lies that externalities m
aterialize only
grad
u
ally over tim
e and
 m
u
st therefore be d
iscou
nted
. T
his m
akes the contribu
tion of
externalities to the social rate of retu
rn on schooling consid
erably low
er than it w
ou
ld
 be
u
nd
er the alternative assu
m
p
tion that they have an im
m
ed
iate effect on ou
tp
u
t levels.
T
o be m
ore p
recise, m
y baseline valu
e for α
S   is the low
est of all the m
eta-estim
ates of this
p
aram
eter obtained
 by D
&
D
 (2002) after correcting for m
easu
rem
ent error bias. 23 T
his valu
e
of α
S   im
p
lies a valu
e of θ  (the ind
ivid
u
al-level M
incerian retu
rns p
aram
eter) equ
al to 9.06%
for the average E
U
 cou
ntry, w
hich is half-w
ay betw
een H
arm
on et al's (2001) m
ean estim
ate
of 8.06%
 for ou
r E
U
 sam
p
le and
 their average estim
ate of 10.62%
 for the A
nglo-Saxon
cou
ntries (see T
able 2 above) w
here estim
ates of θ  p
resu
m
ably best cap
tu
re p
rod
u
ctivity
effects d
u
e to labou
r m
arket flexibility. A
fter correctin
g for m
easu
rem
en
t error bias,
p
ractically all th
e oth
er estim
ates of th
e h
u
m
an
 cap
ital p
aram
eter con
sid
ered
 in
 th
e
A
p
p
end
ix im
p
ly consid
erably larger valu
es of θ for the average E
U
 cou
ntry. D
&
D
's average
m
eta-estim
ate, for instance, im
p
lies a valu
e of 17.2%
 for this p
aram
eter, and
 estim
ates taken
from
 other p
ap
ers in the literatu
re im
p
ly valu
es of θ ranging from
 11.7%
 (C
ohen and
 Soto,
2001) to 32.9%
 (Jones, 1996).
T
o obtain an estim
ate of the rate effects p
aram
eter, γ, I reinterp
ret the corrected
 estim
ates
of the hu
m
an cap
ital coefficient d
iscu
ssed
 above as cap
tu
ring the total contribu
tion of
schooling to stead
y-state ou
tp
u
t levels w
ithin the fram
ew
ork of the m
od
el sketeched
 in B
ox
1, and
 solve for the im
p
lied
 valu
e of γ given the assu
m
ed
 baseline valu
e of the level effects
p
aram
eter α
S  . Since the resu
lting interval of estim
ates of the rate effects p
aram
eter is rather
broad
 and
 inclu
d
es im
p
lau
sibly high valu
es of γ that are likely to su
ffer from
 reverse-
cau
sation bias, I set γ by assu
m
ing that rate effects accou
nt for a bit over one third
 of observed
T
FP
 d
ifferentials across O
E
C
D
 cou
ntries. T
his assu
m
ption yield
s a  baseline valu
e of 0.20%
 for
γ
 , w
hich im
p
lies that a one-year increase in average attainm
ent w
ill raise p
rod
u
ctivity by
3.1%
 in the m
ed
iu
m
 or long-ru
n throu
gh its contribu
tion to faster technological p
rogress. T
his
23 T
hese authors construct nine d
ifferent m
eta-estim
ates of α
S  by com
bining three d
ifferent specifications of
the p
rod
u
ction fu
nction (in levels, w
ith fixed
 effects and
 in d
ifferences) w
ith three d
ifferent assu
m
p
tions
about the nature of m
easurem
ent error. The estim
ated values of α
S   range from
 0.587 to 2.606, w
ith a m
ean of
1.11.
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d
elayed
 effect m
u
st be ad
d
ed
 to the im
m
ed
iate contribu
tion of attainm
ent to p
rod
u
ctivity
throu
gh the level effect, w
hich stand
s at 6.2%
 for the average E
U
 cou
ntry. 24
c. R
esu
lts
Figu
re 6 show
s tw
o alternative estim
ates of the social rate of retu
rn to schooling (rs ) in ou
r
sam
ple of E
U
 m
em
ber cou
ntries. B
oth sets of figu
res are all-in estim
ates that take into accou
nt
rate effects (u
sing ou
r  baseline estim
ate of 0.20%
 for γ) and
 ind
u
ced
 changes in em
p
loym
ent
and
 correct for d
ifferential stu
d
ent em
p
loym
ent p
robabilities. T
he only d
ifference betw
een
them
 has to d
o w
ith the assu
m
ed
 valu
e of the level effects p
aram
eter (α
S ), w
hich is corrected
for m
easu
rem
ent error bias in one case (labeled
 baseline  in the figu
re) bu
t not in the other
(m
in
).
Figu
re 6: S
ocial rate of retu
rn
 to sch
oolin
g in
 th
e E
U
6% 7% 8% 9%
10%
11%
12%
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Sp
Ir
G
r
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N
l
avge
B
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G
e
O
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m
in
A
ccord
ing to m
y baseline estim
ates, the social rate of retu
rn to schooling in the E
U
 ranges
from
 8.3%
 in Finland
 to 11.5%
 in P
ortu
gal, w
ith an average valu
e of 9.7%
. U
nd
er the m
ore
p
essim
istic (m
in) assu
m
ption on the size of the level effects, the average retu
rn d
rops to 7.75%
and
 the low
est valu
e of rs  to 6.5%
. U
nd
er both assu
m
p
tions, estim
ated
 retu
rns to hu
m
an
cap
ital are highest in the cohesion cou
ntries and
 the U
K
, and
 low
est in the Scand
inavian and
G
erm
an-speaking countries.
T
able 9 gives the norm
alized
 valu
es of the baseline estim
ate of rs  and
 of its variou
s cost
and
 benefit com
p
onents (see equ
ation (12) in section 2b). A
s in the case of the p
rivate rate of
24
 N
otice that the valu
es of the p
rod
u
ctivity p
aram
eters u
sed
 here are som
ew
hat d
ifferent from
 those
assu
m
ed
 in ou
r previou
s report. M
y new
 baseline estim
ates are based
 on the final resu
lts of d
e la Fu
ente
and
 D
om
énech (2002), w
hich w
as still in p
rogress w
hen D
&
C
 (2002) w
as com
p
leted
 and
 d
iffer from
 the
previous ones m
ostly because an im
proved
 correction for m
easurem
ent error bias has raised
 m
y estim
ate of
the level param
eters. Since this red
u
ces the u
nexplained
 or T
FP
 com
ponent of cross-cou
ntry prod
u
ctivity
d
isp
arities, ou
r original estim
ate of the rate effects p
aram
eter has been red
u
ced
 to keep
 hu
m
an cap
ital's
contribution to T
FP d
ifferences w
ithin prud
ent bound
s. W
hen these param
eters are translated
 into the long-
term
 contribu
tions to ou
tp
u
t grow
th of an ad
d
itional year of schooling, the total figu
re d
rop
s som
ew
hat
(from
  5 + 5 = 10%
 to 6.2 + 3.1 = 9.3%
). Because m
ost of the im
pact is now
 im
m
ediate, how
ever, the estim
ated
social rate of return to schooling w
ill tend
 to be higher than und
er our earlier param
eter estim
ates, as w
ill
be seen in the next section.
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retu
rn, p
rod
u
ctivity effects and
 op
p
ortu
nity costs are the d
om
inant d
eterm
inants of the social
rate of retu
rn to schooling. In the average cou
ntry, level effects on prod
u
ctivity ( ρ) accou
nt for
65%
 of the total benefits of schooling and
 rate effects (E
X
T
) for an ad
d
itional 20%
, w
hile
opportunity costs (O
P
P
C
) m
ake up alm
ost 90%
 of total costs.
T
ab
le 9: S
ocial rate of retu
rn
 to sch
oolin
g (b
aselin
e estim
ate) an
d
 its com
p
on
en
ts,
n
orm
alized
 valu
es
______________________________________________________________________
rp
N
U
M
ρ
EX
T
ε
D
E
N
O
M
O
P
P
C
D
IR
C
P
ortu
gal
116.3
121.4
96.7
17.7
6.9
103.4
90.0
13.4
Irelan
d
115.5
109.7
65.9
17.8
26.0
94.1
83.8
10.3
S
pain
115.3
119.6
87.3
17.9
14.4
102.8
91.9
11.0
G
reece
107.8
110.6
78.4
18.7
13.6
102.5
93.2
9.3
U
K
107.5
103.7
58.9
18.7
26.0
96.0
83.8
12.2
Italy
103.9
109.3
77.1
19.1
13.1
105.1
94.5
10.6
N
etherlan
ds
102.5
97.8
56.6
19.3
21.9
94.5
82.4
12.1
B
elgiu
m
94.0
98.0
61.5
20.4
16.1
103.6
92.3
11.3
F
ran
ce
91.0
95.9
59.3
20.8
15.8
105.5
91.7
13.9
D
en
m
ark
90.6
82.9
52.9
20.8
9.2
92.1
78.0
14.1
S
w
eden
89.5
92.6
58.4
21.0
13.2
104.8
89.5
15.3
G
erm
an
y
88.8
86.4
47.9
21.1
17.4
97.0
83.0
14.0
A
u
stria
88.5
88.3
54.8
21.1
12.4
99.4
83.0
16.3
F
in
lan
d
87.1
85.4
56.5
21.3
7.5
98.2
87.0
11.2
avge. E
U
14
100.0
100.0
65.2
19.6
15.2
100.0
87.4
12.6
______________________________________________________________________
- N
ote: entries in bold
 or bold
 italics are based
 on incom
plete inform
ation. See the text, A
ppend
ix 1 and
 the
notes to T
able 10 for further d
etails.
T
ab
le 10: N
et social rates of retu
rn
 to sch
oolin
g u
n
d
er d
ifferen
t scen
arios
______________________________________________________________________
                                     level effects                   + em
pl. eff.                  + rate effects              + diffstE
 corr.
m
in
baselin
e
m
in
baselin
e
m
in
baselin
e
m
in
baselin
e
A
u
stria
3.46%
5.95%
5.22%
7.45%
7.22%
9.04%
6.73%
8.45%
B
elgiu
m
4.44%
7.18%
6.66%
9.11%
8.47%
10.57%
7.22%
9.06%
D
en
m
ark
3.65%
6.04%
4.98%
7.17%
7.04%
8.81%
6.89%
8.63%
F
in
lan
d
4.10%
6.66%
5.19%
7.59%
7.28%
9.23%
6.51%
8.30%
F
ran
ce
4.23%
6.81%
6.35%
8.65%
8.14%
10.10%
7.03%
8.76%
G
erm
an
y
2.87%
5.24%
5.46%
7.44%
7.45%
9.07%
6.93%
8.46%
G
reece
6.54%
9.58%
8.18%
11.09%
9.73%
12.35%
8.32%
10.55%
Irelan
d
5.34%
8.04%
8.55%
10.96%
10.04%
12.22%
9.31%
11.33%
Italy
6.25%
9.27%
7.85%
10.72%
9.43%
11.99%
7.97%
10.15%
N
etherlan
ds
3.92%
6.52%
6.93%
9.15%
8.67%
10.58%
8.13%
9.93%
P
ortu
gal
7.70%
11.13%
8.47%
11.85%
9.92%
13.00%
8.75%
11.46%
S
pain
7.12%
10.39%
8.79%
11.94%
10.25%
13.11%
8.87%
11.34%
S
w
eden
4.30%
6.74%
6.01%
8.23%
7.81%
9.69%
6.91%
8.60%
U
K
4.47%
7.00%
7.78%
9.96%
9.35%
11.29%
8.68%
10.48%
avge. E
U
14
4.97%
7.68%
6.94%
9.41%
8.64%
10.79%
7.75%
9.70%
______________________________________________________________________
- N
ote: B
old
 italics ind
icate estim
ates based
 on incom
p
lete d
ata (w
hose im
p
act on the estim
ated
 rate of
return is not likely to be very large). T
he values of η
  in A
ustria and
 Ireland
 are assum
ed
 to be the sam
e as
those for G
erm
any and the U
K
 respectively. The value of ε in Ireland is assum
ed to be the sam
e as in the U
K
.
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A
s in the p
reviou
s section, it w
ill be convenient to recalcu
late the rate of retu
rn to
schooling u
nd
er a variety of assu
m
p
tions or scenarios in ord
er to isolate the contribu
tion of
d
ifferen
t factors to th
is retu
rn
 an
d
 to ch
eck th
e sen
sitivity of th
e resu
lts to variou
s
assu
m
p
tions. U
sing the tw
o alternative assu
m
p
tions abou
t the size of level effects d
iscu
ssed
above, I w
ill constru
ct baselin
e and
 m
in
 estim
ates of the retu
rn to schooling u
nd
er fou
r
d
ifferent scenarios. T
he first one (level) consid
ers only the d
irect level effects of hu
m
an
cap
ital on average p
rod
u
ctivity. In the second
 one (em
ploym
ent), I introd
u
ce em
p
loym
ent
effects and
 in the third
 one (rate) I ad
d
 rate effects u
nd
er the assu
m
p
tion that γ
 =
 0.20%
. In
these three scenarios I assu
m
e that η
 =
 1 (i.e. that the p
robability of em
p
loym
ent for you
ng
p
eop
le is the sam
e in and
 ou
t of school). In the last scenario (O
B
S
), w
hich corresp
ond
s to
Figu
re 6, I u
se the estim
ated
 valu
e of η
  to correct for the low
 p
articip
ation and
 em
p
loym
ent
rates of stu
d
ents in m
any cou
ntries (diffstE
 correction).
T
able 10 show
s the resu
lts of the calcu
lations. A
s noted
 above, the bu
lk of the retu
rn to
hu
m
an cap
ital can be traced
 back to its d
irect (level) effects on p
rod
u
ctivity. C
onsid
ering only
this factor, the baseline estim
ate of rs  goes from
 5.95%
 in A
u
stria to 11.13%
 in P
ortu
gal w
ith a
sam
p
le average of 7.68%
. For the average cou
ntry, the sequ
ential introd
u
ction of em
p
loym
ent
and
 rate effects ad
d
s 1.73 and
 1.38 p
ercentage p
oints resp
ectively to the baseline retu
rns
arisin
g 
from
 
level 
effects, 
an
d
 
th
e 
correction
 
for 
d
ifferen
tial 
stu
d
en
t 
em
p
loym
en
t
p
robabilities low
ers the average valu
e of rs  by 1.09 p
oints. E
m
p
loym
ent effects ad
d
 over tw
o
p
oints to the rate of retu
rn in the U
K
, N
etherland
s and
 G
erm
any (as w
ell as in Ireland
, u
nd
er
the assu
m
p
tion that the relevant p
aram
eter is the sam
e as in the U
K
), and
 the stu
d
ent
correction is largest in the M
ed
iterranean cou
ntries.
d
. T
h
e relative retu
rn
s to in
vestm
en
t in
 sch
oolin
g an
d
 in
 p
h
ysical cap
ital
T
able 11 com
p
ares the estim
ated
 social retu
rn to schooling (u
sing the baseline estim
ates
u
nd
er the last, all-in scenario) w
ith tw
o alternative estim
ates of the retu
rn to p
hysical
cap
ital (rk ). T
he "d
irect" estim
ate of the rate of retu
rn on p
hysical cap
ital show
n in the
second
 colum
n of the table is calculated
 as rk  =
 M
P
k  - δ +
 g  w
here M
P
k  is the m
arginal prod
u
ct
of this factor, δ the rate of d
ep
reciation and
 g the rate of technical p
rogress. 25 M
y estim
ate of
M
P
k  is the m
arginal p
rod
u
ct of cap
ital in 1990 com
p
u
ted
 u
sing the p
rod
u
ction fu
nction
estim
ated
 in d
e la Fu
ente and
 D
om
énech (2002) and
 the d
ata u
sed
 by these au
thors, w
hich
inclu
d
es an estim
ate of the stock of p
hysical cap
ital. I assu
m
e a d
ep
reciation rate of 5%
 and
 a
valu
e of g of 1.5%
 (as in the calcu
lations of the rate of retu
rn to ed
u
cation).
25
 T
his form
u
la com
es ou
t of a calcu
lation analogou
s to the one d
escribed
 in section 2, w
hich is m
u
ch
sim
pler in the case of physical capital because of the absence of d
elays and
 rate effects.
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T
ab
le 11: N
et social rate of retu
rn
 on
 sch
oolin
g vs.
real retu
rn
 on
 p
h
ysical cap
ital
________________________________________
rs
schoolin
g
m
ax rk
(direct)
baseline rk
(adju
sted)
A
u
stria
8.45%
9.68%
7.27%
B
elgiu
m
9.06%
9.94%
7.46%
D
en
m
ark
8.63%
6.76%
5.08%
F
in
lan
d
8.30%
5.78%
4.34%
F
ran
ce
8.76%
9.54%
7.16%
G
erm
an
y
8.46%
8.46%
6.35%
G
reece
10.55%
9.50%
7.14%
Irelan
d
11.33%
11.43%
8.58%
Italy
10.15%
8.65%
6.50%
N
etherlan
ds
9.93%
9.30%
6.99%
P
ortu
gal
11.46%
12.90%
9.69%
S
pain
11.34%
11.29%
8.48%
S
w
eden
8.60%
8.59%
6.45%
U
K
10.48%
12.64%
9.49%
av
erag
e
9.70%
9.60%
7.21%
________________________________________
In Section 7 of the A
ppend
ix I com
pare these estim
ates w
ith those taken from
 other sou
rces
that m
ake u
se of national accou
nts d
ata on cap
ital incom
e and
 alternative estim
ates of the
stock of cap
ital. O
n the basis of this d
iscu
ssion, I conclu
d
e that m
y d
irect estim
ates of rk  are
likely to be biased
 u
p
w
ard
 and
 constru
ct an alternative or ad
ju
sted
 estim
ate that I w
ill u
se as
a baselin
e. T
h
is series, w
h
ich
 is d
en
oted
 by rk  adjusted in T
able 11, is constru
cted
 by
m
u
ltip
lying the p
reviou
s one by a correction factor that is the ratio of m
y d
irect estim
ate of rk
for the U
S (not show
n in the table) and
 P
oterba's (1997) estim
ate of the average rate of retu
rn
on corporate capital, w
hich is in tu
rn based
 on revised
 B
E
A
 d
ata.
Figu
re 7 su
m
m
arizes the inform
ation in T
ables 10 and
 11 for the case of the average E
U
cou
ntry. If w
e exclu
d
e the low
est bou
nd
 scenario (m
y m
in estim
ate w
hen only level effects are
consid
ered
), m
y calcu
lations su
ggest that the econom
ic retu
rns on hu
m
an capital are probably
higher than those on p
hysical cap
ital, as the m
ost com
p
rehensive baseline estim
ate of the
rate of retu
rn to schooling is 2.5 p
oints higher than m
y best estim
ate of the rate of retu
rn on
p
hysical cap
ital and
 lies a bit above m
y u
p
p
er bou
nd
 ("d
irect" estim
ate) for this m
agnitu
d
e.
Figu
re 8 show
s the situ
ation in each of the cou
ntries in the sam
p
le. It d
isp
lays the social
prem
ium
 on hum
an capital, d
efined
 as he d
ifference betw
een m
y baseline all-in estim
ate of
the social rate of retu
rn to schooling and
 each of the alternative estim
ates of the retu
rn to
p
hysical cap
ital. In all cases, m
y baseline estim
ate of the social p
rem
iu
m
 on hu
m
an cap
ital is
p
ositive, su
ggesting that hu
m
an cap
ital shou
ld
 be favou
red
 over p
hysical cap
ital as an
investm
ent alternative. T
his continu
es to be the case for half the cou
ntries in the sam
p
le
w
hen I u
se as a reference the u
pper bou
nd
 on the rate of retu
rn on physical capital. U
nd
er this
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"p
essim
istic" assu
m
p
tion, the retu
rn on p
hysical cap
ital w
ou
ld
 clearly exceed
 that on hu
m
an
cap
ital in the U
K
, P
ortu
gal, A
u
stria, B
elgiu
m
 and
 France.
Figu
re 7: S
ocial rate of retu
rn
 to sch
oolin
g u
n
d
er d
ifferen
t scen
arios an
d
retu
rn
s on
 p
h
ysical cap
ital in
 th
e average E
U
 cou
n
try
0% 2% 4% 6% 8%
10%
12%
o
nly level effects
 +
 em
ploym
ent
effects
 +
 0.20%
 rate
effects
 +
 stdiffE
co
rrection
return on
physical capital
baseline
m
in/m
ax
Figu
re 8: S
ocial p
rem
iu
m
 on
 h
u
m
an
 cap
ital
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5. C
om
p
arin
g p
rivate an
d
 p
u
b
lic retu
rn
s an
d
 im
p
lication
s for th
e fin
an
cin
g of ed
u
cation
C
om
p
arisons betw
een the p
rivate and
 social rates of retu
rn to schooling are p
otentially of
consid
erable interest becau
se they can alert u
s to d
iscrep
ancies betw
een social p
riorities and
p
rivate incentives that m
ay call for corrective p
olicy action. For instance, the find
ing that
th
e retu
rn
 to ed
u
cation
 is h
igh
er at th
e social th
an
 at th
e in
d
ivid
u
al level m
ay be
interp
reted
 as an ind
ication that existing ed
u
cational su
bsid
ies and
 other p
olicy m
easu
res
su
ch as com
p
u
lsory schooling law
s have been insu
fficient to fu
lly correct for the externalities
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associated
 w
ith ed
u
cational investm
ent. H
ence, ad
d
itional p
u
blic resou
rces m
ay be need
ed
 to
bring private incentives back in line w
ith social retu
rns and
 to raise investm
ent in ed
u
cation to
its socially op
tim
al level.
Su
ch com
parisons, how
ever, m
u
st be m
ad
e w
ith extrem
e care for a nu
m
ber of reasons. T
he
first on
e is th
at, as I h
ave em
p
h
asized
 rep
eated
ly, th
ere is con
sid
erable u
n
certain
ty
regard
ing the valu
es of p
ractically all the relevant variables. P
art of this u
ncertainty can be
traced
 back to incom
p
lete or im
p
erfect d
ata and
 to statistical and
 sp
ecification p
roblem
s that
m
ay yield
 biased
 estim
ates of som
e key p
aram
eters. Second
, it shou
ld
 be kep
t in m
ind
 that,
even abstracting from
 these p
roblem
s, the p
rivate and
 social rates of retu
rn to schooling
p
resented
 in p
reviou
s sections m
easu
re d
ifferent things. O
ne m
inor d
ifference, w
hich w
ill be
corrected
 shortly, is that the p
rivate retu
rns I have calcu
lated
 are cond
itional on labou
r force
p
articip
ation w
hile social retu
rns are not. A
 m
ore im
p
ortant d
ifference is that the p
rivate
retu
rns calcu
lated
 above cap
tu
re the financial rew
ard
s available to an ind
ivid
u
al acting
alone (i.e. in "p
artial equ
ilibriu
m
"), w
hile the social rates of retu
rn m
easu
re the p
ayoff to a
m
arginal increase in average schooling at the aggregate level (in "general equ
ilibriu
m
").
H
ence, p
rivate rates of retu
rn im
p
licitly hold
 constant factor p
rices and
 the econom
y-w
id
e
average level of ed
u
cation, w
hereas social rates of retu
rn allow
 for changes in these variables
bu
t hold
 the aggregate stock of p
hysical cap
ital constant. W
hile it is not d
ifficu
lt to ad
ju
st
p
rivate retu
rns for general equ
ilibriu
m
 effects, 26 it is not entirely clear w
hether social rates of
retu
rn shou
ld
 be com
pared
 to raw
 or to ad
ju
sted
 private retu
rns in ord
er to asses the potential
m
isalignm
ent betw
een private incentives and
 social need
s.
A
 third
 p
roblem
 is that w
age scales m
ay not exactly reflect m
arginal p
rod
u
ctivities
becau
se of d
istortions introd
u
ced
 by labou
r m
arket institu
tions. In societies w
ith a high
aversion
 to in
equ
ality, for in
stan
ce, collective bargain
in
g m
ay lead
 to relatively flat
p
ayscales ("w
age com
p
ression"). T
his w
ill red
u
ce p
rivate incentives to invest in ed
u
cation,
thereby increasing the w
ed
ge betw
een the social and
 p
rivate retu
rns to schooling in the sam
e
w
ay as p
ositive extern
alities, an
d
 m
ay call for ed
u
cation
al su
bsid
ies as a secon
d
-best
rem
ed
ial m
easu
re.
A
 final consid
eration is that a straightforw
ard
 com
p
arison betw
een the p
rivate and
 social
rates of retu
rn to schooling m
ay not be very inform
ative in a w
orld
 in w
hich the externalities
associated
 w
ith
 ed
u
cation
al in
vestm
ent are n
ot the only d
istortion th
at m
ay affect the
allocation of investm
ent across alternative assets. Su
ch a com
p
arison im
p
licitly assu
m
es that
agents get the fu
ll social m
arginal p
rod
u
ct w
hen they invest in assets other than schooling.
For m
ost ind
ivid
u
als, how
ever, the relevant alternative to schooling investm
ent involves
stan
d
ard
 fin
an
cial assets, an
d
 ou
r d
ata su
ggest th
at th
e retu
rn
s on
 th
ese claim
s are
consid
erably low
er than the m
arginal social p
rod
u
ct of cap
ital, p
robably as a resu
lt of
26
 U
nd
er reasonable assum
ptions, the required
 correction involves red
ucing the m
icroeconom
ic M
incerian
returns param
eter, θ, by around one third. See footnote 22 and section 8 of the A
ppendix.
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interm
ed
iation costs and
 cap
ital taxes. H
ence, the w
ed
ge betw
een the p
rivate and
 social
retu
rns to hu
m
an cap
ital m
ay be m
atched
 by sim
ilar d
istortions affecting other typ
es of
investm
ent and
 it m
ay be exp
ected
 that, to a first ap
p
roxim
ation, these d
ifferent d
istortions
w
ill tend
 to offset each other. T
his su
ggests that, for p
u
rp
oses of d
eterm
ining w
hether m
arket
signals are channeling resou
rces to the m
ost socially d
esirable investm
ent alternatives, the
m
ore relevant com
p
arison w
ill be the one betw
een w
hat I have called
 above the social and
p
rivate prem
ia on schooling, rather than betw
een the social and
 p
rivate retu
rns to ed
u
cation
per se.
In the rem
aind
er of this section I w
ill carry ou
t both sets of com
p
arisons in an attem
p
t to
d
raw
 som
e tentative conclu
sions regard
ing the ad
equ
acy of observed
 ed
u
cational su
bsid
y
rates. I w
ill start by constru
cting tw
o new
 sets of estim
ates of the p
rivate rate of retu
rn that
are m
ore d
irectly com
p
arable to social retu
rns than those p
resented
 above. T
hen, I w
ill
exam
ine the d
ifference betw
een the p
rivate and
 social p
rem
ia on schooling.
a. P
rivate retu
rn
s allow
in
g for p
articip
ation
 effects in
 p
artial an
d
 in
 gen
eral eq
u
ilib
riu
m
A
s I h
ave alread
y n
oted
, th
e estim
ates of th
e p
rivate an
d
 social rates of retu
rn
 to
schooling p
resented
 in p
reviou
s sections are not fu
lly com
p
arable becau
se they are based
 on
d
ifferent assu
m
p
tions concerning labou
r force p
articip
ation. In p
articu
lar, the p
rivate retu
rn
calcu
lations assu
m
ed
 that the agent of reference w
ou
ld
 rem
ain active throu
ghou
t his stu
d
ent
and
 ad
u
lt life, w
hile the social retu
rn calcu
lations ap
p
lied
 to a rep
resentative ind
ivid
u
al
w
ho m
ay or m
ay not be active w
ith probabilities based
 on observed
 labou
r force participation
rates. T
o m
ake both sets of retu
rns m
ore com
p
arable, in this section I w
ill constru
ct estim
ates
of the p
rivate rate of retu
rn to schooling that w
ill  be based
 on the sam
e p
articip
ation
assu
m
p
tion as the social retu
rns p
resented
 above. I w
ill consid
er an agent w
ho d
oes not yet
know
 w
hether or not he or she w
ill be active in the fu
tu
re and
 assu
m
e that the relevant
p
robabilities are given by the observed
 labou
r force p
articip
ation rates.
A
s d
escribed
 in B
ox 2, this change in assu
m
ptions requ
ires three ad
ju
stm
ents in the private
rate of retu
rn form
u
la. T
he first of these ad
ju
stm
ents tend
s to raise the rate of retu
rn and
 takes
the form
 of an ad
d
itional term
 in the nu
m
erator ( εpart ) that cap
tu
res the p
ositive effect of
ad
d
itional schooling on exp
ected
 earnings acting throu
gh an increase in the activity rate. T
he
other tw
o ad
ju
stm
ents involve the cost term
s in the d
enom
inator of the rate of retu
rn form
u
la
and
 tend
 to red
u
ce its valu
e. A
llow
ing for the p
ossibility of inactivity increases the d
irect
cost of schooling, w
hich is m
easu
red
 as a fraction of the expected
 earnings of an ad
u
lt w
orker,
becau
se the d
enom
inator of this ratio d
rop
s w
henever the p
articip
ation rate is less than one.
Intu
itively, d
irect costs becom
e m
ore im
p
ortant becau
se they are incu
rred
 in any event bu
t
generate a p
ositive revenu
e stream
 only if the agent joins the labou
r force. T
he op
p
ortu
nity
cost of schooling, 1-B
, also rises if η
q  <
 1, that is, w
henever activity rates are low
er for
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B
ox 2: A
llow
in
g for p
articip
ation
 effects
______________________________________________________________________
It w
ill be u
sefu
l to go back to the p
rivate rate of retu
rn form
u
la given in equ
ation (9) and
w
rite the op
p
ortu
nity cost term
 in the form
 O
P
P
C
 =
 1 - B
. W
ith this notational change, the
equ
ation takes the follow
ing form
:
(9')   
Re
B
D
IR
C
R
H
net
net
1
1
−
=
+
−
+
−
θ
ε
(
)
w
here all the term
s have been d
efined
 in section 2a.
C
onsid
er now
 how
 the calcu
lations d
escribed
 above change from
 the p
oint of view
 of an
ind
ivid
u
al w
ho d
oes not yet know
 w
hether he w
ill be active in the fu
tu
re. I w
ill u
se q(S) and
qs (S) =
 η
q q(S
)  for th
e labou
r force p
articip
ation
 rates of ad
u
lt w
orkers an
d
 stu
d
en
ts,
resp
ectively, and
 assu
m
e that these rates are increasing fu
nctions of ed
u
cational attainm
ent.
T
he agent's exp
ected
 incom
e both as an ad
u
lt w
orker and
 as a stu
d
ent can be obtained
 by
m
u
ltip
lying the exp
ressions d
erived
 in section 2a (equ
ations (2) and
 (3)) by the relevant
p
articip
ation
 p
robabilities, given
 by q(S
) and
 qs (S).  It is easy to show
 that, u
nd
er these
assum
ptions, the rate of return form
ula becom
es
(9")   
Re
B
D
IR
C
q
S
R
H
net
net
part
q
o
1
1
−
=
+
+
−
+
−
θ
ε
ε
η
(
)
(
)
w
here εpart  =
 q'(S
o )/q(S
o ) m
easu
res the sensitivity of the labou
r force p
articip
ation rate to
ed
u
cational attainm
ent.
For the calcu
lations rep
orted
 below
 εpart  and
 η
q  have been estim
ated
 w
ith the sam
e d
ata
and
 follow
ing the sam
e p
roced
u
re I have u
sed
 above for calcu
lating ε and
 η
 (see section 3 of
the A
p
p
end
ix). D
u
e to the lack of inform
ation, I assign to Ireland
 the B
ritish valu
es of both
variables, and
 to A
u
stria the G
erm
an valu
e of η
q .
______________________________________________________________________
T
ab
le 12: N
ew
 variab
les u
sed
 in
 th
e calcu
lation
 of th
e p
rivate rate of retu
rn
allow
in
g for p
articip
ation
 effects
______________________________________________________
q
η
q
εpart
part. eq.
εpart
gen. eq.
A
u
stria
87.94%
0.550
1.87%
0.94%
B
elgiu
m
85.54%
0.149
2.23%
1.12%
D
en
m
ark
91.04%
0.948
1.37%
0.69%
F
in
lan
d
90.27%
0.607
0.68%
0.34%
F
ran
ce
88.11%
0.119
1.80%
0.90%
G
erm
an
y
87.66%
0.550
2.25%
1.13%
G
reece
80.16%
0.117
2.19%
1.10%
Irelan
d
78.03%
0.578
4.13%
2.07%
Italy
78.94%
0.051
2.23%
1.12%
N
etherlan
ds
84.80%
0.677
3.88%
1.94%
P
ortu
gal
86.52%
0.272
1.28%
0.64%
S
pain
79.68%
0.227
2.05%
1.03%
S
w
eden
88.81%
0.353
1.96%
0.98%
U
K
85.38%
0.578
4.13%
2.07%
avge. E
U
14
85.20%
0.413
2.29%
1.15%
______________________________________________________
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stu
d
ents than for ad
u
lts, becau
se the p
articip
ation correction red
u
ces exp
ected
 stu
d
ent
earnings by m
ore than those of ad
ult w
orkers, thereby low
ering B
.
T
able 12 d
isp
lays the valu
es of the new
 variables u
sed
 in the rate of retu
rn calcu
lation,
inclu
d
ing tw
o d
ifferent estim
ates of εpart  (one in partial and
 one in general equ
ilibriu
m
) w
hose
u
se w
ill becom
e clear below
. C
olu
m
n [2] of T
able 13 show
s the partial equ
ilibriu
m
 estim
ates of
the p
rivate rate of retu
rn to schooling obtained
 u
nd
er the new
 p
articip
ation assu
m
p
tions,
w
hile colu
m
n [1] rep
rod
u
ces m
y p
reviou
s estim
ates from
 section 3b. N
otice that, since
p
articip
ation rates are generally qu
ite sensitive to attainm
ent, for m
ost cou
ntries the effect of
the correction is to increase the estim
ated
 rate of retu
rn.
T
ab
le 13: A
ltern
ative estim
ates of th
e p
rivate rate of retu
rn
 to sch
oolin
g
______________________________________________________
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
rp
section 3b
rp
part. eq
rp
gen. eq.
rs
social
A
u
stria
10.50%
11.72%
7.31%
8.45%
B
elgiu
m
8.56%
9.27%
5.38%
9.06%
D
en
m
ark
8.87%
11.03%
6.92%
8.63%
F
in
lan
d
9.62%
9.88%
6.24%
8.30%
F
ran
ce
9.59%
10.36%
6.41%
8.76%
G
erm
an
y
10.43%
11.89%
7.31%
8.46%
G
reece
9.81%
10.95%
6.95%
10.55%
Irelan
d
10.41%
14.17%
8.72%
11.33%
Italy
8.61%
10.37%
6.43%
10.15%
N
etherlan
ds
7.95%
12.49%
7.42%
9.93%
P
ortu
gal
12.29%
12.05%
7.94%
11.46%
S
pain
9.36%
10.46%
6.61%
11.34%
S
w
eden
6.06%
8.07%
4.68%
8.60%
U
K
13.87%
17.10%
10.76%
10.48%
avge. E
U
14
9.75%
11.30%
7.04%
9.70%
cond. on particip.
yes
no
no
no
______________________________________________________
C
olu
m
n [3] of T
able 13 contains a set of "general equ
ilibriu
m
" estim
ates of the p
rivate
retu
rn to schooling u
nd
er the sam
e p
articip
ation assu
m
p
tions u
sed
 in colu
m
n [2] for the
"p
artial equ
ilibriu
m
" calcu
lations. T
o obtain the general equ
ilibriu
m
 estim
ates, I have scaled
d
ow
n the m
icroeconom
ic M
incerian retu
rns p
aram
eters by a factor of 1-α
k  so as to hold
 the
stock of cap
ital constant (see footnote 22 and
 section 8 of the A
p
p
end
ix), and
 red
u
ced
 the
estim
ates of the em
p
loym
ent and
 p
articip
ation p
aram
eters ε and
 εpart  u
sed
 in colu
m
n [2] by
50%
 (w
hich is the sam
e correction factor u
sed
 in the calcu
lation of the social rate of retu
rn).
N
otice that these ad
ju
stm
ents su
bstantially red
u
ces the estim
ated
 rate of retu
rn to schooling.
T
his d
ifference reflects the fact that the p
ayoff to increased
 attainm
ent is consid
erably
larger for an ind
ivid
u
al acting alone than for society as a w
hole, essentially becau
se factor
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p
rices w
ill rem
ain constant in the first case, giving the agent access to com
p
lem
entary inp
u
ts
w
hose u
se w
ill raise the retu
rn to ed
u
cational investm
ent.
 
A
 com
p
arison betw
een p
rivate and
 social retu
rns can p
otentially tell u
s to w
hat extent
p
rivate and
 social incentives m
ay be m
isaligned
 in E
u
rop
e. O
ne p
roblem
 is that it is not
entirely clear w
hat specific rates of retu
rn shou
ld
 be u
sed
 in the com
parison. It m
ay be argu
ed
that p
rivate incentives are best cap
tu
red
 by the u
nad
ju
sted
 or p
artial equ
ilibriu
m
 p
rivate
rates of retu
rn given in colu
m
n [2] of T
able 13, as these reflect the exp
ected
 benefits that are
available to ind
ivid
u
als. B
u
t it is also tru
e that these exp
ected
 benefits w
ill p
artially fail to
m
aterialize if aggregate attainm
ent rises as a su
fficient nu
m
ber of ind
ivid
u
als stay longer in
school. H
ence, it is probably best to take colu
m
ns [2] and
 [3] of T
able 13 as d
efining an interval
of p
otentially relevant rates of retu
rn for each cou
ntry that shou
ld
 be com
p
ared
 w
ith the
social rate of return given in colum
n [4] of the sam
e table.
Figu
re 9: D
ifferen
ce b
etw
een
 th
e p
rivate an
d
 social rates of retu
rn
 on
 sch
oolin
g
-6%
-4%
-2% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8%
UK
G
e
O
st
Ir
N
l
Dk
avge
Fr
Fi
Po
G
r
It
Be
Sw
Sp
m
ax
m
in
          - N
ote: R
eferring to T
able 13, m
ax is given by [2] - [4] and
 m
in by [3]- [4].
Figu
re 9 show
s the d
ifference betw
een the p
rivate and
 social rates of retu
rn on schooling
u
sing both the p
artial and
 general equ
ilibriu
m
 estim
ates of the first m
agnitu
d
e. W
hen this
variable is p
ositive, p
rivate retu
rn
s exceed
 social retu
rn
s an
d
, assu
m
in
g th
ere are n
o
d
istortions in the econom
y asid
e from
 those that affect ed
u
cational investm
ent, w
e m
ay
conclud
e that existing ed
ucational subsid
ies should
 be red
uced
, for they m
ore than com
pensate
for the relevant externalities and
 for the d
isincentives created
 by w
age com
p
ression.
Insp
ection of Figu
re 9 su
ggests a classification of E
U
 cou
ntries into five d
ifferent grou
p
s.
T
he U
K
 is the only cou
ntry w
here both m
easu
res of private retu
rns exceed
 the social retu
rn on
schooling, su
ggesting that observed
 su
bsid
y levels are higher than requ
ired
. Sp
ain and
Sw
ed
en are in the op
p
osite situ
ation, w
ith p
rivate retu
rns clearly below
 social retu
rns
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accord
ing to both estim
ates of the first variable. A
 fairly clear case for cu
tting su
bsid
ies can
be m
ad
e for G
erm
any, A
u
stria and
 D
enm
ark, and
 the op
p
osite is tru
e in Italy, G
reece and
P
ortu
gal. In the rem
aining cou
ntries (Ireland
, N
etherland
s, France and
 Finland
, as w
ell as in
B
elgiu
m
 d
u
e to d
ata lim
itations), the resu
lts are inconclu
sive as the tw
o estim
ates of p
rivate
retu
rns yield
 very d
ifferent im
p
lications abou
t the op
tim
ality of observed
 net su
bsid
y levels.
b
. P
rivate vs. social p
rem
ia on
 sch
oolin
g
I have argu
ed
 that a com
p
arison betw
een the p
rivate and
 social p
rem
ia on schooling is
likely to be m
ore inform
ative than the one carried
 ou
t in the p
reviou
s section for p
u
rp
oses of
id
en
tifiyin
g p
oten
tial d
iscrep
an
cies betw
een
 m
arket sign
als an
d
 social n
eed
s. T
able 14
contains the inform
ation requ
ired
 for this com
p
arison. 27 Its left-hand
 block show
s the social
p
rem
iu
m
 on schooling as calcu
lated
 in section 4 together w
ith tw
o alternative estim
ates of
the p
rivate p
rem
iu
m
. T
he first one (labeled
 private 1 in the table) is based
 on the p
artial
equ
ilibriu
m
 resu
lts obtained
 in Section 3d
 (see T
able 5), and
 the second
 one correspond
s to the
general equilibrium
 calculations carried
 out in the previous subsection (colum
n [3] in T
able 12).
T
he right-hand
 block of the table show
s the ratio betw
een the p
rivate and
 social p
rem
ia,
u
sing both estim
ates of the first variable, and
 the average valu
e of this ratio for each
country.
For the average cou
ntry, both estim
ates of the p
rivate to social p
rem
iu
m
 ratio (hereater
the p
rem
iu
m
 ratio) are greater than one and
 their m
ean valu
e is 1.76. T
his resu
lt su
ggests
that, for the average E
u
rop
ean cou
ntry, m
arket signals and
 existing p
u
blic interventions d
o
reflect 
th
e 
relative 
scarcity 
of 
h
u
m
an
 
cap
ital 
an
d
 
p
rovid
e 
in
cen
tives 
for 
ad
d
ition
al
investm
ent in schooling that ap
p
ear to be m
ore than correct. In fact, and
 w
ith all d
u
e cau
tion,
this result suggests that ed
ucational subsid
ies should
 probably be red
uced
. T
he case for cutting
su
bsid
ies ap
p
ears to be qu
ite strong in the U
K
 (w
ith an average p
rem
iu
m
 ratio exceed
ing 8),
and
 also in A
u
stria, P
ortu
gal, Ireland
 and
 Sp
ain (all of w
hich have p
rem
iu
m
 ratios over
tw
o). A
t the other end
 of the scale, the p
em
iu
m
 ratio d
rop
s below
 one in the Scand
inavian
cou
ntries, and
 esp
ecially in Sw
ed
en w
here large su
bsid
ies ap
p
ear to be requ
ired
 in ord
er to
com
p
ensate for the d
isincentive effects created
 by p
articu
larly flat p
ayscales.
27
 O
ne factor that m
ay d
istort this com
parison is that, as noted
 in section 2, m
y estim
ates of social returns
(and
 hence of the social prem
ium
) are likely to be biased
 against countries w
ith ed
ucational system
s of high
quality. W
hile there is no generally accepted
 m
easure of ed
ucational quality, the results of the stand
ard
ized
tests of stud
ent achievem
ent cond
ucted
 as part of the PISA
 project suggest that Finland
, the U
K
 and
 Ireland
p
erform
 significantly above the O
E
C
D
 average (in term
s of m
ean scores), w
hile P
ortu
gal, G
reece, Italy,
G
erm
any and Spain display below
-average perform
ance.
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T
ab
le 14: social vs. p
rivate p
rem
iu
m
 on
 sch
oolin
g
__________________________________________________________
                                                              prem
ium
 on schooling                  ratio private/social prem
ium
social
private1
private2
ratio 1
ratio 2
av
g
e.
U
K
0.99%
9.87%
6.76%
10.00
6.85
8.43
A
u
stria
1.18%
6.47%
3.28%
5.48
2.78
4.13
P
ortu
gal
1.77%
8.26%
3.91%
4.66
2.20
3.43
Irelan
d
2.75%
6.81%
5.12%
2.48
1.86
2.17
S
pain
2.87%
7.56%
4.81%
2.64
1.68
2.16
B
elgiu
m
1.59%
4.36%
1.18%
2.74
0.74
1.74
F
ran
ce
1.59%
3.89%
0.71%
2.44
0.45
1.44
N
etherlan
ds
2.94%
4.35%
3.82%
1.48
1.30
1.39
Italy
3.65%
6.06%
3.88%
1.66
1.06
1.36
G
reece
3.42%
5.77%
2.92%
1.69
0.85
1.27
G
erm
an
y
2.11%
3.98%
0.86%
1.88
0.41
1.15
F
in
lan
d
3.96%
5.58%
2.21%
1.41
0.56
0.99
D
en
m
ark
3.55%
4.47%
2.52%
1.26
0.71
0.98
S
w
eden
2.14%
2.11%
0.73%
0.98
0.34
0.66
avge. E
U
14
2.49%
5.72%
3.01%
2.30
1.21
1.76
__________________________________________________________
   N
otes:
- The social prem
ium
 on hum
an capital is defined as the difference betw
een the baseline all-in estim
ate of the
social rate of return to schooling and
 the baseline (ad
justed
) estim
ate of the social rate of return on hum
an
cap
ital.
- T
he private prem
ium
 on hum
an capital is constructed
 as the d
ifference betw
een the estim
ated
 private rate
of return on schooling and
 the real return on an equal-w
eight portfolio of shares and
 governm
ent bond
s. A
s
noted
 above, this last piece of inform
ation is not available for A
u
stria, Finland
, G
reece and
 P
ortu
gal, so I
have im
puted
 them
 the average return over the rest of the sam
ple. A
s a result, the private prem
ia for these
countries are show
n in bold
 type.
6. C
on
clu
sion
 an
d
 p
olicy im
p
lication
s
T
he results obtained
 in this stud
y tend
 to confirm
 and
 strengthen the m
ain conclusion of our
p
reviou
s rep
ort (D
&
C
, 2002). I find
 that i) ed
u
cational attainm
ent is a key d
eterm
inant of
ind
ivid
u
al earnings and
 aggregate p
rod
u
ctivity and
 has a significant effect on labou
r m
arket
ou
tcom
es an
d
 ii) th
at h
u
m
an
 cap
ital ap
p
ears as an
 attractive in
vestm
en
t relative to
alternative assets, both from
 the ind
ivid
u
al and
 from
 the aggregate p
ersp
ectives.
D
raw
ing on recent resu
lts from
 D
&
D
 (2002) and
 other p
ap
ers in the literatu
re, I estim
ate
that an ad
d
itional year of average school attainm
ent raises p
rod
u
ctivity in the average E
U
cou
ntry by 6.2%
 on im
p
act and
 by a fu
rther 3.1%
 in the long ru
n throu
gh its contribu
tion to
faster technological p
rogress. T
he first of these effects is consid
erably higher in the cohesion
cou
ntries and
 in Italy, reaching 9.2%
 in the case of P
ortu
gal, and
 d
rop
s to arou
nd
 5%
 in the
Scand
inavian and
 G
erm
an-sp
eaking cou
ntries. P
rod
u
ctivity effects accou
nt for the bu
lk of the
social retu
rns to hu
m
an cap
ital (85%
 of the total in the case of the average cou
ntry) and
 the
rem
aind
er reflects ind
u
ced
 increases in participation and
 em
p
loym
ent rates.
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T
he social rate of retu
rn to schooling in the E
U
 ranges from
 8.3%
 in Finland
 to 11.5%
 in
P
ortu
gal, w
ith an average valu
e of 9.7%
. For all the cou
ntries in the sam
p
le, the social retu
rn
on hu
m
an cap
ital is higher than m
y p
referred
 estim
ate of the retu
rn to p
hysical cap
ital,
su
ggesting that a m
arginal reallocation of investm
ent resou
rces in favou
r of hu
m
an cap
ital
w
ou
ld
 be d
esirable from
 a social p
oint of view
. T
he social p
rem
iu
m
 on hu
m
an cap
ital,
how
ever, varies significantly across m
em
ber states reflecting the relative end
ow
m
ents of
p
rod
u
ction
 factors an
d
 ap
p
ears to be largest in
 Fin
lan
d
, Italy, D
en
m
ark, G
reece, th
e
N
etherland
s, Sp
ain and
 Ireland
, and
 sm
allest in the U
K
, A
u
stria, France, B
elgiu
m
 and
P
ortu
gal.
Private returns to schooling cluster betw
een 8 and
 10%
 for m
ost E
uropean countries. Sw
ed
en
is a clear ou
tlier at the bottom
 of the d
istribu
tion, p
ossibly as a resu
lt of severe w
age
com
p
ression, w
hile the highest retu
rns corresp
ond
 to the U
K
 and
 P
ortu
gal, follow
ed
 by
A
u
stria, G
erm
any and
 Ireland
. P
rivate rates of retu
rn on schooling are heavily influ
enced
 by
variou
s governm
ent p
olicies. O
n average, d
irect su
bsid
ies to ed
u
cation raise the p
rivate rate
of retu
rn by arou
nd
 a third
 w
hile p
ersonal taxes and
 social benefits red
u
ce it by 10 and
 8%
resp
ectively. In m
ost cou
ntries, the com
bined
 effect of all these p
olicies is a net su
bsid
y to
ed
u
cation. T
his su
bsid
y exceed
s 30%
 in Sw
ed
en, P
ortu
gal and
 D
enm
ark and
 has an average
valu
e of 10%
. T
he only cou
ntries w
here the net tax on schooling is p
ositive are Ireland
 and
G
erm
any, w
ith effective tax rates of 15%
 and
 4%
 resp
ectively.
A
t the ind
ivid
u
al level, schooling seem
s to be a m
ore attractive investm
ent than the
fin
an
cial assets available to h
ou
seh
old
s. T
akin
g as a referen
ce a balan
ced
 p
ortfolio of
corp
orate shares and
 governm
ent bond
s, the p
rivate p
rem
iu
m
 on hu
m
an cap
ital ranges from
2.11%
 in Sw
ed
en to 9.87%
 in the U
K
 and
 has an average valu
e of 5.72%
. For m
ost cou
ntries,
the p
rivate p
rem
iu
m
 on schooling is significantly larger than the social one, su
ggesting that
the com
bination of m
arket forces and
 existing su
bsid
ies alread
y p
rovid
es m
ore than su
fficient
financial incentives for ind
ivid
u
als to m
od
ify their investm
ent p
atterns in w
ays that are
consistent w
ith social need
s. T
he only excep
tion ap
p
ear to be the Scand
inavian cou
ntries,
w
here larger su
bsid
ies m
ay be requ
ired
 to fu
lly offset the d
isincentives created
 by rather flat
p
ayscales thay m
ay not ad
equ
ately cap
tu
re ed
u
cation-ind
u
ced
 p
rod
u
ctivity gains.
A
lthou
gh cau
tion is clearly need
ed
 for a nu
m
ber of reasons that have alread
y been
d
iscu
ssed
, I believe these resu
lts reinforce the tw
o m
ain p
olicy conclu
sions d
raw
n in D
&
C
(2002): First, that a m
od
est increase in ed
u
cational investm
ent w
ou
ld
 alm
ost certainly be
beneficial from
 a social p
oint of view
 in all E
U
 cou
ntries. A
nd
 second
, that an increase in
general su
bsid
ies for p
ost-com
p
u
lsory schooling w
ou
ld
 p
robably not be requ
ired
 to achieve
this goal in m
ost E
uropean countries.
T
he first of these conclu
sions follow
s essentially from
 a com
p
arison betw
een the estim
ated
social rates of retu
rn on p
hysical and
 hu
m
an cap
ital. M
y resu
lts su
ggest that the econom
ic
retu
rns to schooling investm
ent are at least com
p
arable to, and
 very likely significanly
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h
igh
er th
an
, th
ose available from
 in
vestm
en
t in
 p
h
ysical cap
ital. W
h
en
 a reason
able
allow
ance is m
ad
e for the non-m
arket retu
rns to ed
u
cation and
 for its benefits for social
coh
esion
 an
d
 for p
erson
al d
evelop
m
en
t, h
u
m
an
 cap
ital ap
p
ears as a rath
er attractive
investm
ent alternative from
 a social p
oint of view
 for all the cou
ntries in the sam
p
le.
It m
u
st be kep
t in m
ind
, how
ever, that the d
ata u
nd
erlying m
y social retu
rn calcu
lations
refer to 1990, and
 that m
u
ch of the requ
ired
 investm
ent in ed
u
cation is p
robably u
nd
er w
ay
alread
y, as schooling levels for you
ng cohorts are consid
erably higher than p
op
u
lation m
eans
in all E
U
 cou
ntries. H
ence, average attainm
ent w
ill rise sharp
ly in the near fu
tu
re even
w
ithou
t any changes in cu
rrent p
olicies. W
hile it is im
p
ossible to know
 at this stage w
hether
the social p
rem
iu
m
 on hu
m
an cap
ital w
ill rem
ain p
ositive in the fu
tu
re, the acceleration of
th
e p
ace of tech
n
ological ch
an
ge in
 recen
t d
ecad
es an
d
 th
e secu
lar tren
d
 tow
ard
s an
in
creasin
gly kn
ow
led
ge-in
ten
sive econ
om
y d
o m
ake it likely th
at h
u
m
an
 cap
ital w
ill
continu
e to be a strategic p
rod
u
ction factor, and
 hence an attractive investm
ent alternative,
over the foreseable fu
tu
re. 28
Strictly sp
eaking, all the resu
lts d
erived
 above refer to the retu
rns to a m
arginal increase
in the quantity of ed
u
cation. T
here is still consid
erable room
 for im
p
rovem
ent in this area,
p
articu
larly in som
e of the p
oorer cou
ntries and
 regions of the U
nion, w
here enrollm
ent in
u
p
p
er second
ary training is still far from
 u
niversal and
 tertiary accession rates rem
ain
relatively low
. B
u
t there can be little d
ou
bt that in the long ru
n the m
ore relevant p
olicy
m
argin has to d
o w
ith the quality of ed
u
cation, rather than w
ith its qu
antity, as w
e m
u
st
eventu
ally ru
n into sharp
ly d
im
inishing retu
rns to fu
ther increases in attainm
ent. O
ne reason
for this is that, given the finiteness of hu
m
an lives, longer schooling p
eriod
s w
ill eventu
ally
cease to p
ay off, as they im
p
ly increasingly shorter w
orking lives over w
hich to recou
p
 the
requ
ired
 investm
ent. A
 second
 reason is that the m
arginal cost of hu
m
an cap
ital, u
nlike that
of p
hysical assets, rises w
ith the accu
m
u
lated
 p
er cap
ita stock becau
se of its op
p
ortu
nity cost
com
ponent.
T
u
rning now
 to the im
p
lications of the analysis for ed
u
cational finance, m
y conclu
sion
regard
ing su
bsid
y levels is based
 both on the large p
rivate p
rem
iu
m
 on schooling and
 on the
fact that this p
rem
iu
m
 generally exceed
s its social cou
nterp
art. T
hese find
ings su
ggest that
the financial retu
rns to investm
ent in ed
u
cation reflect social need
s m
ore than ad
equ
ately and
that they are high enou
gh that it is u
nlikely that insu
fficient p
ecu
niary incentives can be a
real obstacle to higher enrollm
ent rates in m
ost E
U
 cou
ntries. I su
sp
ect that other factors (and
in
 p
articu
lar liqu
id
ity con
strain
ts an
d
 low
 levels of basic skills for in
d
ivid
u
als from
d
isad
van
taged
 backgrou
n
d
s) are far m
ore im
p
ortan
t as barriers to access to ad
van
ced
p
rogram
m
es. H
ence, p
olicies sp
ecifically targeted
 at these p
roblem
s shou
ld
 be m
ore effective
in raising u
p
p
er-level enrollm
ents than fu
rther d
ecreases in alread
y low
 tu
ition charges that
28
 See section 2 of D
&
C
 (2002).
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im
p
ly a large su
bsid
y for relatively p
rivileged
 grou
p
s. 29 Ind
eed
, higher tu
ition fees, cou
p
led
w
ith a w
ell d
esigned
 loan program
m
e and
 w
ith an increase in m
eans-tested
 grants, m
ay be an
efficient w
ay to p
rovid
e ad
d
itional resou
rces to increase the qu
antity and
 qu
ality of p
ost-
second
ary ed
u
cation w
hile at the sam
e tim
e red
u
cing the regressivity of its financing,
ensu
ring equ
al access op
p
ortu
nities regard
less of socieconom
ic backgrou
nd
, and
 im
p
roving
stu
d
ent m
otivation to take fu
ll ad
vantage of ed
u
cational op
p
ortu
nities.
29 See for instance O
E
C
D
 (2001b).
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A
P
P
E
N
D
IX
1. T
h
e d
irect costs of sch
oolin
g
T
his section d
escribes the constru
ction of the d
irect cost of schooling variables ( µ and
 µ
s ).
A
s noted
 in the text, these variables are w
eighted
 averages of total and
 p
rivate costs p
er
stu
d
ent at the second
ary and
 tertiary levels m
easu
red
 as a fraction of either ou
tp
u
t p
er
em
p
loyed
 w
orker or A
P
W
 earnings. T
he p
rim
ary d
ata are taken from
 variou
s recent issu
es of
the O
E
C
D
's E
ducation at a G
lance rep
ort, to w
hich I w
ill refer as E
A
G
.
a. S
econ
d
ary ed
u
cation
T
able A
.1 su
m
m
arizes the available d
ata on ed
u
cational exp
end
itu
re at the second
ary
level. C
olu
m
n [1] show
s total exp
end
itu
re p
er stu
d
ent (in p
u
blic and
 p
rivate ed
u
cational
institu
tions) in 1997 m
easu
red
 as a p
ercentage of G
D
P
 p
er cap
ita and
 colu
m
n [2] show
s the
share of this exp
end
itu
re that is p
u
blicly financed
. M
u
ltip
lying [1] by [2] w
e obtain p
u
blic
expend
iture per stud
ent (colum
n[4]) and
 private expend
iture as a resid
ual (colum
n [3]). T
he
T
ab
le A
.1: E
xp
en
d
itu
re p
er stu
d
en
t as a p
ercen
tage of G
D
P
 p
er cap
ita
secon
d
ary level
________________________________________________
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
total
%
gov't
p
riv
ate
pu
blic
A
u
stria
36%
97.0%
1.1%
34.9%
B
elgium
 *
29%
94.0%
1.7%
27.3%
D
en
m
ark
28%
98.0%
0.6%
27.4%
F
in
lan
d
25%
99.4%
0.1%
24.9%
F
ran
ce
31%
95.0%
1.6%
29.5%
G
erm
an
y**
28%
97.0%
0.8%
27.2%
G
reece
19%
90.2%
1.9%
17.1%
Irelan
d
19%
97.0%
0.6%
18.4%
Italy
29%
100.0%
0.0%
29.0%
N
etherlan
ds
23%
96.0%
0.9%
22.1%
P
ortu
gal
29%
99.9%
0.0%
29.0%
S
pain
27%
88.0%
3.2%
23.8%
S
w
eden
27%
100.0%
0.0%
27.0%
U
K
23%
88.2%
2.7%
20.3%
avge. E
U
14
26.64%
95.7%
1.09%
25.55%
________________________________________________
    - Sources and notes:
[1] E
A
G
 2000 (T
able B
4.2 w
ith d
ata for 1997). I u
se "all second
ary" rather than "u
p
p
er second
ary"
becau
se these d
ata are available for m
ore cou
ntries. T
he one excep
tion is Italy. T
he d
ata for this cou
ntry
refer to 1998 and
 are taken from
 E
A
G
 2001.
[2]  T
hese d
ata are only available for tertiary stu
d
ies and
 for all other levels com
bined
, so I u
se the
second
 category. T
he m
ain source is E
A
G
 2000 (T
able B
2.1 w
ith d
ata for 1997). For this year, the d
ata refer
to initial sources of the relevant fund
s.  For Finland
, G
reece, Portugal and
 the U
K
 (show
n in bold
 type), the
sou
rce is E
A
G
 2002 (T
able B
4.2 w
ith d
ata for 1999). A
s noted
 in the text, these d
ata refer to shares in final
expenditure.
(*) T
he data for Belgium
 refer to the Flanders region.
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d
ata refer m
ostly to 1997 and
 the m
ain sou
rce is the 2000 ed
ition of E
ducation at a G
lance
(E
A
G
 2000). E
xcep
tions are highlighted
 in bold
 typ
e and
 d
iscu
ssed
 in the notes to the table
and
 in the follow
ing p
aragrap
h.
For m
ost cou
ntries, the d
ata on the share of governm
ent financing given in colu
m
n [2] refer
to the initial sou
rce of fu
nd
s. For the cou
ntries show
n in bold
 typ
e, how
ever, the d
ata com
e
from
 a d
ifferent issu
e of E
A
G
 and
 refer to final exp
end
itu
re after transfers from
 the p
u
blic to
the p
rivate sector (i.e. d
escribe w
ho p
ays in the end
, and
 not w
here the m
oney originally
cam
e from
). For the U
K
, how
ever, E
A
G
 gives the share of p
rivate (final) exp
end
itu
re w
hich
is financed
 by public transfers. H
ence, I subtract these transfers from
 private spend
ing and
 ad
d
them
 to p
u
blic exp
end
itu
re before com
p
u
ting the governm
ent's share in the financing of
ed
u
cational institu
tions. For Finland
, E
A
G
 rep
orts that the am
ou
nt of su
ch transfers is
"negligible. For the rem
aining cou
ntries there is no inform
ation on su
bsid
ies, and
 I im
p
licitly
assu
m
e they are zero. Since p
rivate final exp
end
itu
re is extrem
ely low
 in P
ortu
gal the
resu
ltin
g m
istake w
ill be in
sign
ifican
t. For G
reece, h
ow
ever, th
e m
argin
 of error is
consid
erably larger. T
o ind
icate this, I u
se bold
 italics for this cou
ntry in colu
m
ns [3] and
 [4].
A
s in the text, I w
ill u
se this typ
e to id
entify resu
lts that are based
 on incom
p
lete inform
ation
w
hen this is not exp
ected
 to be asou
rce of su
bstantial errors, and
 p
lain bold
 typ
e to id
entify
resu
lts w
here the error cau
sed
 by incom
p
lete d
ata is p
otentially im
p
ortant for the rate of
retu
rn calcu
lations.
For G
erm
any, E
A
G
 (2000) rep
orts a share of p
u
blic exp
end
itu
re of only 76%
. It also
ind
icates, how
ever, that in this cou
ntry "nearly all p
rivate exp
end
itu
re is accou
nted
 for by
contribu
tions from
 the bu
siness sector to the d
u
al system
 of ap
p
renticeship
 at the u
p
p
er
second
ary level"(p
. 62). 30 Since I am
 interested
 in the cost of ed
u
cation to hou
sehold
s, I w
ill
treat enterprise contributions as public expend
iture. A
s no specific figure is given for enterprise
contribu
tions, I w
ill assu
m
e a share of pu
blic expend
itu
re (inclu
d
ing bu
siness contribu
tions) of
97%
, w
hich is the valu
e observed
 in A
u
stria.
b
. H
igh
er ed
u
cation
T
able A
.2 rep
licates T
able A
.1 for the case of higher ed
u
cation to obtain p
relim
inary
estim
ates of total, p
rivate and
 p
u
blic exp
end
itu
re p
er stu
d
ent as a p
ercentage of G
D
P
 p
er
cap
ita. A
s above, the available d
ata on the governm
ent's share refer to final exp
end
itu
res for
the cou
ntries show
n in bold
 typ
e in colu
m
n [2]. In Finland
, the share of p
rivate exp
end
itu
re
financed
 by p
u
blic transfers is negligible. For the other cou
ntries there is no inform
ation on
this variable bu
t, given the sm
all size of overall p
rivate final exp
end
itu
re, the p
otential
error cau
sed
 by m
y im
plicit assu
m
ption that su
ch transfers are zero is sm
all.
30
 T
hanks to L
. W
össm
ann (2003) for pointing this out to m
e.
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T
ab
le A
.2: E
xp
en
d
itu
re p
er stu
d
en
t as a p
ercen
tage of G
D
P
 p
er cap
ita
tertiary level: i) p
relim
in
ary estim
ates
________________________________________________
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
total
%
gov't
p
riv
ate
pu
blic
A
u
stria
43%
98.7%
0.6%
42.4%
B
elgium
 *
33%
90.0%
3.3%
29.7%
D
en
m
ark
29%
99.0%
0.3%
28.7%
F
in
lan
d
35%
97.4%
0.9%
34.1%
F
ran
ce
34%
88.0%
4.1%
29.9%
G
erm
an
y
43%
93.0%
3.0%
40.0%
G
reece
29%
99.9%
0.0%
29.0%
Irelan
d
39%
79.0%
8.2%
30.8%
Italy
28%
82.0%
5.0%
23.0%
N
etherlan
ds
45%
97.0%
1.4%
43.7%
P
ortu
gal
28%
98.0%
0.6%
27.4%
S
pain
32%
77.0%
7.4%
24.6%
S
w
eden
64%
91.0%
5.8%
58.2%
U
K
40%
88.0%
4.8%
35.2%
avge. E
U
15
37.3%
91.3%
3.23%
34.05%
________________________________________________
    - Sources and notes:
[1] T
he sou
rce is E
A
G
 2000 (T
able B
4.2 w
ith d
ata for all tertiary p
rogram
m
es in 1997) excep
t in the
cases of Italy and
 P
ortu
gal. T
he Italian d
ata refer to 1998 and
 are taken from
 E
A
G
 2001. T
he inform
ation
for P
ortugal is from
  E
A
G
 2002 and
 refers to 1999.
[2]  T
he m
ain sou
rce is E
A
G
 2000 (T
able B
2.1 w
ith d
ata for tertiary ed
u
cation in 1997). For this year,
the d
ata refer to initial sou
rces of the relevant fu
nd
s.  For A
u
stria, Finland
 and
 G
reece (show
n in bold
type), the sou
rce is E
A
G
 2002 (T
able B
4.2 w
ith d
ata for 1999). A
s in the previou
s table, these d
ata refer to
shares in final expend
iture.
(*) T
he data for Belgium
 refer to the Flanders region.
 
T
he p
relim
inary figu
res given in T
able A
.2 have to be ad
ju
sted
 to elim
inate the cost of
research carried
 ou
t in u
niversities and
 to reflect pu
blic transfers to stu
d
ents that are intend
ed
to help d
efray living expenses and
 other non-tu
ition costs (ou
r prelim
inary pu
blic expend
itu
re
figu
res alread
y incorporate the "tu
ition" costs that are inclu
d
ed
 in governm
ent expend
itu
re on
ed
u
cational institu
tions). T
he d
ata requ
ired
 for these ad
ju
stm
ents are given in T
able A
.3.
C
olu
m
n
 [5] sh
ow
s th
e sh
are of R
&
D
 exp
en
d
itu
re in
 total sp
en
d
in
g on
 tertiary-level
ed
u
cational institu
tions. C
olu
m
n [6] show
s p
u
blic su
bsid
ies to hou
sehold
s to cover stu
d
ent
living costs and
 non-tuition expenses, m
easured
 as a percentage of G
D
P per capita.
A
s u
su
al, bold
 entries in the table ind
icate m
issing observations that have been estim
ated
in variou
s w
ays. I have im
p
u
ted
 to those cou
ntries for w
hich the share of R
&
D
 is m
issing the
values observed
 in close neighbours or in countries w
ith sim
ilar incom
e levels (see the notes to
the table). W
hen d
ata on su
bsid
ies are not available, an ap
p
roxim
ation has been constru
cted
u
sing related
 inform
ation from
 a d
ifferent issu
e of E
A
G
 w
hich is show
n in colu
m
n [7]. T
his
colu
m
n gives an estim
ate of the am
ou
nt of p
u
blic su
bsid
ies for living costs and
 other non-
tu
ition
 exp
en
ses m
easu
red
 as a fraction
 of govern
m
en
t d
irect exp
en
d
itu
re on
 tertiary
ed
u
cational institu
tions. T
he nu
m
erator is financial aid
 to stu
d
ents (scholarship
s and
 other
55
grants) net of the am
ou
nt earm
arked
 for the p
aym
ent of tu
tion fes w
hen available. T
he bold
entries in cou
m
n [6] are obtained
 by m
u
ltip
lying [7] by d
irect governm
ent exp
end
itu
re on
ed
u
cational institu
tions (colu
m
n [4] in T
able A
.2).
T
ab
le A
.3: E
xp
en
d
itu
re p
er stu
d
en
t as a p
ercen
tage of G
D
P
 p
er cap
ita
tertiary level: ii) d
ata for ad
ju
stm
en
ts
______________________________________
[5]
[6]**
[7]
sh. R
&
D
su
bsidies
sh. subs.
A
u
stria
0.381
6.62%
*
B
elgiu
m
0.367
5.62%
0.189
D
en
m
ark
0.272
17.42%
F
in
lan
d
0.356
7.02%
F
ran
ce
0.156
1.82%
G
erm
an
y
0.381
4.67%
G
reece
0.227
1.02%
0.035
Irelan
d
0.164
7.44%
Italy
0.241
2.73%
0.119
N
etherlan
ds
0.393
7.78%
P
ortu
gal
0.227
1.28%
S
pain
0.241
1.46%
S
w
eden
0.480
22.72%
U
K
0.359
6.92%
avge. E
U
14
0.303
6.75%
______________________________________
  - Sources and notes for T
able A
.3
[5] E
A
G
 2002 (T
able B
6.2 w
ith d
ata for tertiary ed
u
cation in 1999). Since no d
ata are available for
A
ustria, Italy and
 P
ortugal, I assign to these countries the values observed
 in G
erm
any, Spain and
 G
reece,
respectively.
[6]  E
A
G
 2000 (T
able B
3.2 w
ith d
ata for 1997, excep
t for G
erm
any, w
here  it is for 1996). N
o d
ata are
available for B
elgium
, G
reece and
 Ireland
. T
he figures given for these countries are estim
ated
 as explained
in the text using [7].
(*) For A
ustria, there is no breakd
ow
n betw
een subsid
ies earm
arked
 for the paym
ent of tuition fees and
the rest. I assum
e that all subsidies are for living costs, as the data in T
able A
.2 suggests that the governm
ent
pays d
irectly for the bulk of the costs of ed
ucational institutions.
(**) T
he inform
ation available in E
A
G
 inclu
d
es the fraction of total transfers (inclu
d
ing those for
tu
ition costs) that corresp
ond
s to stu
d
ent loans. I assu
m
e that only 25%
 of the am
ou
nt of the loan is a
subsid
y and
 that this subsid
y finances tuition and
 non-tuition costs in the sam
e proportion. T
o correct the
original figure for non-tuition transfers, I red
uce it by one fourth of the share of loans in total transfers.
[7] E
A
G
 2002 (T
able B
5.2 w
ith inform
ation for tertiary ed
u
cation in 1999).
T
able A
.4 show
s the ad
ju
sted
 estim
ates of p
rivate, p
u
blic and
 total exp
end
itu
re p
er
stu
d
ent at the tertiay level m
easu
red
 as a p
ercentage of G
D
P
 p
er cap
ita. A
d
ju
sted
 total
exp
end
itu
re is obtained
 by su
btracting R
&
D
 sp
end
ing from
 the u
ncorrected
 total. A
d
ju
sted
p
u
blic exp
end
itu
re is raw
 p
u
blic exp
end
itu
re m
inu
s research exp
end
itu
re (w
hich w
e attribu
te
exclusively to the governm
ent) plus transfers to stud
ents for non-tuition costs. A
d
justed
 private
exp
end
itu
re is gross p
rivate exp
end
itu
re m
inu
s su
bsid
ies for non-tu
ition costs. B
old
 italics are
u
sed
 for total and
 p
u
blic costs in A
u
stria, Italy and
 P
ortu
gal becau
se, as noted
 above, there is
no d
ata on research expend
itu
re by u
niversities.
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T
ab
le A
.4: E
xp
en
d
itu
re p
er stu
d
en
t as a p
ercen
tage of G
D
P
 p
er cap
ita
tertiary level: iii) ad
ju
sted
 estim
ates
______________________________________
[8]
[9]
[10]
adju
sted
total
adju
sted
p
riv
ate
adju
sted
pu
blic
A
u
stria
26.64%
-6.06%
32.70%
B
elgiu
m
20.90%
-2.32%
23.22%
D
en
m
ark
21.10%
-17.13%
38.23%
F
in
lan
d
22.54%
-6.11%
28.66%
F
ran
ce
28.68%
2.26%
26.42%
G
erm
an
y
26.64%
-1.66%
28.30%
G
reece
22.41%
-0.99%
23.40%
Irelan
d
32.61%
0.75%
31.86%
Italy
21.25%
2.31%
18.94%
N
etherlan
ds
27.33%
-6.43%
33.76%
P
ortu
gal
21.64%
-0.72%
22.36%
S
pain
24.28%
5.90%
18.39%
S
w
eden
33.27%
-16.96%
50.23%
U
K
25.62%
-2.12%
27.75%
avge. E
U
14
25.35%
-3.52%
28.87%
______________________________________
    - N
ote: the ad
justed
 estim
ates show
n in colum
ns [8] to [10] are calculated
 as follow
s:
ad
justed
 total = total * (1 - sh. R
&
D
), i.e. [8] = [1] * (1 - [5])
ad
justed
 private = private - subsid
ies,  i.e. [9] = [3] - [6]
ad
justed
 public = public - (sh.R
&
D
*total) + subsid
ies    i.e. [10] = [4] - ([1]*[5]) + [6]
c. T
otal exp
en
d
itu
re
I average exp
end
itu
re p
er stu
d
ent across ed
u
cational levels, u
sing a w
eight of 2/
3 for
second
ary schooling and
 of 1/
3 for higher ed
u
cation. T
he resu
lts are show
n in T
able A
.5,
w
hich gives average expend
itu
re per stu
d
ent as a percentage of G
D
P
 per capita. For the social
rate of retu
rn calcu
lations I w
ill w
ant to exp
ress total exp
end
itu
re p
er stu
d
ent as a fraction of
ou
tp
u
t p
er em
p
loyed
 w
orker. H
ence, I m
u
ltip
ly the original figu
res show
n in colu
m
ns [1]  by
the ratio of em
p
loym
ent to the total p
op
u
lation in 1990, taken from
 an u
p
d
ated
 version of
D
om
énech and
 B
oscá (1996), w
hich is show
n in colu
m
n [4]. For the p
rivate rate of retu
rn
calcu
lations, the ap
p
rop
riate d
enom
inator is the gross earnings of an average p
rod
u
ction
w
orker (A
P
W
).  T
he ad
ju
stm
ent factor is therefore the ratio betw
een G
D
P
 p
er cap
ita and
A
P
W
 gross earnings, w
hich is given in colu
m
n [5]. T
his ratio is calcu
lated
 u
sing d
ata for 1999
taken from
 the cou
ntry chap
ters of the O
E
C
D
's B
enefit System
s and W
ork Incentives 1999  an
d
from
 the 2002 ed
ition of E
ducation at a G
lance (T
able X
2.2).
E
ntries in bold
 italics in colu
m
ns [1] to [3] are carried
 over from
 p
reviou
s tables. T
he entry
for P
ortu
gal in colu
m
n [5] is show
n in bold
 typ
e becau
se P
ortu
gu
ese A
P
W
 earnings are
atyp
ically low
 relative to G
D
P
 p
er cap
ita. A
s a resu
lt, P
ortu
gu
ese exp
end
itu
re p
er stu
d
ent
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w
ill ap
p
ear to be rather high w
hen norm
alized
 by A
P
W
 w
ages. T
his w
ill have som
e effect on
the p
rivate retu
rn calcu
lations.
T
ab
le A
.5: E
xp
en
d
itu
re p
er stu
d
en
t as a %
 of G
D
P
 p
er cap
ita
w
eigh
ted
 average of secon
d
ary an
d
 (ad
ju
sted
) tertiary levels
________________________________________________________
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
total
p
riv
ate
pu
blic
jobs per
cap
ita
G
D
P
pc/A
P
W
earn
gs
A
u
stria
32.88%
-1.30%
34.18%
0.444
1.075
B
elgiu
m
26.30%
0.39%
25.91%
0.369
0.816
D
en
m
ark
25.70%
-5.34%
31.04%
0.507
0.832
F
in
lan
d
24.18%
-1.94%
26.12%
0.410
0.947
F
ran
ce
30.23%
1.79%
28.44%
0.389
1.084
G
erm
an
y
27.55%
0.01%
27.54%
0.436
0.773
G
reece
20.14%
0.91%
19.23%
0.362
1.071
Irelan
d
23.54%
0.63%
22.91%
0.339
1.156
Italy
26.42%
0.77%
25.65%
0.352
0.957
N
etherlan
ds
24.44%
-1.53%
25.97%
0.438
0.876
P
ortu
gal
26.55%
-0.22%
26.77%
0.451
1.488
S
pain
26.09%
4.13%
21.97%
0.313
0.983
S
w
eden
29.09%
-5.65%
34.74%
0.452
1.026
U
K
23.87%
1.10%
22.77%
0.436
0.852
avge. E
U
14
26.21%
-0.45%
26.66%
0.407
0.995
________________________________________________________
    - N
ote: W
eighted
 average of the valu
es show
n in T
ables A
.1 and
 A
.4 w
ith w
eights of 2/
3 and
 1/
3
respectively.
2. M
in
cerian
 retu
rn
s to sch
oolin
g at th
e in
d
ivid
u
al level
In this section I constru
ct estim
ates of the ind
ivid
u
al-level M
incerian retu
rns to schooling
p
aram
eter in m
ost E
U
 cou
ntries. For this, I w
ill rely on the resu
lts of a large research p
roject
on the retu
rns to ed
u
cation in E
u
rop
e know
n as P
U
R
E
 (P
u
blic fu
nd
ing and
 p
rivate retu
rns to
ed
ucation) that w
as recently sponsored
 by the E
uropean C
om
m
ission.
In their introd
u
ction to a collective volu
m
e su
m
m
arizing the resu
lts of the P
U
R
E
 p
roject,
H
arm
on
, W
alker an
d
 W
estergaard
-N
ielsen
 (H
W
&
W
 2001) u
se d
ata p
rovid
ed
 by th
e
project's national team
s to obtain estim
ates of the M
incerian retu
rns param
eter (θ) for m
en and
w
om
en in each of a num
ber of European countries around 1995. They estim
ate by O
LS a com
m
on
w
age equ
ation sp
ecification for all cou
ntries u
sing d
ata on hou
rly w
ages and
 controlling for
p
otential exp
erience (i.e. tim
e since the com
p
letion of ed
u
cation) and
 the squ
are of this
variable. T
heir resu
lts are show
n in colu
m
ns [1] and
 [2] of T
able A
.6. U
sing these estim
ates I
constru
ct a m
easu
re of the average retu
rn to schooling for the entire p
op
u
lation by w
eighting
the m
ale and
 fem
ale estim
ates by the corresp
ond
ing shares in total em
p
loym
ent (u
sing d
ata
from
 the 2000 L
abour Force Survey provid
ed
 by E
urostat). T
his average is show
n in colum
n [4].
58
T
ab
le A
.6: H
arm
on
 et al's  resu
lts on
 th
e in
d
ivid
u
al M
in
cerian
 retu
rn
s to sch
oolin
g
an
d
 ad
ju
sted
 estim
ates
________________________________________________________
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
m
en
w
om
en
w
eig
h
t
w
om
en
w
eig
h
ted
av
erag
e
adju
sted
estim
ate
A
u
stria*
6.9%
6.7%
0.437
6.81%
8.60%
B
elgium
 **
0.422
7.24%
D
en
m
ark
6.4%
4.9%
0.463
5.71%
5.71%
F
in
lan
d
8.6%
8.8%
0.474
8.69%
8.69%
F
ran
ce
7.5%
8.1%
0.450
7.77%
7.77%
G
erm
an
y
7.9%
9.8%
0.435
8.73%
8.73%
G
reece*
6.3%
8.6%
0.376
7.16%
8.21%
Irelan
d
9.0%
13.7%
0.404
10.90%
10.90%
Italy
*
6.2%
7.7%
0.365
6.75%
7.90%
N
etherlan
ds*
6.3%
5.1%
0.419
5.80%
6.70%
P
ortu
gal
9.7%
9.7%
0.457
9.70%
9.70%
S
pain
*
7.2%
8.4%
0.361
7.63%
8.23%
S
w
eden
4.1%
3.8%
0.481
3.96%
3.96%
U
K
9.4%
11.5%
0.446
10.34%
10.34%
av
erag
e
7.3%
8.2%
0.428
7.69%
8.05%
________________________________________________________
N
otes:
(*) O
riginal estim
ates are based
 on d
ata on net (rather than gross) w
ages.
(**) H
arm
on et al rep
ort no resu
lts for B
elgiu
m
. T
he valu
e show
n in colu
m
n [5] for this cou
ntry is the
average of the French and D
utch estim
ates.
O
ne p
roblem
 w
ith H
arm
on et al's estim
ates is that they are not entirely com
p
arable across
cou
ntries. T
he au
thors rep
ort that their estim
ates are based
 on d
ata on gross w
ages excep
t in
the cases of A
u
stria, G
reece, Italy, N
etherland
s and
 Sp
ain, w
here the d
ata refer to net w
ages
(i.e. w
ages after p
ersonal incom
e taxes and
 em
p
loyee social secu
rity contribu
tions have been
w
itheld
). H
ence, for som
e cou
ntries w
e have a m
easu
re of the before-tax M
incerian retu
rn and
for the rest an ind
icator of the after-tax retu
rn, w
hich w
ill be low
er if the w
ithold
ing rate
rises w
ith incom
e.
I have attem
p
ted
 to correct this p
roblem
 by constru
cting estim
ates of the gross (before-tax)
retu
rn to schooling for the relevant cou
ntries (show
n w
ith an asterisk in T
able A
.6) in the
m
anner exp
lained
 below
. T
hese ad
ju
sted
 figu
res rep
lace H
arm
on et al's estim
ates in colu
m
n
[5], w
here I show
 the valu
es that w
ere finally u
sed
 in the rate of retu
rn calcu
lations rep
orted
in the text. N
otice that his colu
m
n inclu
d
es an entry for B
elgiu
m
 even thou
gh H
arm
on et al
rep
ort no resu
lts for this cou
ntry. 31 T
his valu
e is obtained
 as the average of the estim
ates for
France and
 H
olland
. H
ence, m
y resu
lts for B
elgiu
m
 shou
ld
 be interp
reted
 w
ith extrem
e
cau
tion and
 are inclu
d
ed
 in the rep
ort only becau
se they contain inform
ation of interest abou
t
31
 In fact, I have been u
nable to locate any estim
ates of the M
incerian p
aram
eter for B
elgiu
m
, even in a
recent and
 rather com
prehensive com
pilation of results d
ue to Psacharopoulos and
 Patrinos (2002).
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the effects of ed
u
cational su
bsid
ies, taxes and
 social benefits on private retu
rns to schooling in
this cou
ntry.
T
he ad
ju
sted
 estim
ates of the M
incerian retu
rns p
aram
eter have been constru
cted
 as
follow
s. In tw
o cases (N
etherland
s and
 Sp
ain), I have fou
nd
  in the corresp
ond
ing cou
ntry
chapters of the P
U
R
E
 volum
e estim
ates of m
ale and
 fem
ale returns to schooling based
 on gross
w
ages for 1995 or nearby years that are obtained
 w
ith a sp
ecification sim
ilar (bu
t not
id
entical) to the one u
sed
 by H
arm
on et al. T
he D
u
tch estim
ate is taken from
 Sm
its et al
(2001, p
. 183, T
able 10.3 for 1996). T
he sp
ecification u
sed
 by these au
thors (u
nlike H
arm
on et
al's) inclu
d
es a d
u
m
m
y for p
art-tim
e w
orkers in the fem
ale equ
ation, bu
t its estim
ated
coefficient is zero. T
he Sp
anish estim
ate is taken from
 B
arceinas et al (2001, p
. 238, T
able
13.1, resu
lts for W
SS-95). In this case, the fem
ale sam
p
le is restricted
 to fu
ll-tim
e w
orkers. In
the case of Italy, the cou
ntry chap
ter p
rovid
es com
p
arable estim
ates based
 on both net and
gross w
ages in 1989 (B
ru
nello et al, 1991, p
. 162, T
able 9.3). Since the net retu
rns are very
d
ifferent from
 those rep
orted
 by H
arm
on et al for 1995, I cannot u
se the net estim
ate d
irectly,
bu
t I u
se the ratio of net to gross retu
rns in 1989 (0.833 for m
en and
 0.885 for w
om
en) to ad
ju
st
the 1995 net returns.
For A
u
stria and
 G
reece, I cou
ld
 not find
 su
fficient d
ata in the cou
ntry chapters to carry ou
t
a sim
ilar ad
ju
stm
ent so I have based
 the correction on the theoretical relationship
 betw
een
net and
 gross retu
rns and
 on O
E
C
D
 d
ata on average and
 m
arginal tax rates on labou
r incom
e.
T
he p
roced
u
re is as follow
s. L
et f(S) be the gross w
age rate w
ritten as a fu
nction of years of
schooling, S. T
hen, the net or after-tax w
age rate is given by
(1) F(S) =
 f(S) - T
[f(s)] =
  (1- τ)f(S)
w
here T
(y) is the total tax d
u
e on incom
e y (w
hich I assu
m
e coincid
es w
ith the tax w
itheld
 at
p
ay tim
e) and
(2) τ =
 T
[f(S)]/f(S)
is the average tax rate. W
e are interested
 in the relationship
 betw
een the gross retu
rns to
schooling θ =
 f'(S)/f(S) and
 the net retu
rns, θ
n
 =
 F'(S)/F(S). N
otice that
(3) θn
 =
 F'(S)
F
(S
)  =
 (1-T
')f'(S)
 (1-τ)f(S
)
 =  1-T'
1-τ
θ
w
here T
' is the m
arginal tax rate. I have u
sed
 this form
u
la to estim
ate the gross retu
rn to
schooling given H
arm
on et al's estim
ate of the net retu
rn. T
he d
ata on m
arginal and
 average
tax rates requ
ired
 for the calcu
lation are taken from
 the O
E
C
D
 T
ax D
atabase and
 com
e
origin
ally from
 T
axing 
W
ages. T
hey refer to the year 2000 and
 are those ap
p
licable to a
single p
erson w
ith no child
ren and
 A
P
W
 gross earnings. T
his calcu
lation yield
s ad
ju
stm
ent
ratios of 0.873 for G
reece and
 of 0.792 for A
ustria.
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3. E
m
p
loym
en
t p
rob
ab
ilities an
d
 em
p
loym
en
t effects of sch
oolin
g
It is w
ell d
ocu
m
ented
 that increased
 ed
u
cational attainm
ent goes hand
 in had
 w
ith
greater rates of labou
r force p
articip
ation (p
articu
larly in the fem
ale p
op
u
lation) and
 low
er
u
nem
p
loym
ent rates. B
oth of these effects w
ill in tu
rn increase lifetim
e incom
e and
 raise the
exp
ected
 retu
rn on schooling above the level im
p
lied
 by w
age regressions that u
se sam
p
les of
em
p
loyed
 w
orkers. A
lthou
gh there are som
e attem
p
ts in the literatu
re to incorp
orate these
effects into calcu
lations of the rate of retu
rn to schooling (see for instance B
arceinas et al
(2001) and
 the references therein), I have not fou
nd
 a set of hom
ogeneou
s estim
ates of the
relevant p
aram
eters for E
U
 cou
ntries that can be u
sed
 to m
ake the requ
ired
 ad
ju
stm
ents. T
o
fill in this gap
 and
 try to get som
e feeling for the p
otential im
p
act of these factors, in this
section I rep
ort  a (rather cru
d
e) estim
ate of the im
p
act of schooling on the p
robability of
em
ploym
ent using d
ata from
 the Spring 2000 L
abour Force Survey provid
ed
 by E
urostat.
T
ab
le A
.7: P
rob
ab
ility of em
p
loym
en
t b
y attain
m
en
t level
p
op
u
lation
 35-44
________________________________________________________________
                                          total =
 (1-u)*LFP
R
                                conditional on partic. =
 1-u
low
m
ediu
m
h
ig
h
low
m
ediu
m
h
ig
h
A
u
stria
71.5%
86.7%
91.9%
92.8%
96.9%
97.5%
B
elgiu
m
70.1%
83.8%
91.6%
90.8%
95.3%
98.0%
G
erm
an
y
67.0%
81.9%
90.5%
87.1%
92.9%
96.5%
D
en
m
ark
77.5%
90.3%
92.3%
93.7%
96.2%
98.2%
S
pain
62.3%
74.9%
86.8%
85.7%
89.0%
93.8%
F
in
lan
d
76.7%
82.5%
89.9%
88.1%
91.6%
96.0%
F
ran
ce
70.0%
84.4%
89.1%
86.2%
92.7%
95.6%
G
reece
66.8%
73.1%
90.6%
91.0%
91.3%
96.3%
Italy
63.7%
81.5%
92.1%
90.6%
94.6%
97.7%
N
etherlan
ds
71.4%
85.9%
91.7%
96.6%
98.0%
98.5%
P
ortu
gal
83.3%
91.4%
94.9%
97.0%
96.6%
97.8%
S
w
eden
73.5%
85.3%
90.4%
92.6%
94.5%
97.9%
U
K
59.8%
84.1%
90.8%
91.0%
95.9%
98.2%
avge. E
U
14
70.3%
83.5%
91.0%
91.0%
94.3%
97.1%
________________________________________________________________
- Source: E
u
rostat, L
abou
r Force Su
rvey, Spring 2000.
- T
he d
ata refer to the popu
lation aged
 35 to 44. T
he d
ata for Ireland
 are not broken d
ow
n by attainm
ent
categories.
For each E
U
 cou
ntry (w
ith the excep
tion of Ireland
), E
u
rostat p
rovid
es inform
ation on
labou
r force p
articip
ation and
 u
nem
p
loym
ent rates d
isaggregated
 by age grou
p
 and
 by three
levels of ed
u
cational attainm
ent (low
, m
ed
iu
m
 and
 high). 32 T
able A
.7 show
s the "total" and
cond
itional p
robabilities of em
p
loym
ent for the p
op
u
lation aged
 35 to 44  im
p
lied
 by these
d
ata, broken d
ow
n by three attainm
ent levels (low
, m
ed
iu
m
 and
 high). T
he total p
robability
32
 Low
 attainm
ent inclu
d
es p
rim
ary and
 low
er second
ary ed
u
cation and
 elem
entary vocational training
(ISC
E
D
 levels 1 and
 2); m
edium
 refers to higher second
ary ed
ucation and
 vocational program
m
es (ISC
E
D
 3
and
 4); and
 high to post-second
ary training (ISC
E
D
 level 5 or higher).
61
of em
p
loym
ent is d
efined
 as (1-u)*LFP
R
 w
here u is the u
nem
p
loym
ent rate and
 LFP
R
 the rate
of labou
r force p
articip
ation. T
he "cond
itional" p
robability of em
p
loym
ent is sim
p
ly 1-u.
T
able A
.8 show
s the cu
m
u
lative years of schooling associated
 w
ith each of the three
attainm
ent categories in the E
u
rostat d
ata. I w
ill u
sed
 the d
ata in these tw
o tables to
calcu
late the increase in the p
robability of em
p
loym
ent associated
 w
ith a one-year increase
in
 ed
u
cation
al attain
m
en
t (p'(S
)). L
et p(n
) be th
e (total or con
d
ition
al) p
robability of
em
p
loym
ent of the the p
op
u
lation that has achieved
 the n-th attainm
ent level (w
ith n =
 1, 2
or 3 for low
, m
ed
iu
m
 and
 high attainm
ent) and
 S(n) th
e cu
m
u
lative years of sch
oolin
g
assign
ed
 to th
e sam
e grou
p
. I calcu
late th
e m
argin
al in
crease in
 th
e p
robability of
em
ploym
ent brought about by m
oving from
 group n to n+1 by
d(n) =
 p(n
+
1) - p(n
)
 S(n+
1) - S(n)
for n =
 1 and
 2. T
he d
esired
 variable, p'(S) is then constru
cted
 as a w
eighted
 average of d(1)
and
 d(2) w
ith w
eights of 2/
3 and
 1/
3 resp
ectively. A
 (p
relim
inary) estim
ate of ε
 is then
obtained
 by d
ivid
ing p'(S) by the average p
robability of em
p
loym
ent in the entire (35 to 44)
p
op
u
lation, p(S).
T
ab
le A
.8: C
u
m
u
lative years of sch
oolin
g for each
 ed
u
cation
al level
______________________________________
low
m
ediu
m
h
ig
h
A
u
stria
9
13
17
B
elgiu
m
9
12
16
G
erm
an
y
10
13
17
D
en
m
ark
9
13
17
S
pain
8
12
17
F
in
lan
d
9
12
17
F
ran
ce
9
12
16
G
reece
9
12
16
Italy
8
13
18
N
etherlan
ds
10
12
17
P
ortu
gal
8
12
16
S
w
eden
9
12
16
U
K
9
12
16
______________________________________
- Source: d
e la Fuente and
 D
om
énech (2002), T
able 4, using these authors' L
2.1 for low
, L
2.2 for m
ed
ium
 and
L
3.2 for high.
T
able A
.9 su
m
m
arizes the resu
lts of the exercise. T
he left-hand
 sid
e block of the table
refers to th
e "total" p
robability of em
p
loym
en
t, takin
g in
to accou
n
t both
 labou
r force
p
articip
ation and
 u
nem
p
loym
ent rates, and
 the right-hand
 sid
e block refers to em
p
loym
ent
p
robabilities cond
itional on labou
r force p
articip
ation (i.e. one m
inu
s the u
nem
p
loym
ent rate
as conventionally d
efined
). In both cases, p(S) stand
s for p
robability of em
p
loym
ent (i.e. the
fraction of the relevant grou
p
 that is em
p
loyed
), p'(S
) is the m
arginal increase in this
p
robability associated
 w
ith
 an
 ad
d
ition
al year of sch
oolin
g, an
d
 ε =
 p'(S)/p(S) is th
e
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coefficient w
hich enters the rate of retu
rn calcu
lation. A
s noted
 above, since the d
ata for
Ireland
 are not broken d
ow
n by attainm
ent level, it is not p
ossible to calcu
late p'(S). I have
assu
m
ed
 that  the valu
e of ε
 in this cou
ntry is the sam
e as in the U
K
.
T
ab
le A
.9: M
argin
al con
trib
u
tion
 of sch
oolin
g to th
e p
rob
ab
ility of em
p
loym
en
t
p
op
u
lation
 35-44
________________________________________________________________
                                 total probability of em
ploym
ent             conditional on participation
p(S
)
p'(S
)
ε
 =
 p'/p
p(S
)
p'(S
)
ε
 =
 p'/p
A
u
stria
84.73%
2.97%
3.51%
96.35%
0.74%
0.77%
B
elgiu
m
80.95%
3.71%
4.58%
94.63%
1.22%
1.29%
G
erm
an
y
81.62%
4.03%
4.93%
93.11%
1.59%
1.71%
D
en
m
ark
87.66%
2.30%
2.62%
96.29%
0.57%
0.60%
S
pain
70.61%
2.88%
4.09%
88.62%
0.87%
0.99%
F
in
lan
d
83.65%
1.79%
2.14%
92.67%
1.07%
1.15%
F
ran
ce
80.41%
3.60%
4.47%
91.27%
1.69%
1.85%
G
reece
74.05%
2.86%
3.86%
92.37%
0.50%
0.54%
Irelan
d*
73.54%
7.39%
93.16%
1.36%
Italy
82.90%
3.07%
3.71%
97.76%
0.74%
0.76%
N
etherlan
ds
83.97%
5.22%
6.21%
97.06%
0.51%
0.52%
P
ortu
gal
84.57%
1.65%
1.96%
95.23%
0.04%
0.04%
S
w
eden
81.74%
3.06%
3.74%
95.74%
0.70%
0.73%
U
K
80.80%
5.97%
7.39%
94.17%
1.28%
1.36%
avge. E
U
14
80.80%
3.32%
4.33%
94.17%
0.89%
0.98%
________________________________________________________________
   (*) For lack of data, Ireland is im
puted the sam
e value of ε as the U
K
.
T
he p
roced
u
re I have ju
st d
escribed
 is clearly far from
 the id
eal w
ay to estim
ate the valu
e
of ε and
 m
ay be su
bject to a very large u
p
w
ard
 bias becau
se it d
oes not control for m
any
relevant ind
ivid
u
al and
 social characteristics that m
ay generate a "sp
u
riou
s" correlation
betw
een school attainm
ent and
 em
p
loym
ent. A
ge is one su
ch characteristic, p
articu
larly in
the case of fem
ales. O
ld
er fem
ale cohorts tend
 to be less ed
u
cated
 than you
nger ones and
 are
also m
u
ch less likely to be em
p
loyed
. B
u
t it is highly u
nlikely that low
er em
p
loym
ent
p
robabilities are only the resu
lt of low
er attainm
ent levels. U
nd
ou
bted
ly, social norm
s are
also an im
portant factor, as these w
om
en grew
 up in a society w
here they w
ere not expected
 to
stay long in school or w
ork ou
tsid
e the hom
e. Failing to control for this factor w
ill tend
 to
overstate th
e effects of ed
u
cation
 on
 em
p
loym
en
t. Sim
ilarly, it m
ay be exp
ected
 th
at
ind
ivid
u
als w
ho, for w
hatever reason, d
o not p
lan to p
articip
ate actively in the labou
r
m
arket w
ill d
em
and
 less ed
u
cation than those w
ho d
o.
T
he u
p
shot of this d
iscu
ssion is that it is extrem
ely d
angerou
s to interp
ret observed
d
ifferences in average em
p
loym
ent rates across ed
u
cational levels as an ind
ication of the
cau
sal effect of schooling on em
p
loym
ent p
robabilities. T
o try to m
itigate the resu
lting bias, I
have taken tw
o p
recau
tions. First, in an attem
p
t to m
inim
ize the age bias reflecting changes
in social valu
es, I have based
 all m
y calcu
lations on d
ata for a relatively you
ng cohort (those
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aged
 35 to 44) rather for the ad
u
lt p
op
u
lation as a w
hole. 33 A
nd
 second
, I w
ill assu
m
e that
only a fraction of the calcu
lated
 effect can be p
rop
erly attribu
ted
 to ed
u
cation itself. T
hu
s,
the p
relim
inary estim
ates of ε given in T
able A
.9  w
ill be m
u
ltip
lied
 by a factor of either 1/
3
or 2/
3 before inserting them
 in the ap
p
rop
riate rate of retu
rn form
u
la. I w
ill u
se the larger
coefficient for calcu
lating the ind
ivid
u
al level p
ayoff to increased
 schooling, and
 the sm
aller
one for estim
ating the social rate of retu
rn to ed
u
cation. T
he size of the ad
ju
stm
ent is certainly
arbitrary, bu
t it seem
s clear that it shou
ld
 be larger at the aggregate than at the ind
ivid
u
al
level becau
se the exp
ected
 gain in term
s of em
p
loym
ent p
rosp
ects from
 an ad
d
itional year of
schooling w
ill be greater if you
 are the only one raising you
r qu
alifications than if everybod
y
else is d
oing it too.
C
orrection for differential student em
ploym
ent probabilities
C
asu
al observation su
ggests that, at least in som
e cou
ntries, find
ing a part-tim
e or su
m
m
er
job w
h
ile atten
d
in
g sch
ool m
ay be h
ard
er th
an
 fin
d
in
g a fu
ll-tim
e job, an
d
 th
at th
e
p
rop
ensity of stu
d
ents to enter the labou
r m
arket tend
s to be m
u
ch low
er than that of those
w
ho have com
p
leted
 their ed
u
cation. Since these factors can have an im
p
ortant effect on the
op
p
ortu
nity cost of ed
u
cation and
 hence on its p
rivate and
 social rates of retu
rn, they shou
ld
be taken into account in the rate of return calculations.
T
ab
le A
.10: P
rob
ab
ility of em
p
loym
en
t, p
op
u
lation
 20-24 in
 an
d
 ou
t of sch
ool
________________________________________________________________
                                                             in education                  not in education                   η = ratio in/not in edu.
total
activ
e
total
activ
e
total
activ
e
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
A
u
stria
B
elgiu
m
9.36%
73.08%
71.43%
83.01%
0.131
0.880
D
en
m
ark
65.91%
85.86%
74.34%
91.82%
0.887
0.935
F
in
lan
d
26.72%
54.55%
65.09%
80.68%
0.411
0.676
F
ran
ce
10.25%
62.26%
72.54%
0.165
G
erm
an
y
47.38%
98.29%
76.49%
87.30%
0.619
1.126
G
reece
4.70%
51.72%
54.79%
70.73%
0.086
0.731
Irelan
d
Italy
0.93%
23.08%
55.47%
70.49%
0.017
0.327
N
etherlan
ds
56.49%
91.74%
86.66%
95.29%
0.652
0.963
P
ortu
gal
20.88%
84.52%
83.33%
91.67%
0.251
0.922
S
pain
9.73%
46.81%
63.32%
69.12%
0.154
0.677
S
w
eden
19.95%
66.94%
71.84%
85.03%
0.278
0.787
U
K
45.12%
89.93%
77.98%
89.85%
0.579
1.001
average E
U
14
26.45%
69.68%
70.25%
82.29%
0.352
0.821
________________________________________________________________
- Source: E
A
G
 2000 (T
able E
2.1 p
. 280) w
ith d
ata for 1998.
33 T
his red
uces the estim
ated
 effect by around
 one third
. For instance, the average value of ε for the 25-64
popu
lation is 6.62%
 (rather than 4.33%
 as in T
able A
.9).
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T
o calcu
late th
e requ
ired
 correction
 factor ( η
), I w
ill u
se d
ata on the p
robability of
em
p
loym
ent of the 20 to 24 age grou
p
 in 1998 taken from
 the 2000 ed
ition of E
ducation at a
G
lance. C
olu
m
ns [1] to [4] of T
able A
.10 show
 the total p
robability of em
p
loym
ent of this
grou
p
 and
 its p
robability of em
p
loym
ent cond
itional on p
articip
ation in the labou
r force, 34
d
istin
gu
ish
in
g betw
een
 th
ose en
rolled
 in
 ed
u
cation
al in
stitu
tion
s an
d
 th
ose w
h
o h
ave
com
p
leted
 their form
al schooling. C
olu
m
ns [5] and
 [6] show
 p
relim
inary estim
ates of the
correction
 factor, η
. T
h
is variable is con
stru
cted
 by d
ivid
in
g th
e relevan
t em
p
loym
en
t
p
robability for those attend
ing scool by its cou
nterp
art for those ou
t of school. C
olu
m
n [5]
refers to the total p
op
u
lation (and
 therefore takes into accou
nt d
ifferences across these grou
p
s
in participation rates), w
hile colu
m
n [6] refers only to active stu
d
ents and
 non-stu
d
ents.
T
o go from
 T
able A
.10 to T
able 2 in the text (w
hich show
s the valu
es of the correction
factor, η
, that are u
sed
 in the rate of retu
rn calcu
lations), I assign a valu
e of 1 to cou
ntries
w
here the p
relim
inary estim
ate show
n here exceed
s that valu
e (i.e. assu
m
e that, other
things equ
al, it is never easier to find
 p
art-tim
e em
p
loym
ent as a stu
d
ent than a fu
ll-tim
e
job). I also fill in the m
issing cells in colu
m
ns [5] and
 [6] by assigning to A
u
stria, France and
Ireland
 the valu
es of observed
 in G
erm
any, Sp
ain and
 the U
K
 resp
ectively.
4. T
ax an
d
 b
en
efit p
aram
eters
A
s noted
 in the text, the average tax rate on stu
d
ent incom
e (τs ) has been constru
cted
 u
sing
the inform
ation given in T
axing W
ages 2000-2001 abou
t national incom
e tax and
 social
secu
rity system
s. Stu
d
ents are assu
m
ed
 to be single ind
ivid
u
als w
ith no d
escend
ants w
ith
labour incom
e equal to 20%
 of A
PW
 earnings. In m
ost countries existing tax allow
ances or zero-
rate brackets are su
ch that ind
ivid
u
als w
ith these characteristics w
ill p
ay no incom
e tax.
T
he excep
tions are the N
ord
ic cou
ntries, w
here they w
ou
ld
 be su
bject to p
rop
ortional local
taxes, and
 the N
etherland
s, w
here som
e social contribu
tions are levied
 on taxable incom
e
rather than on gross w
ages. In m
ost countries, how
ever, em
ployee social security contributions
w
ou
ld
 have to be p
aid
 at stand
ard
 rates. T
he excep
tions to this norm
 are the U
K
, w
hich
exem
p
ts w
ages below
 a certain level from
 these contribu
tions, and
 Ireland
 w
here they are
exem
p
ted
 from
 m
ost bu
t not all social contribu
tions. In the case of D
enm
ark, I have assu
m
ed
that you
ng p
art-tim
e w
orkers op
t ou
t of certain u
nem
p
loym
ent and
 p
ension schem
es that
ap
p
ear to be volu
ntary.
M
y estim
ates of th
e ben
efit p
aram
eters (a and
 b) h
ave been
 con
stru
cted
 u
sin
g th
e
d
escrip
tion of the existing benefit schem
es given in the cou
ntry chap
ters of the O
E
C
D
's
B
enefit System
s and W
ork Incentives 1999. I have w
orked
 u
nd
er the assu
m
p
tions that i) w
e
are d
ealing w
ith a single ind
ivid
u
al w
ith no child
ren w
hose w
age p
rior to the loss of
34
 A
s above, the first of these figu
res is sim
p
ly the ratio of em
p
loym
ent to the total p
op
u
lation, and
 the
second one the ratio of em
ploym
ent to the labour force.
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em
p
loym
ent w
as equ
al to average p
rod
u
ction w
orker (A
P
W
) earnings and
 ii) that any
u
nem
p
loym
ent sp
ells exp
erienced
 by ou
r rep
resentative w
orker are su
fficiently brief that he
d
oes not exhau
st the contribu
tory benefits to w
hich he is entitled
.
T
able A
.11 contains the relevant inform
ation. C
olu
m
n [1] show
s the total net rep
lacem
ent
ratio (a+
b) for the reference ind
ivid
u
al, d
efined
 as the ratio of his after-tax incom
e w
hen
unem
ployed
 to his after-tax incom
e w
hen em
ployed
 at a w
age equal to A
PW
 earnings. C
olum
n
[2] tells u
s w
hether the u
nem
ploym
ent benefit (w
hich in all cases accou
nts for the bu
lk of ou
t-
of-w
ork incom
e) is linked
 to p
reviou
s earnings or not. W
hile m
ost cou
ntries tie benefit levels
to p
reviou
s w
ages, som
e of them
 also establish ceilings that m
ay be bind
ing for ou
r reference
ind
ivid
u
al, and
 others p
ay a fixed
 rate or u
se a m
ixed
 system
. I u
se P
W
 to ind
icate that
benefits are an increasing fu
nction of p
reviou
s w
ages, FR
 for a fixed
 rate system
, FR
* for the
case w
here the benefit is in p
ractice fixed
 for ou
r reference ind
ivid
u
al (becau
se the benefit
ceiling ap
p
lies to him
) and
 m
ixed for the case of Finland
, w
here benefit levels inclu
d
e both a
fixed
 base rate and
 a second
 com
p
onent that rises w
ith p
reviou
s earnings. C
olu
m
n [3] show
s
the share of hou
sing benefits (H
B
) in total after-tax incom
e ou
t of w
ork in those cou
ntries
w
here ou
r reference ind
ivid
u
al w
ou
ld
 be eligible for su
ch a su
bsid
y (w
hich is non-taxable and
not tied
 to previou
s earnings in all cases).
T
ab
le A
.11: B
en
efit p
aram
eters
_________________________________________________________
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
a+
b
net 
replace-
m
ent ratio
type of U
I
schem
e
w
eight 
of
hou
sin
g
ben
efits
a
linked 
to
prev. earns
b
not so
lin
ked
A
u
stria
59.56%
P
W
59.56%
0.00%
B
elgiu
m
64.47%
F
R
*
0.00%
64.47%
D
en
m
ark
62.71%
F
R
*
0.016
0.00%
62.71%
F
in
lan
d
64.90%
m
ixed
0.097
33.74%
31.16%
F
ran
ce
70.52%
P
W
70.52%
0.00%
G
erm
an
y
60.20%
P
W
0.008
59.69%
0.51%
G
reece
46.59%
P
W
46.59%
0.00%
Irelan
d
31.18%
F
R
0.00%
31.18%
Italy
41.57%
P
W
0.055
39.28%
2.29%
N
etherlan
ds
81.98%
P
W
0.058
77.27%
4.72%
P
ortu
gal
78.89%
P
W
78.89%
0.00%
S
pain
74.45%
P
W
74.45%
0.00%
S
w
eden
70.62%
F
R
*
0.00%
70.62%
U
K
46.32%
F
R
0.571
0.00%
46.32%
avge. E
U
14
61.00%
38.57%
22.43%
_________________________________________________________
U
sing this inform
ation, I sp
lit the total rep
lacem
ent rate given in colu
m
n [1] into the tw
o
com
p
onents show
n in colu
m
ns [4] and
 [5]. T
he first of these p
aram
eters, a, cap
tu
res benefits
that are linked
 to p
reviou
s earnings, and
 the second
 one, b, fixed
-rate u
nem
p
loym
ent and
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hou
sing benefits. H
ence, w
e have a =
 0 and
 b =
 a+
b for system
s of type FR
 or FR
*. For countries
of typ
e P
W
, w
e set b =
 0 and
 a =
 a+
b w
henever no (fixed
 rate) hou
sing benefits are available.
If hou
sing benefits are p
rovid
ed
, then b is equ
al to the total rep
lacem
ent ratio (a+
b) tim
es the
share of hou
sing benefits in after-tax incom
e, and
 the rem
aind
er is assigned
 to a. In the case of
Finland
, w
e follow
 the sam
e p
roced
u
re to sp
lit a+
b into its hou
sing and
 u
nem
p
loym
ent
com
p
onents and
 then allocate the latter betw
een a and
 b in p
rop
ortion to the variable and
fixed
 p
arts of the benefit.
5. T
h
e p
rivate retu
rn
 to sch
oolin
g: d
etailed
 resu
lts
T
able A
.12 show
s estim
ates of the p
rivate rate of retu
rn to schooling u
nd
er each of the
scenarios d
iscu
ssed
 in section 3.c of the text. T
he first block of the table gives the actu
al rates
of retu
rn, and
 the second
 one a set of norm
alized
 rates of retu
rn that are obtained
 by setting
the average valu
e for each scenario to 100. T
able A
.13 show
s the change in the rate of retu
rn
as w
e m
ove across scenarios and
 T
able A
.14 converts these changes into the im
p
lied
 su
bsid
y
(w
hen p
ositive) or tax rate (w
hen negative) by d
ivid
ing the total changes show
n in T
able
A
.13  by the initial rate of retu
rn (before the contem
p
lated
 change) show
n in T
able A
.12.
A
s u
su
al bold
 and
 bold
 italic entries in T
able A
.12 id
entify estim
ates based
 on incom
p
lete
d
ata. B
elgian estim
ates are p
articu
larly u
nreliable in all scenarios (becau
se the m
issing p
iece
of inform
ation is the M
incerian retu
rns p
aram
eter, w
hich is u
sed
 in all scenarios), w
hereas in
the rem
aining cou
ntries d
ata p
roblem
s affect only the calcu
lations in the last colu
m
n throu
gh
the stu
d
ent u
nem
p
loym
ent correction, excep
t in the case of P
ortu
gal w
here the m
ain p
otential
problem
 has to d
o w
ith the total d
irect costs of ed
u
cation.
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T
ab
le A
.12: N
et p
rivate rates of retu
rn
 to sch
oolin
g u
n
d
er d
ifferen
t scen
arios
____________________________________________________________
baselin
e
+
su
bsidies
+
 taxes
G
O
V
'T
+
 benefits
O
B
S
+
diffstU
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
A
u
stria
8.92%
12.99%
11.02%
10.50%
10.50%
B
elgiu
m
8.99%
11.38%
10.29%
8.97%
8.56%
D
en
m
ark
6.90%
9.33%
9.87%
9.11%
8.87%
F
in
lan
d
10.31%
13.55%
11.61%
10.48%
9.62%
F
ran
ce
8.93%
12.35%
11.66%
10.34%
9.59%
G
erm
an
y
10.88%
13.75%
11.63%
10.43%
10.43%
G
reece
9.61%
11.99%
10.70%
10.39%
9.81%
Irelan
d
12.24%
16.10%
11.08%
10.41%
10.41%
Italy
9.20%
11.81%
10.73%
10.40%
8.61%
N
etherlan
ds
7.88%
10.20%
8.64%
8.07%
7.95%
P
ortu
gal
9.33%
13.68%
12.67%
12.52%
12.29%
S
pain
9.45%
11.92%
10.87%
10.06%
9.36%
S
w
eden
4.49%
7.05%
7.38%
6.49%
6.06%
U
K
12.49%
15.36%
14.92%
13.87%
13.87%
avge. E
U
14
9.31%
12.30%
11.06%
10.24%
9.75%
baselin
e
+
 subsidies
+
 taxes
+
 benefits
O
B
S
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
A
u
stria
95.8
105.6
99.6
102.6
107.7
B
elgiu
m
96.6
92.5
93.1
87.6
87.8
D
en
m
ark
74.1
75.8
89.3
89.0
91.0
F
in
lan
d
110.8
110.2
105.0
102.3
98.6
F
ran
ce
95.9
100.4
105.4
101.0
98.3
G
erm
an
y
116.8
111.7
105.1
101.8
106.9
G
reece
103.3
97.5
96.7
101.4
100.6
Irelan
d
131.5
130.9
100.2
101.6
106.7
Italy
98.8
96.0
97.1
101.6
88.3
N
etherlan
ds
84.7
82.9
78.1
78.8
81.5
P
ortu
gal
100.2
111.2
114.6
122.3
126.1
S
pain
101.5
96.9
98.3
98.2
96.0
S
w
eden
48.3
57.3
66.8
63.3
62.1
U
K
134.1
124.8
134.9
135.5
142.3
av
g
e
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
____________________________________________________________
- N
ote: bold entries denote estim
ates based on incom
plete or suspicious data.
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T
ab
le A
.13: ch
an
ge in
 th
e n
et p
rivate rates of retu
rn
 to sch
oolin
g in
d
u
ced
 b
y
variou
s p
u
b
lic in
terven
tion
s an
d
 b
y d
ifferen
tial stu
d
en
t u
n
em
p
loym
en
t
____________________________________________________________
edu
cation
al
su
bsidies
person
al
taxes
social
ben
efits
a
ll
gov't
student
u
n
em
pl.
total
[2]-[1]
[3]-[2]
[4]-[3]
[4]-[1]
[5]-[4]
[5]-[1]
A
u
stria
4.07%
-1.97%
-0.51%
1.58%
0.00%
1.58%
B
elgiu
m
2.39%
-1.09%
-1.32%
-0.02%
-0.41%
-0.43%
D
en
m
ark
2.43%
0.55%
-0.76%
2.21%
-0.24%
1.97%
F
in
lan
d
3.24%
-1.94%
-1.13%
0.16%
-0.86%
-0.70%
F
ran
ce
3.42%
-0.69%
-1.32%
1.41%
-0.75%
0.65%
G
erm
an
y
2.87%
-2.12%
-1.20%
-0.45%
0.00%
-0.45%
G
reece
2.38%
-1.30%
-0.31%
0.78%
-0.58%
0.19%
Irelan
d
3.86%
-5.02%
-0.67%
-1.83%
0.00%
-1.83%
Italy
2.61%
-1.08%
-0.33%
1.20%
-1.79%
-0.59%
N
etherlan
ds
2.32%
-1.57%
-0.57%
0.18%
-0.12%
0.06%
P
ortu
gal
4.35%
-1.00%
-0.15%
3.20%
-0.23%
2.97%
S
pain
2.47%
-1.05%
-0.81%
0.61%
-0.70%
-0.09%
S
w
eden
2.55%
0.34%
-0.90%
1.99%
-0.43%
1.57%
U
K
2.87%
-0.43%
-1.05%
1.39%
0.00%
1.39%
avge. E
U
14
2.99%
-1.24%
-0.82%
0.93%
-0.49%
0.44%
____________________________________________________________
T
ab
le A
.14: N
et im
p
licit su
b
sid
y (+
) or tax (-) rate in
d
u
ced
 b
y
variou
s p
u
b
lic in
terven
tion
s an
d
 b
y d
ifferen
tial stu
d
en
t u
n
em
p
loym
en
t
____________________________________________________________
edu
cation
al
su
bsidies
person
al
taxes
social
ben
efits
a
ll
gov't
student
u
n
em
pl.
total
[2]-[1]
[3]-[2]
[4]-[3]
[4]-[1]
[5]-[4]
[5]-[1]
A
u
stria
45.62%
-15.18%
-4.65%
17.77%
0.00%
17.77%
B
elgiu
m
26.61%
-9.59%
-12.80%
-0.18%
-4.58%
-4.75%
D
en
m
ark
35.15%
5.87%
-7.70%
32.05%
-2.64%
28.56%
F
in
lan
d
31.41%
-14.34%
-9.76%
1.58%
-8.23%
-6.78%
F
ran
ce
38.25%
-5.59%
-11.33%
15.73%
-7.26%
7.33%
G
erm
an
y
26.36%
-15.42%
-10.30%
-4.13%
0.00%
-4.13%
G
reece
24.78%
-10.81%
-2.89%
8.07%
-5.62%
2.00%
Irelan
d
31.53%
-31.17%
-6.07%
-14.96%
0.00%
-14.96%
Italy
28.42%
-9.16%
-3.09%
13.05%
-17.18%
-6.37%
N
etherlan
ds
29.38%
-15.35%
-6.59%
2.31%
-1.46%
0.82%
P
ortu
gal
46.69%
-7.35%
-1.19%
34.29%
-1.82%
31.85%
S
pain
26.11%
-8.81%
-7.47%
6.41%
-6.91%
-0.94%
S
w
eden
56.83%
4.81%
-12.17%
44.36%
-6.59%
34.85%
U
K
22.96%
-2.82%
-7.03%
11.09%
0.00%
11.09%
avge. E
U
14
32.14%
-10.11%
-7.39%
10.00%
-4.78%
4.74%
____________________________________________________________
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6. A
 p
lau
sib
le ran
ge of m
acroecon
om
ic p
aram
eter estim
ates 35
In this section I w
ill try to extract from
 D
&
D
 (2002) and
 from
 the review
 of the literatu
re
in the A
p
p
end
ix to ou
r p
reviou
s rep
ort (D
&
C
, 2002) a p
lau
sible range of valu
es for the
p
aram
eters that d
escribe the relationship
 betw
een hu
m
an cap
ital and
 the level and
 grow
th
rate of aggregate p
rod
u
ctivity. T
he coefficients of interest are tw
o alternative m
easu
res of
level effects and
 one m
easu
re of rate effects. T
he level p
aram
eters are the elasticity of ou
tp
u
t
w
ith respect to average schooling, α
S , and
 the aggregate M
incerian retu
rn on schooling, ρ, that
m
easu
res the p
ercentage increase in ou
tp
u
t resu
lting from
 a one-year increase in average
attainm
ent. A
s the read
er w
ill recall (see B
ox 1 in section 2b the text), ρ can be obtained
 by
d
ivid
ing α
S  by average attainm
ent in years, and
 vice versa. T
he rate effects p
aram
eter is the
coefficient of ed
u
cational attainm
ent (S) in the technical p
rogress fu
nction, γ, and
 m
easu
res
the contribu
tion of an ad
d
itional year of schooling to the rate of T
FP
 grow
th hold
ing other
things (and
 in p
articu
lar the gap
 w
ith the w
orld
 technological frontier) constant.
T
he first block of T
able A
.15 show
s a nu
m
ber of selected
 coefficient estim
ates taken from
the em
p
irical literatu
re review
ed
 in D
&
C
 (2002). T
he first row
 of the table gives the sou
rce
of the estim
ate, the second
 show
s the sp
ecific form
 in w
hich years of schooling enters the
equ
ation
, 36 the third
 and
 fou
rth row
s d
isp
lay the estim
ated
 valu
e of the "raw
" regression
coefficient and
 the associated
 t statistic, and
 the fifth row
 lists the sou
rce of the schooling
d
ata. T
o increase the com
p
arability of the coefficients and
 to facilitate their interp
retation,
I have selected
 only estim
ates obtained
 u
sing d
ata on average years of schooling (rather than
on enrollm
ent rates). I have focu
sed
 m
ostly on recent stu
d
ies that m
ake u
se of the latest
available d
ata sets and
 u
se sp
ecifications that p
rod
u
ce "resp
ectable" signal to noise ratios for
an O
E
C
D
 d
ata set. Im
p
licitly, then, I am
 accep
ting K
ru
eger and
 L
ind
hal's (2001) argu
m
ent
that failu
re to find
 significant p
rod
u
ctivity effects is m
ost likely d
u
e to p
oor d
ata, and
 not
taking into accou
nt the negative find
ings of som
e of the stu
d
ies w
e have review
ed
 in the
A
ppend
ix to the previou
s report.
35
 T
his section is based
 on d
e la Fu
ente (2003). It is also an u
p
d
ate of m
aterial that w
as inclu
d
ed
 in
sections 5a and
 5b of the text and
 in section 3f of the A
ppend
ix of D
&
C
 (2002). T
he m
ain d
ifference w
ith the
p
reviou
s version has to d
o w
ith the ad
ju
stm
ent for m
easu
rem
ent error. A
s noted
 in the text, in the first
colu
m
n of T
able A
.15 I u
se a d
irect m
eta-estim
ate taken from
 D
&
D
's (2002) to correct  these au
thors' raw
estim
ate of the hu
m
an cap
ital coefficient. For the rem
aining colu
m
ns, I u
se w
hat D
&
D
 (2002) call SU
R
estim
ates of the relevant reliability ratios rather than those originally com
puted
 in C
&
D
 (2002) because the
form
er shou
ld
 be m
ore precise. T
hese reliability ratios are d
erived
 from
 O
E
C
D
 d
ata (rather than from
 the
larger cou
ntry sam
p
les u
sed
 in som
e of the relevant stu
d
ies). A
s noted
 in A
p
p
end
ix 2a of C
&
D
 (2002),
reliability ratio estim
ates for broad
er sam
ples tend
 to be larger than those based
 on O
E
C
D
 d
ata, but this is
likely to give a m
isleading im
pression of data quality.
36 T
he notation is the stand
ard
 one in this rep
ort: S d
enotes years of schooling, s the log of this variable
and
 ∆
s its annu
al grow
th rate, com
pu
ted
 as the average annu
al log change over the relevant period
. C
&
S
stand
s for C
ohen and
 Soto, D
&
D
 and
 for d
e la Fu
ente and
 D
om
énech, and
 B
as&
Scarp
 for B
assanini and
Scarp
etta.
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T
ab
le A
.15:  S
elected
 estim
ates, correction
s for m
easu
rem
en
t error b
ias
an
d
 ten
tative estim
ates of rate effects
_________________________________________________________________
1. original coefficient estim
ates:
source:
D
&
D
 (2002)
C
&
S (2001)
B
as&
S
carp
B
arro (2000)
Jones (1996)
regressor:
∆
s
S
s
S
*
S
raw
 
coefficient
0.394
0.085
0.95
0.0044
0.159
(t)
(4.57)
(4.00)
(3.96)
(2.44)
(2.48)
data 
from
:
D
&
D
 (2001)
C
&
S (2001)
D
&
D
 (2001)
B
&
L
 (2000)
B
&
L
 (1993)
2. im
plied values of the level param
eters:
coefficien
t
interpreted 
as
α
S
ρ1-α
k
α
S
1-α
k
β
ρ1-α
k
ρ1-α
k
im
plied ρ
3.70%
5.67%
7.76%
11.73%
11.75%
im
plied 
α
S
0.394
0.603
0.826
1.248
1.250
3. level param
eters after correcting for m
easurem
ent error:
reliab. 
ratio**
m
eta-est.
0.793
0.859
0.768
0.587
corrected 
coeff.
0.587
0.107
1.106
0.006
0.271
im
plied ρ
5.52%
7.15%
9.04%
15.28%
20.02%
im
plied 
α
S
0.587
0.760
0.962
1.626
2.130
im
plied θ
8.42%
10.72%
10.39%
22.92%
27.09%
4. im
plied value of γh  under the assum
ption that α
Y
S  =
 0.587/ρ =
 5.52%
corrected 
coeff.
interpreted 
as:
 α
S
ρ1-α
k  + γλ
α
S
1-α
k   + γλ
βρ1-α
k   + βγλ
ρ1-α
k  + γλ
im
plied γ
0.00%
0.18%
0.30%
1.08%
1.45%
5. other param
eter values used in the calculations:
avge. S
10.64
10.64
10.64
10.64
10.64
λ
0.074
0.074
0.074
0.074
0.074
α
k
0.345
0.333
0.130
0.333
0.261
β
0.025
_________________________________________________________________
(*) T
he regressor is som
e transform
ation of the average years of total schooling of the ad
u
lt p
op
u
lation,
excep
t in B
arro (2000), w
here it is the average years of second
ary and
 higher schooling of the ad
u
lt m
ale
population.
(**) SU
R
 reliability ratios for the appropriate d
ata set and
 d
ata transform
ation from
 D
&
D
 (2002), T
able 8.
I u
se p
anel a of this table (reliability ratios for the raw
 d
ata) for C
&
S (2001), B
arro (2000) and
 Jones
(1996), and
 p
anel b (reliability ratios for the d
ata after rem
oving fixed
 tim
e effects) for B
assanini and
Scarp
etta (2001).
T
he second
 block of the table show
s the valu
es of α
S  and
 ρ
 im
p
lied
 by the original
coefficients w
hen these are interp
reted
 as cap
tu
ring level effects only. In m
ost cases, the
valu
es of these p
aram
eters are not given d
irectly by the estim
ated
 coefficients d
isp
layed
 in
the first block of the table bu
t can be recovered
 from
 them
 u
sing either the exp
licit stru
ctu
ral
m
od
el that u
nd
erlies the estim
ated
 equ
ation, or a m
od
el that generates the sam
e red
u
ced
form
 sp
ecification. For instance, Jones (1996) interp
rets the coefficient of S in the stead
y-state
equ
ation he estim
ates as cap
tu
ring rate effects in a w
orld
 w
ith technological d
iffu
sion. I w
ill
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d
o som
ething like this below
, bu
t for now
 I interp
ret this coefficient as cap
tu
ring a level effect
w
ithin the fram
ew
ork of a M
incerian version of the m
od
el of M
ankiw
, R
om
er and
 W
eil
(M
R
W
, 1992), w
hich yield
s exactly the sam
e stead
y-state sp
ecification. In the case of B
arro
(2000), the estim
ated
 convergence equ
ation is not exp
licitly d
erived
 from
 a stru
ctu
ral m
od
el,
but it can be interpreted
 as such because the functional form
 is sim
ilar to the one that w
ould
 be
im
p
lied
 by the sam
e M
incerian M
R
W
 m
od
el w
hen w
e allow
 for transitional d
ynam
ics. 37 T
o
recover the valu
es of α
S and
 ρ I typ
ically need
 an estim
ate of α
k . W
hen p
ossible, this is taken
from
 the original equ
ation (as in Jones (1996) or in B
assanini and
 Scarp
etta (2001)); otherw
ise,
a valu
e of 0.333 is assu
m
ed
 for this param
eter.
T
he calcu
lations I have ju
st sketched
 w
ill p
rod
u
ce an estim
ate of α
S  w
hen the u
nd
erlying
prod
u
ction fu
nction is C
obb-D
ou
glas in years of schooling (i.e. w
hen w
e assu
m
e that the stock
of hu
m
an cap
ital, H
, is given by H
 =
 S), and
 an estim
ate of ρ
 =
 θα
h w
h
en
 a M
in
cerian
sp
ecification (w
ith H
 =
 E
xp (θS)) is ad
op
ted
. T
o com
p
u
te ρ given α
S , I w
ill d
ivid
e the latter
p
aram
eter by 10.64, w
hich is the average years of schooling in 1990 in a sam
p
le of O
E
C
D
cou
ntries u
sing D
&
D
's (2001) d
ata set. 38 T
he reverse p
roced
u
re w
ill be u
sed
 to com
p
u
te α
S
given the valu
e of ρ. T
he valu
es of the au
xiliary p
aram
eters u
sed
 in these com
p
u
tations are
show
n in the last block of the table.
I w
ill u
se as a low
er bou
nd
 on the level effects p
aram
eters the sm
allest of the estim
ates
show
n in B
lock 2 of the T
able, w
hich is taken from
 D
&
D
 (2002). I exp
ect that this coefficient
w
ill u
nd
erestim
ate the tru
e retu
rn to schooling becau
se it is not corrected
 for m
easu
rem
ent
error bias and
 is obtained
 w
orking w
ith grow
th rates com
p
u
ted
 over five-year p
eriod
s, w
hich
can m
ake it d
ifficu
lt to d
etect p
rod
u
ctivity effects that m
ay involve consid
erable lags -- as is
likely to be the case w
ith the technology-related
 rate effects.
T
he third
 block of T
able A
.15 show
s the effects on p
aram
eter estim
ates of correcting for
m
easu
rem
ent error bias. In the case of D
&
D
 (2002), I w
ill u
se a d
irect m
eta-estim
ate of α
S
p
rovid
ed
 by the sam
e au
thors that shou
ld
 be free of attenu
ation bias. 39 In the rem
aining
37 W
ithin this m
od
el, the coefficient of years of schooling w
ill provid
e an estim
ate of β
ρ1-α
k   , w
here β  (the
rate of convergence) is the coefficient of log initial incom
e p
er cap
ita. B
arro's equ
ation inclu
d
es both this
variable and
 its squ
are, bu
t the au
thor reports that the average rate of convergence in the sam
ple is 2.5%
.
T
his is the valu
e of β u
sed
 in m
y calcu
lations and
 is show
n in the last block of the table. B
arro's equ
ation
controls for investm
ent in p
hysical cap
ital, bu
t the investm
ent ratio d
oes not enter the equ
ation in a w
ay
that allow
s m
e to recover an estim
ate of α
k . H
ence, I assum
e a value of 1/3 for this param
eter.
38 H
ence, the valu
es of ρ and
 θ given in T
able A
.15 refer to this sam
p
le and
 are therefore d
ifferent from
those u
sed
 for the average E
U
 cou
ntry in the rate of retu
rn calcu
lations in the text, w
hich focu
ses on a
subset of the O
EC
D
 sam
ple com
prised by 14 EU
 m
em
bers.
39 T
o constru
ct this m
eta-estim
ate, D
&
D
 (2002) rely on an extension of the classical error-in-variables
m
od
el. T
heir proced
u
re w
orks roughly as follow
s. First, the authors construct an ind
epend
ent m
easure of
the signal-to-noise ratio in eight d
ifferent schooling d
ata sets by exp
loiting the covariance across the
different series. Second, a com
m
on grow
th specification is estim
ated w
ith each of the different data sets. T
he
m
eta-estim
ate is then constructed
 essentially by extrapolating the observed
 relationship betw
een the ind
ex
of d
ata qu
ality and
 the estim
ated
 hu
m
an cap
ital coefficient to the case w
here the d
ata contain no
m
easu
rem
ent error. T
his p
roced
u
re is rep
eated
 u
sing d
ifferent econom
etric sp
ecifications and
 d
ifferent
assum
ptions about the nature of m
easurem
ent error to obtain a num
ber of different m
eta-estim
ates of α
S .  The
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colu
m
ns, the correction is based
 on the reliability ratio (d
ata qu
ality ind
ex) estim
ated
 by
D
&
D
 (2002) for the relevant d
ata set. N
otice that the correction is only a p
artial one becau
se
it ignores the increase in the attenu
ation bias that w
ill resu
lt from
 the introd
u
ction of
ad
d
itional regressors w
hen these are correlated
 w
ith schooling (see Section 2b.iii of D
&
C
(2002)). T
h
e corrected
 estim
ates of th
e raw
 coefficien
ts are obtain
ed
 by d
ivid
in
g th
eir
original valu
es (in the first block of the table) by the reliability ratios show
n in the first row
of the third
 block. T
he im
p
lied
 valu
es of α
S  and
 ρ are then recovered
 in the m
anner exp
lained
above, w
orking w
ith the corrected
 raw
 coefficients. Finally, the last row
 of block 3 show
s the
valu
e of the ind
ivid
u
al-level M
incerian
 retu
rns p
aram
eter (θ) im
p
lied
 by th
e corrected
valu
es of ρ for the case of the average O
E
C
D
 cou
ntry (and
 not for the average E
U
 cou
ntry,
w
hich is the reference u
sed
 in section 4b of the text). T
he valu
e of θ is estim
ated
 as ρ/
(1-α
k ),
as d
iscussed
 in section 8 of the A
ppend
ix.
T
he corrected
 p
aram
eter valu
es d
isp
layed
 in the third
 block of T
able A
.15 are rather
high. N
otice that the low
est valu
e of α
S  is 0.587, w
hich corresp
ond
s to D
&
D
's low
est m
eta-
estim
ate. Sin
ce th
is figu
re im
p
lies a valu
e of θ
 th
at is con
sisten
t w
ith
 H
arm
on
 et al's
estim
ates of the ind
ivid
u
al retu
rns to schooling in the E
U
, I w
ill u
se it as m
y baseline valu
e
for the level effects p
aram
eter. H
ence, the larger estim
ates of α
S  that are im
p
lied
 by the
other stu
d
ies listed
 in the table and
 by the rest of D
&
D
's (2002) m
eta-estim
ates (w
hich range
from
 0.843 to 2.606 w
ith an average value of 1.11) m
ust be picking up som
ething d
ifferent from
the d
irect p
rod
u
ctivity or level effects that are likely to translate into higher w
ages.
T
here are essentially tw
o p
ossibilities: one is the u
p
w
ard
 bias from
 reverse cau
sation (see
D
&
C
, 2002), and
 the other w
hat w
e have called
 rate effects, i.e. the ind
irect contribu
tion of
hu
m
an cap
ital to grow
th via faster technical p
rogress that constitu
tes the m
ost p
lau
sible
sou
rce of externalities linked
 to ed
u
cation. T
he p
attern of resu
lts in the stu
d
ies that p
rod
u
ce
large estim
ates of α
S  su
ggests that both factors are at w
ork. Schooling coefficients are
generally larger w
hen they com
e from
 stead
y-state level equ
ations (w
here reverse cau
sation
can be a seriou
s p
roblem
 if w
e d
o not control for d
ifferences in T
FP
 levels across cou
ntries) or
from
 d
ifferenced
 sp
ecifications that u
se grow
th rates com
p
u
ted
 over long p
eriod
s (w
here
again there is greater d
anger of reverse cau
sation bias as there is tim
e for changes in
enrollm
ents to affect schooling stocks). O
n the other hand
, these sp
ecifications are also m
ore
likely to p
ick u
p
 p
rod
u
ctivity effects that involve long gestation lags, and
 there are reasons
to exp
ect that not all of the observed
 increase in the coefficients is d
u
e to reverse cau
sation. In
p
articu
lar, som
e of the relevant stu
d
ies that estim
ate stead
y-state equ
ations d
o inclu
d
e
p
roxies for T
FP
 or other control variables that shou
ld
 at least red
u
ce the end
ogeneity bias
(e.g. C
ohen and
 Soto (2001) and
 B
arro (2000)), and
 one of them
 (B
assanini and
 Scarp
etta
(2001)) estim
ates very high schooling coefficients w
ith annu
al d
ata u
sing an error correction
corrected
 values show
n in B
lock 3 of T
able A
.15 for D
&
D
 (2002) correspond
 to the low
est of all such m
eta-
estim
ates. The average value of the m
eta-estim
ates of α
S is 1.11.
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sp
ecification that p
robably p
erm
its a better characterization of long-term
 relationship
s by
allow
ing short-term
 d
eviations from
 them
.
T
hu
s, I conjectu
re that, as m
ay be exp
ected
 from
 the d
iscu
ssion in D
&
C
 (2002) abou
t the
d
ifficu
lty of em
p
irically sep
arating level and
 rate effects, the coefficient estim
ates show
n in
T
able A
.15 are p
icking u
p
 both of them
. T
o get som
e feeling for the likely size of the rate
effects, I w
ill take as given the valu
e of the level p
aram
eters im
p
lied
 by D
&
D
's low
est
m
eta-estim
ate and
 solve for the valu
e of the rate effects coefficient, γ, that is consistent w
ith
the raw
 coefficient of schooling. T
o d
o this, I w
ill reinterp
ret the rep
orted
 raw
 coefficients
w
ithin the fram
ew
ork of an enlarged
 m
od
el w
ith rate effects and
 technological d
iffu
sion as
d
escribed
 in B
ox 1 in the text. In this context, and
 u
nd
er the fu
rther assu
m
ption that cou
ntries
are reasonably close to their "technological stead
y states" relative to the w
orld
 frontier, the
coefficient of the schooling variables w
ill reflect both the stand
ard
 level effect and
 an
ad
d
itional term
 of the form
 γ/λ, w
here λ is the rate of technological d
iffu
sion. 40 T
he fou
rth
block of the table show
s the resu
lts of this calcu
lation, w
hich u
ses the valu
e of λ estim
ated
 by
d
e la Fuente and
 D
om
énech (2002).
T
ab
le A
.16: Im
m
ed
iate sou
rces of cross cou
n
try p
rod
u
ctivity d
ifferen
tials
1990, 21 O
EC
D
 countries
________________________________
contribution of:
physical 
capital
38.02%
schooling 
(level 
effect)
29.09%
total k +
 sch. level
67.11%
rest =
  due to T
FP
32.89%
________________________________
- N
ote: Shares of d
ifferent factors in observed
 relative prod
uctivity in a typical O
E
C
D
 country as d
efined
 in
B
ox 4 of D
&
C
 (2002). R
elative p
rod
u
ctivity is ou
tp
u
t p
er em
p
loyed
 w
orker in log d
ifferences w
ith its
(geom
etric) sam
ple average.
40 T
he d
etails of the requ
ired
 calcu
lations are as follow
s. L
et x be the relevant "raw
 coefficient" corrected
for m
easurem
ent error and assum
e for concreteness that w
e are interpreting this coefficient as
x = 
ρ1-α
k  + γλ
G
iven the assum
ed values of λ, ρ
 and α
k , w
e can solve for γ as
γ = λ
  
  
x - 
ρ1-α
k  
.
In the case of B
asanini and
 Scarpetta (2001), an ad
d
itional step is necessary. Since these au
thors u
se years
of schooling in logs rather than in levels (ie. s =
 ln S), the calculation just d
escribed
 w
ill yield
 an estim
ate of
the change in the rate of technical progress (g) ind
uced
 by a unit increase in log schooling, i.e. of ∂g
∂lnS  rather
than of γ w
hich is d
efined
 as ∂g∂S  . T
o recover the param
eter of interest, notice that
∂g∂S  = ∂g
∂lnS  dlnS
dS
 =  ∂g
∂lnS 1S
so w
e have to d
ivid
e the result of the first calculation by average years of schooling to recover γ.
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T
he valu
e of γ
  obtained
 in this m
anner ranges from
 0.18%
 in C
ohen and
 Soto (2001) to over
1%
 in Jones (1996) and
 B
arro (2000) and
 is equ
al to 0.37%
 for D
&
D
's (2002) average m
eta-
estim
ate of the hu
m
an cap
ital coefficient (not show
n in the table). Since som
e of these valu
es
are im
p
lau
sibly high, I w
ill attem
p
t to narrow
 d
ow
n this range of estim
ates by exam
ining the
im
p
lications of d
ifferent p
aram
eter valu
es for the im
p
ortance of rate effects from
 hu
m
an
cap
ital as a sou
rce of cross-cou
ntry d
ifferentials in relative levels of total factor p
rod
u
ctivity
(T
FP
) in an O
E
C
D
 sam
ple.
Figu
re A
.1: C
u
m
u
lative im
p
act of th
e rate effects from
 h
u
m
an
 cap
ital
as a %
 of th
e total con
trib
u
tion
 of T
FP
 to relative p
rod
u
ctivity
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
125%
0.0%
0.1%
0.2%
0.3%
0.4%
0.5%
0.6%
0.7%
rate effects param
eter
Su
btracting from
 observed
 relative p
rod
u
ctivity the contribu
tion of p
hysical cap
ital and
(the baseline estim
ate of) the level effects from
 hu
m
an cap
ital, I obtain the share of T
FP
 in
relative p
rod
u
ctivity for an average O
E
C
D
 cou
ntry w
hich, as show
n in T
able A
.16, is arou
nd
one third
. Figu
re A
.1 then p
lots the contribu
tion of rate effects to relative p
rod
u
ctivity as a
fraction
 
of 
th
e 
estim
ated
 
T
FP
 
sh
are. 41 A
 "large" valu
e of th
is ratio w
ill ren
d
er th
e
u
nd
erlying rate effects coefficient su
sp
ect. For instance, the find
ing that rate effects are
greater than observed
 total T
FP
 d
ifferences w
ou
ld
 im
ply that the com
ponent of T
FP
 levels not
related
 to hu
m
an cap
ital (e.g. that arising from
 d
ifferences in R
&
D
 investm
ent) w
ou
ld
 have
to be negatively correlated
 w
ith labou
r p
rod
u
ctivity w
hich seem
s u
nlikely. T
u
rning to Figu
re
A
.16, the exercise su
ggests that w
e shou
ld
 ru
le ou
t estim
ates of γ greater than 0.55%
, and
 that
valu
es of this p
aram
eter over 0.30%
 are u
nlikely becau
se they w
ou
ld
 im
p
ly that m
ore than
half of the observed
 cross-cou
ntry T
FP
 d
ifferentials are ind
u
ced
 by hu
m
an cap
ital. M
y choice
41
 See B
ox 4 in C
&
D
 (2002) for the d
etails of this calcu
lation.
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of 0.20%
 as the baseline valu
e for γ
 im
p
lies that rate effects accou
nt for a bit over a third
 of
observed
 T
FP
 d
ifferentials across O
E
C
D
 cou
ntries.
7. T
h
e rate of retu
rn
 on
 p
h
ysical cap
ital
T
he O
E
C
D
 p
u
blishes annu
al estim
ates of the rate of retu
rn to p
hysical cap
ital in the
bu
siness sector that are based
 on d
ata from
 its N
ational A
ccou
nts and
 (either national or
O
E
C
D
) estim
ates of the gross stock of non-resid
ential fixed
 cap
ital. T
he rate of retu
rn is
calcu
lated
 as the ratio of the gross op
erating su
rp
lu
s of enterp
rises (i.e. valu
e ad
d
ed
 m
inu
s
labou
r costs) to the stock of cap
ital valu
ed
 at rep
lacem
ent cost.
T
he O
E
C
D
 w
arns that its rate of retu
rn estim
ates su
ffer from
 a nu
m
ber of shortcom
ings.
First, the d
ata are not com
p
arable across cou
ntries becau
se there are im
p
ortant d
ifferences in
the assu
m
p
tions u
sed
 to constru
ct the cap
ital stock series, p
articu
larly in regard
 to the u
sefu
l
lives of d
ifferent typ
es of assets. 42  Second
, these estim
ates are likely to be biased
 u
p
w
ard
becau
se th
e n
u
m
erator in
clu
d
es th
e op
eratin
g su
rp
lu
s of th
e h
ou
sin
g sector, w
h
ereas
resid
ential capital is exclu
d
ed
 from
 the d
enom
inator. A
ccord
ing to the O
E
C
D
 (see the notes to
A
nnex T
ables 24 and
 25 in the 1998 E
conom
ic O
utlook), the available d
ata su
ggest that the
requ
ired
 correction w
ou
ld
 low
er the estim
ated
 rate of retu
rn by arou
nd
 three p
ercentage
p
oints. In ad
d
ition, I su
sp
ect that there m
ay be an ad
d
itional p
roblem
 that w
ill increase this
u
p
w
ard
 bias and
 also contribu
te to red
u
ce cross-cou
ntry com
p
arability. In p
rincip
le, the
m
easu
re of labou
r incom
e that is u
sed
 to calcu
late the gross op
erating su
rp
lu
s of enterp
rises
inclu
d
es the im
p
u
ted
 incom
e of self-em
p
loyed
 p
ersons, w
hich is calcu
lated
 by m
u
ltip
lying
the nu
m
ber of self-em
ployed
 (exclu
d
ing u
npaid
 fam
ily w
orkers) by an estim
ate of the average
w
age. For som
e cou
ntries, how
ever, there d
oes not seem
 to be any d
ata on self-em
p
loym
ent
u
ntil very recent years (see V
olu
m
e II of the O
E
C
D
's N
ational A
ccounts). I su
sp
ect, therefore,
that the gross op
erating su
rp
lu
s is significantly overstated
 in som
e cou
ntries (e.g. G
reece), bu
t
not in others.
G
iven these p
roblem
s, it seem
s clear that the O
E
C
D
 series on the rate of retu
rn on cap
ital
are not su
itable for ou
r p
u
rp
oses here. N
onetheless, a com
p
arison of its average valu
e across
cou
ntries w
ith that of ou
r p
rod
u
ction-fu
nction estim
ates m
ay still be inform
ative. T
able A
.17
show
s the average rate of retu
rn in the O
E
C
D
 series, calcu
lated
 over d
ifferent p
eriod
s,
together w
ith m
y ow
n estim
ates of the m
arginal p
rod
u
ct of cap
ital. (N
otice that since this is
a gross rate of retu
rn in w
hich no allow
ance is m
ad
e for d
epreciation, it is rou
ghly com
parable
to m
y p
rod
u
ction-fu
nction based
 estim
ate of the m
arginal p
rod
u
ct of cap
ital, rather than
w
ith m
y m
easure of net returns).
42
 For instance, K
eese, Salou
 and
 R
ichard
son (1991) rep
ort that for the 1980's the assu
m
ed
 u
sefu
l life of
stru
ctu
res ranged
 from
 30 to 72 years and
 that of p
lant and
 equ
ip
m
ent from
 10 to 24 years in a set of 10
countries that constructed
 capital stock estim
ates.
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Since the average valu
es of the tw
o series are very sim
ilar, I conclu
d
e that m
y ow
n d
irect
estim
ates of the rate of retu
rn on p
hysical cap
ital are also likely to be biased
 u
p
w
ard
. I
constru
ct a rou
gh m
easu
re of the likely bias by relying on a carefu
l stu
d
y by P
oterba (1987)
w
hich m
akes u
se of revised
 B
E
A
 d
ata for the U
S. H
is estim
ate of the aveage p
re-tax net rate
of retu
rn on non-financial corp
orate cap
ital over the p
eriod
 1959-86 is 8.5%
 (w
ith som
e
oscillations bu
t w
ithou
t a clear trend
). D
ivid
ing this nu
m
ber by m
y original estim
ate of the
rate of retu
rn to p
hysical cap
ital in the U
S (w
hich is 11.32%
 after correcting for d
ep
reciation
and
 technical p
rogress) I obtain an ad
ju
stm
ent coefficient of 0.751 w
hich is u
sed
 to constru
ct
the ad
ju
sted
 estim
ate of the retu
rn on p
hysical cap
ital that is u
sed
 in section 4d
 of the text.
T
ab
le A
.17: A
ltern
ative estim
ates of th
e gross retu
rn
 on
 p
h
ysical cap
ital
________________________________________________________
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
source:
O
E
C
D
O
E
C
D
O
E
C
D
D
&
D
 (2002)
period:
1981-97
1985-97
1988-97
1990
A
u
stria
13.71%
13.84%
13.18%
B
elgiu
m
13.19%
13.71%
13.85%
13.44%
D
en
m
ark
7.90%
10.26%
F
in
lan
d
8.52%
8.52%
8.57%
9.28%
F
ran
ce
14.25%
15.00%
15.41%
13.04%
G
erm
an
y
12.56%
12.95%
13.15%
11.96%
G
reece
22.83%
22.78%
23.41%
13.00%
Irelan
d
9.57%
10.72%
11.81%
14.93%
Italy
13.73%
14.33%
14.54%
12.15%
N
etherlan
ds
17.96%
12.80%
P
ortu
gal
16.40%
S
pain
16.45%
17.64%
18.28%
14.79%
S
w
eden
11.04%
11.38%
11.60%
12.09%
U
K
9.24%
9.43%
9.44%
16.14%
avge. E
U
14
13.14%
13.65%
13.83%
13.10%
period:
1981-96
1985-96
1988-96
1990
U
S
16.56%
17.36%
17.74%
14.82%
________________________________________________________
- Sources: the O
E
C
D
 series are taken from
 the 1998 E
conom
ic O
u
tlook except for the case of the U
S, as the
series for this country had been discontinued by then due to changes in the m
ethodology used by the BEA
 to
construct the und
erlying d
ata. For the U
S I use the O
E
C
D
 series as reported
 in Poterba (1997). C
olum
n [4] is
the m
arginal p
rod
u
ct of cap
ital calcu
lated
 u
sing the p
rod
u
ction fu
nction estim
ated
 in d
e la Fu
ente and
D
om
énech (2002) and
 their output and
 capital stock series.
8. R
econ
cilin
g m
icro an
d
 m
acro estim
ates of th
e retu
rn
s to sch
oolin
g: a sim
p
le m
od
el 43
A
ssum
e all firm
s in a given country have access to a constant returns prod
uction function of
the form(1)  Y
 =
 A
K
α
kE
α
hL 1-α
k -α
h
43
 T
his section is taken from
 d
e la Fuente (2003). It ow
es a lot to m
y conversations w
ith A
ntonio C
iccone.
T
he d
erivation of the w
age sched
ule, in particular, is his.
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w
here E
 is the total stock of hu
m
an cap
ital of the relevant p
rod
u
ction u
nit and
 L
 its total
em
p
loym
ent, given resp
ectively by
(2) E
 =
 ∑
 Li H
i
(3) L =
 ∑
 Li
w
here L
i  is the nu
m
ber of w
orkers w
ith a stock of hu
m
an cap
ital equ
al to H
i . Since the
p
rod
u
ction fu
nction d
isp
lays constant retu
rns to scale, firm
 size w
ill be ind
eterm
inate (as in
m
ost grow
th m
od
els), bu
t all firm
s w
ill p
rod
u
ce in equ
ilibriu
m
 u
sing the sam
e factor ratios,
w
h
ich
 w
ill coin
cid
e w
ith
 aggregate factor ratios an
d
 th
u
s m
ake for d
irect an
d
 easy
aggregation. I w
ill follow
 the stand
ard
 p
roced
u
re and
 w
ork w
ith a "rep
resentative firm
"
that behaves com
p
etitively, (that is, I w
ill im
p
licitly assu
m
e that there is a large nu
m
ber of
su
ch firm
s in the econom
y and
 that they all behave as p
rice-takers).
L
et u
s first consid
er the resp
onse of aggregate p
rod
u
ctivity to an increase in the average
stock of hu
m
an cap
ital, w
hich is w
hat ou
r m
acroeconom
ic grow
th equ
ations p
resu
m
ably
cap
tu
re. L
et H
 d
enote the average stock of hu
m
an cap
ital and
 Z
 the cap
ital/
labou
r ratio, ie.
(4) H
 =
 EL
  =
   ∑
 Li H
i
L
       and   Z
 =  KL
and
 observe that average labou
r prod
u
ctivity Q
 =
 Y
/L can be w
ritten in the form
(5) Q
 =
 A
Z
α
kH
α
h
or, in logarithm
s
(6) q =
 a +
 α
k z +
 α
h h.
H
ence, the elasticity of aggregate labou
r p
rod
u
ctivity w
ith resp
ect to the average stock of
hu
m
an cap
ital is given, as w
e alread
y knew
, by α
h .
C
onsid
er now
 a rep
resentative firm
, say f, and
 w
rite its p
rod
u
ction fu
nction (w
hich is
id
entical to the aggregate one) in the form
(7)  Y
f  =
 A
K
f α
kE
f α
hL
f 1-α
k -α
h =
 Lf A
Z
f α
kH
f α
h=
L
f Q
f
W
e w
ill assu
m
e th
at p
h
ysical cap
ital is trad
ed
 in
 a com
p
etitive m
arket. Settin
g th
e
m
arginal p
rod
u
ct of cap
ital equ
al to its rental rate, R
, it is easy to check that the op
tim
al
cap
ital/
labou
r ratio for the firm
 is given by
(8) Z
f * =
 
  
   αAR    1/(1-α
k )H
f α
h /(1-α
k )
Su
bstitu
ting this back into the firm
's p
rod
u
ction fu
nction w
ritten in intentive form
, w
e see
that the firm
's average p
rod
u
ctivity is given by
(9) Q
f  =
 A
  
   αAR    α
k /(1-α
k )H
f α
k α
h /(1-α
k ) H
f α
h=
 Γ
(R
, A
)H
f α
h /(1-α
k )
w
here Γ
(R
, A
) is an exogenou
s constant from
 the point of view
 of the firm
 bu
t d
epend
s on the
equ
ilibriu
m
 rental rate of cap
ital. In logs, w
e have
(10) qf  =
 γ(R
, A
) +
 
α
h
1-α
K
   hf
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H
ence, the p
artial equ
ilibriu
m
 (firm
-level) elasticity of average p
rod
u
ctivity w
ith resp
ect
to hu
m
an cap
ital is larger than its general equ
ilibriu
m
 (aggregate level) cou
nterp
art. U
nd
er
ou
r assu
m
p
tions, a p
rod
u
ctivity regression w
ith firm
-level d
ata w
ou
ld
 overestim
ate the
retu
rns to ed
u
cation u
nless it is corrected
 for the effects of a greater d
em
and
 for p
hysical
cap
ital. Figu
re A
.2 illu
strates the situ
ation: if w
e d
raw
 Q
 as a fu
nction of H
 and
 Q
f  as a
fu
nction of H
f  for a rep
resentative firm
 on the sam
e set of axis, the tw
o fu
nctions w
ill cross at
the p
oint w
here H
f  =
 H
 (w
hich corresp
ond
s to the equ
ilibriu
m
), bu
t the firm
-level p
rod
u
ction
fu
nction w
ill be steep
er than the aggregate one. A
n increase in H
f  hold
ing H
 constant w
ill
increase the firm
's p
rod
u
ctivity by m
ore than a sim
ilar increase in H
 w
ill increase aggregate
p
rod
u
ctivity becau
se the firm
 is not constrained
 by the fixed
 aggregate su
p
p
ly of cap
ital.
Figu
re A
.2: Firm
 an
d
 aggregate-level p
rod
u
ction
 fu
n
ction
s
firmaggregate
  Q
Q
f ,
  H
f ,H
Finally, w
e w
ill consid
er the resp
onse of w
ages to hu
m
an cap
ital in this setting. If w
orkers
are p
aid
 their m
arginal p
rod
u
cts, the w
age of a w
orker w
ith hu
m
an cap
ital H
i  w
ill be given
by
(11) W
(H
i ) =
 ∂Y
f
∂L
i   =
 A
K
f α
kα
h E
f α
h -1H
i L
f 1-α
k -α
h +
 A
K
f α
kE
f α
h(1-α
k -α
h )Lf -α
k -α
h
=
 α
h H
i
H
f   Q
f   +
 (1-α
k -α
h )Q
f  =
  (1-α
k )Q
f +
 α
h
  
  
 H
i
H
f  - 1
  Q
f
N
otice that the w
age increases linearly w
ith the w
orker's stock of hu
m
an cap
ital (since Q
f
and
 H
f  can be treated
 as exogenou
s constants from
 his p
ersp
ective). H
ence, at the ind
ivid
u
al
level there are no d
ecreasing retu
rns to hu
m
an cap
ital. T
his im
p
lies that the coefficient of a
w
age equ
ation w
ith d
ata at the ind
ivid
u
al level w
ill, in the absence of the p
rop
er correction,
overestim
ate the m
acro returns to ed
ucation even m
ore than equation (10) w
ould
.
T
o d
raw
 the w
age sched
u
le, notice that
(12) W
(0) =
 (1-α
k -α
h )Q
f
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(13) W
(H
f ) =
 (1-α
k )Q
f
so the w
age fu
nction W
() has a p
ositive vertical intercep
t that corresp
ond
s to the w
age p
aid
to the w
orker w
ith no hu
m
an capital and
 interesects the fu
nction
(14) g(H
) =
  (1-α
k )Q
f  =
 (1-α
k )Γ
(R
, A
)H
α
h /(1-α
k )
(w
here Q
f  is given by the red
u
ced
 form
 firm
-level p
rod
u
ction fu
nction d
erived
 above) w
hen
H
i  is equ
al to the average stock of hu
m
an cap
ital. In fact, W
() is tangent to this fu
nction at
H
f , forg'(H
f ) =
 (1-α
k )Γ
(R
, A
)
α
h
1-α
k    H
f (α
h /(1-α
k ))−1 =
 α
h  Q
f
H
f     =
 W
'(H
f )
Figu
re A
.3: Firm
-level p
rod
u
ction
 fu
n
ction
 an
d
 w
age sch
ed
u
le
  H
H
i
f
,
  W
(H
i )
  (
)
1
−
α
k
f
Q
If hu
m
an cap
ital (H
) is related
 to schooling (S) by H
 =
 e θS, equ
ation (11) com
es very close
to being a stand
ard
 m
incerian w
age equ
ation. If w
e rew
rite it as
W
(H
i ) - W
(0) =
  α
h Q
f  
H
f   e θSi
and
 take logarithm
s, w
e have
ln (
)
W
(H
i ) - W
(0)
 = c + θSi
so one ad
d
itional year of schooling w
ill increase by θ%
 the p
rem
iu
m
 over the w
age p
aid
 to a
w
orker w
ith no hu
m
an cap
ital. T
o recover the exact M
incerian sp
ecification, w
e need
 to
assu
m
e fu
rther that α
h  =
 1-α
k , i.e. that "raw
 labou
r" L d
oes not enter the p
rod
u
ction fu
nction
as a sep
arate inp
u
t. In that case W
(0) =
 0 (an
d
 th
e red
u
ced
-form
 firm
-level p
rod
u
ction
fu
nction is itself linear and
 coincid
es w
ith the w
age sched
u
le, w
hich now
 goes throu
gh the
origin). N
otice that in this case the stand
ard
 w
age equ
ation w
ill yield
 an estim
ate of θ
w
hich w
ill have to be m
u
ltip
lied
 by α
h  =
 1-α
k  to obtain the valu
e of ρ. If this assu
m
p
tion d
oes
not hold
, (the M
incerian equ
ation w
ill be m
issp
ecified
 and
) the p
reviou
s ad
ju
stm
ent w
ill be
only an ap
p
roxim
ation.
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